Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-fscjk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T06:58:49.896Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Skeptical theism and Skepticism About the External World and Past

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2017

Stephen Law
Stephen Law*
Affiliation:
Heythrop College, University of London
*
think@royalinstitutephilosophy.org
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Skeptical theism is a popular - if not universally theistically endorsed - response to the evidential problem of evil. Skeptical theists question how we can be in a position to know God lacks God-justifying reason to allow the evils we observe. In this paper I examine a criticism of skeptical theism: that the skeptical theists skepticism re divine reasons entails that, similarly, we cannot know God lacks God-justifying reason to deceive us about the external world and the past. This in turn seems to supply us with a defeater for all our beliefs regarding the external world and past? Critics argue that either the skeptical theist abandon their skeptical theism, thereby resurrecting the evidential argument from evil, or else they must embrace seemingly absurd skeptical consequences, including skepticism about the external world and past. I look at various skeptical theist responses to this critique and find them all wanting.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 81: Religious Epistemology , October 2017 , pp. 55 - 70
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2017 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Wykstra dubbed such arguments ‘noseeum’ inferences. See his ‘Rowe's noseeum arguments from evil’ in Howard-Snyder, D., (ed.) The Evidential Argument from Evil (Indiana: Indiana University Free Press, 1996) 126–50Google Scholar.

2 I note in passing that a version of the evidential argument from evil might still succeed even if the claim that gratuitous evil exists cannot be justified. Suppose that for a belief to be justified, it's epistemic probability must be at least 0.85 (if one bullet is placed in six chamber revolver, the chamber is spun and the gun about to be fired, the probability it won't fire is 0.85, but intuitively I am not justified in thinking the gun won't fire). But then suppose the probability that gratuitous evil exists is 0.84. Then the probability that gratuitous evil exists is not sufficient for belief that it exists to be justified. Nevertheless, a probability of 0.84 is sufficient to lower theism's probability below credibility. My thanks to Trent Dougherty for flagging this.

3 A. Plantinga, ‘Epistemic probability and evil’, in D. Howard-Snyder (ed.) op cit. 1996, 69–96, 73.

4 Bergmann, M., ‘Commonsense skeptical theism’ in Clark, K. and Rea, M. (eds.) Science, Religion, and Metaphysics: New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 9–30 Google Scholar, 11.

5 McBrayer, J. and Swenson, P. ‘Skepticism and the argument from divine hiddenness’, Religious Studies 48 (2012), 129–150 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 McBrayer and Swenson (2012) op cit.

7 Bergmann, M., ‘Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil’ in Flint, T. and Rea, M. (eds.) Oxford Handbook to Philosophical Theology, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 374–399 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 Bergmann, (2009) op cit.

9 M. Lasonen Aarnio, M. ‘Unreasonable Knowledge’, Philosophical Perspectives, 24 (2010) 1–21 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 Laasonen Aarnio (2010) op cit. 2.

11 M. Bergmann (2012) op cit. 10.

12 M. Bergmann (2012) op cit. 15.

13 J. Beaudoin, J. ‘Skepticism and the skeptical theist’, Faith and Philosophy, 22 (2005) 42–56 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 Beaudoin 2005 op cit. 44.

15 Beaudoin 2005, op cit. 45.

16 I previously used this example in Law, S., ‘The Pandora's Box Objection to Skeptical Theism’ in International Journal of Religious Studies, 78 (2015) 285–299 Google Scholar.

17 Maitzen, S., S. Skeptical theism and moral obligation. International Journal of the Philosophy of Religion, 65 (2009) 93–103 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 S. Maitzen, op cit. 97.

19 Haldane, E., E, and Ross, G.R.T. (trans.), The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967) 78 Google Scholar.