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VI. Emotional Feelings and Intentionalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Anthony Hatzimoysis
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Extract

Emotions are Janus-faced: their focus may switch from how a person is feeling deep inside her, to the busy world of actions, words, or gestures whose perception currently affects her. The intimate relation between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ seems to call for a redrawing of the traditional distinction of mental states between those that can look out to the world, and those that are, supposedly, irredeemably blind.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 52 , March 2003 , pp. 105 - 111
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2003

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References

Byrne, Alex 2002. ‘Intentionalism Defended’, Philosophical Review.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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