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A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Michael Tye
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There is widespread agreement that consciousness must be a physical phenomenon, even if it is one that we do not yet understand and perhaps may never do so fully. There is also widespread agreement that the way to defend physicalism about consciousness against a variety of well known objections is by appeal to phenomenal concepts (Loar, 1990; Lycan, 1996; Papineau, 1993; Sturgeon, 1994; Tye, 1995, 2000; Perry, 2001). There is, alas, no agreement on the nature of phenomenal concepts.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 53 , September 2003 , pp. 91 - 105
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2003

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