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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 February 2009
In the continuing discussion between Christian theology and linguistic philosophy there is a fundamental division of the theological responses which has weighty implications for the whole encounter between the two disciplines. This basic distinction into two types of Christian response is one of those simple categorisations which by their very obviousness are often overlooked. I refer to two kinds of Christian thinkers who deal with linguistic analysis: the ‘non-metaphysical’ and the ‘metaphysical’. In this article I have chosen to discuss certain types of the ‘non-metaphysical’ response.
Whether a Christian theologian deals with Oxford philosophy from a metaphysical or a non-metaphysical perspective is vital to the whole discussion. It is vital to the theologian because linguistic analysis is the latest in a series of philosophical movements beginning with Hume which claim to have undermined metaphysics finally and forever. If the theologian responds in a metaphysical way to the questions asked by the Oxford philosophers, he must justify his appeal to metaphysics over against the critique of metaphysics which lies behind language analysis. If, on the other hand, the theologian replies in a non-metaphysical way, he must demonstrate the epistemological significance of Christian doctrine apart from metaphysical support.
The major contemporary criticisms of theological language come not from language analysis considered independently but from a revitalised logical positivism aided by analytical methods. I call this ‘new’ positivism ‘linguistic empiricism’ or ‘analytical positivism’. Linguistic analysis is fundamentally a method, while positivism is a theory of knowledge.
page 12 note 1 Barth, Karl, Church Dogmatics, I, 1, tr. Thomson, G. T. and Knight, Harold (Edinburgh, 1956), pp. 141–142Google Scholar.
page 12 note 2 Bonhoeffer, Dietrich called it a ‘positivism of revelation’, Letters and Papers from Prison, tr. Fuller, R. H. (London, 1953), p. 148Google Scholar.
page 12 note 3 London, 1955.
page 12 note 4 ibid., pp. 99–103.
page 13 note 1 ibid., p. 108.
page 13 note 2 I am aware that Maclntyre is no longer a Christian. However, for the purposes of this article I am considering only his Christian writings.
page 14 note 1 Miles, T. R., Religion and the Scientific Outlook (London, 1959), p 162Google Scholar.
page 14 note 2 ibid., pp. 161–2.
page 14 note 3 Maclntyre, Alasdair, ed., Metaphysical Beliefs (London, 1957), p. 85Google Scholar.
page 14 note 4 Maclntyre's critique of the classical ‘proofs’ for God's existence is one of the strong points of his little book Difficulties in Christian Belief (London, 1959)Google Scholar.
page 15 note 1 Metaphysical Beliefs, p. 211.
page 15 note 2 Ramsey, Ian T., Religious Language (London, 1957), p. 90Google Scholar.
page 15 note 3 ibid., p. 90.
page 16 note 1 ibid., p. 37.
page 16 note 2 ibid., p. 38.
page 17 note 1 ibid., p. 185.
page 17 note 2 Ramsey, Ian T., ed., Prospect for Metaphysics (London, 1961), p. 174Google Scholar.
page 17 note 3 Hepburn, Ronald W., Christianity and Paradox (London, 1958)Google Scholar.
page 18 note 1 ibid., pp. 192–3.
page 18 note 2 Miles, op. cit., p. 165.
page 19 note 1 Barth, Karl, The Humanity of God (London, 1961), pp. 58–59Google Scholar; here, in brief compass, Barth criticises both linguistic analysis and the Bonhoeffer of Letters and Papers.
page 19 note 2 Two recent examples on the British scene are Mascall's, EricWords and Images (New York, 1957)Google Scholar from a Thomist perspective; and Cleobury's, F. H.Christian Rationalism and Philosophical Analysis (London, 1959)Google Scholar, which restates the case for personal idealism.