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Models of Science: Fictions or Idealizations?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 September 2008

Yemima Ben-Menahem
Yemima Ben-Menahem
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy of ScienceThe Hebrew University of Jerusalem
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Abstract

Idealizations and approximations are an indispensable tool for the scientist. This paper argues that idealizations and approximations are equally indispensable for the philosopher of science. In particular, it is shown that the deductive model of scientific theories is an idealization in precisely the same sense that frictionless motion is an idealization in mechanics. By its very nature, an idealization cannot be criticized as not being absolutely true to the facts, for it need not be. Thus, the usual type of criticism levelled against the deductive model is shown to be irrelevant. The main step in the argument consists in using a logic of approximation to clarify the notions of approximate implication and approximate entailment, which are usually rejected as hopelessly vague. More generally, the conception underlying the paper is that the desiderata of science should be formulated in such a way that complying with them could be a matter of degree, and that pragmatic considerations could be taken into account. This conception is motivated by the wish to introduce some quantitative concepts in the philosophy of science, thereby bringing the philosopher's perspective closer to that of the scientist.

Type
Article
Information
Science in Context , Volume 2 , Issue 1 , Spring 1988 , pp. 163 - 175
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1988

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