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The Oil Deal: Nariman Narimanov and the Sovietization of Azerbaijan

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2017

Sara Brinegar
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Abstract

This essay, with a focus on Baku, Azerbaijan, demonstrates that the need to secure and hold energy resources—and the infrastructures that support them—was critical to the formation of the Soviet Union. The Azerbaijani statesman Nariman Narimanov played a pivotal role in the establishment of Soviet power in Azerbaijan by attempting to use Baku's oil to secure prerogatives for the Azerbaijan SSR. In part, Narimanov gained his position by striking a deal with Vladimir Lenin in 1920, an arrangement that I am calling the oil deal. This deal lay the foundations of Soviet power in the south Caucasus. Lenin charged Narimanov with facilitating connections between the industrial stronghold of Baku and the rural countryside of Azerbaijan and Narimanov agreed to do what he could to help supply Soviet Russia with oil. Lenin put Narimanov in charge of the Soviet government of Azerbaijan, with the understanding that he would be granted significant leeway in cultural policies. Understanding the role of the south Caucasus in Soviet history, then, is also understanding how the extraction and use of oil and other natural resources were entangled with more familiar questions of nationalities policy and identity politics.

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Slavic Review , Volume 76 , Issue 2 , Summer 2017 , pp. 372 - 394
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Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies 2017 

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References

1. Baberowski, Jörg, Vrag est' vezde: Stalinizm na Kavkaze, trans. Altukhova, V. T. (Moscow, 2010), 230–31, 264Google Scholar.

2. Serebrovskii's meeting with Lenin see, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Ekonomiki, (RGAE), fond (f.) 270, opis' (op.) 1, delo (d.) 8, list (l.) 53ob (Documents and recollections of A.P. Serebrovskii). For a copy of his mandate see, RGAE, f. 270, op. 1, d. 7, l. 17 (Documents on the activities of A.P Serebrovksii identified by the fond TsGANKh SSSR).

3. Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial'no-polioticheskoi Istorii (RGASPI), f. 64, op.1, d. 90, ll. 19–20 (Stenographic record and protocol of the meeting of the first plenum of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party (b), August 1921).

4. Gasanly, Dzhamil' P., Vneshiaia politika Azerbaidzhana v gody sovetskoi vlasti (1920–1939), vol. 2, Istoriia diplomatii Azerbaidzhanksoi Respubliki: V trekh tomakh, trans. Razaeva, I. N. (Moscow, 2013) 13Google Scholar; Baberowski, Vrag est' vezde, 230.

5. The most thorough treatment remains, Suny, Ronald Grigor, The Baku Commune, 1917–1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution (Princeton, 1972)Google Scholar.

6. On Muslim communism and Narimanov, Feldman, Leah, “Red Jihad: Translating Communism in the Muslim Caucasus,” Boundary 2 43, no. 3 (August 2016): 221–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On Narimanov's cultural milieu, see Aimee Dobbs, “Negotiating Modern Education for Muslims: Contestation and Compromise among Russian Imperial Bureaucrats, Local Administrators, and Azerbaijani Turkish Elites, 1867–1900,” (PhD diss., Indiana University, forthcoming 2017). For the reformist movement in Central Asia, see Khalid, Adeeb, The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia (Berkeley, 1998)Google Scholar and Khalid, Adeeb, Making Uzbekistan: Nation, Empire, and Revolution in the Early USSR (Ithaca, 2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Also see Morrison's, Alexander review essay “Muslims and Modernity in the Russian Empire,” The Slavonic and East European Review 94, no. 4 (October 2016): 715–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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8. Narimanov references his arrangement with Lenin frequently, for one just example, RGASPI, f. 64, op.1, d. 90, ll. 19–20; Baberowski, Vrag est' vezde, 230–31, 264–65. While there is a consensus that Narimanov had a particular mission in Azerbaijan from Lenin, it has not been discussed in terms of a deal or pact. There is a preponderance of evidence, however, that Narimanov understood his arrangement with Lenin as a deal and behaved as if that was the case.

9. This observation was made by Benjamin Loring about Central Asia but it applies here as well, Loring, Benjamin, “‘Colonizers with Party Cards’: Soviet Internal Colonialism in Central Asia, 1917–1939,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 15, no.1 (Winter 2014): 77–102 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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11. A copy of his manifesto can be found in RGASPI, f. 588, op. 2, d. 176, ll. 2–39 (On the history of our revolution in the provinces). First published version, Narimanov, Nariman, K istorii nashei revoliutsii v okrainakh (Baku, 1990)Google Scholar.

12. Igolkin, Aleksandr Alekseevich, Otechestvennaia neftianaia promyshlennost' v 1917–1920 godakh (Moscow, 1999), 112–13Google Scholar.

13. That the oil industry was not connected to the countryside, Nicholas Lund, “At the Center of the Periphery: Oil, Land, and Power in Baku, 1905–1917” “PhD diss., Stanford University, 2013); Suny, The Baku Commune, 293–300.

14. The Baku Commune was established on the heels of a series of massacres by Armenian nationalists against Muslims and marked by a series of massacres after its collapse by Muslims, aided by the Ottoman Army, against Armenians. Smith, Michael G., “Power and Violence in the Russian Revolution: The March Events and Baku Commune of 1918,” Russian History 41, no. 2 (2014): 197–210 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rustamova-Togidi, Solmaz, ed., Mart 1918 g., Baku: Azerbaidzhanskie pogromy v dokumentakh (Baku, 2009)Google Scholar; Suny, The Baku Commune, 214–33; Dzhamil' Gasanly, Russkaia revoliutsiia i Azerbaidzhan: Trudnyi put' k nezavisimosti, 1917–1920 (Moscow, 2011), 100–27Google Scholar.

15. In September 1918, Turkish troops occupied Baku, leaving in November. British troops entered the same day (Nov 17) and stayed until August 24, 1919, Igolkin, A. A. and Gorzhaltsan, Iu., eds., Russkaia neft' o kotoroi my tak malo znaem (Moscow, 2003), 152–64Google Scholar. On the various interventions, see Kazemzadeh, Firuz, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 1917–1921 (New York, 1951)Google Scholar; Swietochowski, Tadeusz, Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920: The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community (Cambridge, Eng., 1985), 129–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16. RGASPI, f. 588, op. 2, d. 177, ll. 244–46 (A short history of the Azerbaijan “Gummet” party); Swietochowski, Tadeusz, “The Himmät Party: Socialism and the National Question in Russian Azerbaijan, 1904–1920,” Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique 19, no. 1–2, (Jan–Jun 1978): 119–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17. For an overview of Narimanov's biography up to 1920 see, Baberowski, Vrag est' vezde, 219–34.

18. The Adalat directly tied socialism to Islam. Dailami, Pezhmann, “The First Congress of the Peoples of the East and the Iranian Soviet Republic of Gilan, 1920–21” in Cronin, Stephanie, ed., Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran (New York, 2004), 89Google Scholar. See also Feldman, “Red Jihad,” 228–34.

19. Narimanov, Izbrannye, “Vzgliad na zakhvat kavkaza,” 2:185–96; also see Narimanov, Izbrannye, “S kakim lozungom my idem na Kavkaz,” 2:176–85.

20. Narimanov, Izbrannye, “Vzgliad na zakhvat kavkaza,” 2:185–96.

21. Narimanov, Izbrannye, 2:189.

22. Debo, Richard K., Survival and Consolidation: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1918–1921 (Montreal, 1992), 179–80Google Scholar.

23. This was reiterated by Ordzhonikidze, RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 25, l. 1. (The correspondence of G.K. Ordzhonikidze with party committees, soviets, military organizations, Sept 1920–1921).

24. Baberowski, Vrag est' vezde, 229. Narimanov lobbied consistently for Moscow to pursue an active policy in Iran. See, Izbrannye, 239; 253–56. For more on this, see Swietochowski, Russian Azerbaijan, 168–72; Dailami, “The First Congress,” 91–94.

25. He advocated for Azerbaijan to become part of the RSFSR in 1919, but was overruled and seems to have changed his mind later. Baberowski, Vrag est' vezde, 229–30.

26. Ibid., 232–33.

27. Narimanov, Izbrannye, 2:269. For more on how he viewed his role see, Ibid., 253, 255, 257.

28. For the various posts see, Naidel', M. I., ed., Dekrety Azrevkoma, 1920–21: Sbornik dokumentov, (Baku, 1988), 13–14 Google Scholar.

29. These requests continued until the final invasions. For example, Kvashonkin, A.V. et al. ., eds., Bol'shevistskoe rukovodstvo: Perepiska, 1912–1927 (Moscow, 1996), 174–75Google Scholar.

30. Batumi was occupied by the Ottomans and then granted to the Bolsheviks by Kemal Ataturk after the Soviets guaranteed the Muslim population of the city autonomy.

31. RGASPI, f. 64, op. 1, d. 90, l. 53; RGASPI f. 85, op. 5, d. 52, ll. 35–39 (Report by comrade Ordzhonikidze at a meeting of Caucasian party workers). Also, Genis, Vladimir, Krasnaia Persiia: Bol'shevkiki v Giliane. 1920–1921: Dokumental'naia khronika (Moscow, 2000), 77Google Scholar; On Trotskii see, Suny, Ronald Grigor, The Making of the Georgian Nation (Bloomington, 1994), 210Google Scholar.

32. Kharmandarian, Segvard Vagarshakhovich, Lenin i stanovlenie zakavkazskoi federatsii, 1921–1923 (Yerevan, 1969), 46–47 Google Scholar.

33. RGASPI, f. 85, op. 5, d. 52, ll. 35–37.

34. The official report can be found in RGASPI, f. 85, op. 13, d.34 (Report to the representative of the Central Bureau of the Turkish Communist organization M. Subkhi to the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party with a copy to Ordzhonikidze on the results of the tour through Ganja, on the reasons for the uprising, etc.).

35. RGASPI, f. 85, op. 13, d.34, ll. 2–3.

36. RGASPI, f. 85, op.13, d. 26, l. 1 (Telegram from the Caucasian Command V. Gittis and others to the Head of the XI Army about the necessity of reliable supply and retention of the Baku region, oil fields and installations, etc.).

37. RGASPI, f. 85, op. 13, d. 27, l. 6 (Telegrams to V.I. Lenin, Trotskii, and Kamenev on the suppression of the Ganja uprising, etc.).

38. Baberowski, Vrag est' vezde, 259.

39. Narimanov, Izbrannye, 2:286–89. “Provokatsiia Müsavata i Dashnakov,” May 31, 1920.

40. Ibid. and Baberowski, Vrag est' vezde, 259.

41. The invasions of Armenia and Georgia have a different trajectory than that of Azerbaijan and are part of a wider history that involves several negotiations with Turkey.

42. RGASPI, f. 85, op. 5, d. 46, l. 6 (Transcript of the plenum of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party).

43. RGASPI, f. 588, op. 2, d. 176, ll. 28–29.

44. RGASPI, f. 85, op. 13, d. 12, l. 101 (Ordzhonikidze G.K., Kirov, S.M. Radiogram addressed to V.I. Lenin with reports about establishment of Soviet power in Baku, etc.); also, Gasanly, Vneshiaia politika Azerbaidzhana, 27. I should note that I disagree with Gasanly's interpretation of Narimanov's role. He believed that Narimanov had no influence and was merely a decoration for the Russians but this does not explain why Moscow supported and promoted him over a period of years. Nor does it explain the constant meetings, committees, petitions, and investigations surrounding Narimanov and the turbulence within the Azerbaijan Communist Party.

45. The Azerbaijan Oil Committee was actually made up of five members who worked in concert, despite Serebrovskii's mandate. He assumed full control over Azneft' in September 1921. Furthermore, he had no control over the distribution of oil products, giving him, according to Igolkin “no real economic power.” The relationship was far more complicated than Narimanov appreciated, see Igolkin, Otechestvennaia, 118.

46. This was amended several times to give Azneft' and Serebrovskii more direct control over the industry, including the right to barter oil products for supplies and food. Igolkin, Otechestvenaia, 130–31.

47. Krasnyi Baku. Organ Bakinskogo Soveta (Red Baku. An organ of the Baku Soviet), Jan-Feb, No 1-2 (6-7) date unknown, either 1922 or 1923, 33–34; these disputes was addressed repeatedly in Krasnyi Baku, see, No 3 (8) 1924, 15-17; No 8 1924, 22-25 (although both volumes are marked No 8 1924 their contents differ); No 4 (9) 1924, 8-14; No 9, 1925, 5-11. This type of relationship would also have been present in such places as the Donbas, Ukraine SRR, where the Coal Trust Donugl' also had All-Union status, or in Central Asia with cotton production.

48. Azörbaycan Respublikası Dövlət Arxivi (State Archive of the Republic of Azerbaijan) (ARDA) f. 411, op. 1, d. 98, l. 12 (Protocol of the meetings with VES about forming an oil committee 1922). The agreement was frequently amended and updated. In December 1923, the Azerbaijan Sovnarkom conceded the rights to the Oil Fund to the Transcaucasian Federation Ekonompredstavitel'stvo. For more on the origins of the Oil Fund see, Jabbarov, Farhad, Bakinskaia neft' v politike sovetskoi Rossii (1917–1922 gg.) (Baku, 2009), 139–49Google Scholar.

49. Kharmandarian, Lenin i stanovlenie, 96–97, 127.

50. Menteshashvili, Avtandil Mikhailovich, Bol'shevistskaia pressa Zakavkaz'ia v bor'be za obrazovanie zakavkazskoi federatsii i Soiuza SSR (1921–1922 gg.) (Tbilisi, 1972), 22Google Scholar. The details of the proposed unification are not listed, but was likely economic in basis. There is a large literature on the unification, to name only a few: Garibdzhanian, Gevorg Bagratovich, V.I. Lenin i bol'sheviki Zakavkaz'ia (Moscow, 1971)Google Scholar; Kharmandarian, Lenin i stanovlenie. For an overview see, Blank, Stephen, “Bolshevik Organizational Development in Early Soviet Transcaucasia: Autonomy vs Centralization, 1918–1924,” in Suny, Ronald G., ed., Transcaucasia, Nationalism and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (Ann Arbor, 1983), 305–38Google Scholar.

51. Kharmandarian, Lenin i stanovlenie, 127.

52. RGASPI, f. 85, op. 5, d. 46, l. 1. As last as January 1921, Ordzhonikidze was still unsure that the Red Army could hold Baku; Kvashonkin, Bol'shevistskoe rukovodstvo, 178–79.

53. RGASPI, f. 86, op. 5, d. 46, l. 1.

54. Menteshashvili, Bol'shevistskaia pressa, 21. He is quoting Lenin's telegram to Ordzhonikidze. The transcript of the telegram can be found in RGASPI, f. 85, op. 5, d. 46, ll. 1–31.

55. RGASPI, f. 85, op. 5, d. 46, ll. 1–31. A copy of Lenin's decree can be found in Guliev, D. B., ed., V.I. Lenin ob Azerbaidzhane (Baku, 1970), 215Google Scholar.

56. Also, Kharmandarian, Lenin i stanovlenie, 124–25. Quoting Lenin: “The conversation is about the unification of the Caucasian republics in one economic center: Georgian, Azerbaijani, and Armenian. Azerbaijan produces oil, it is necessary to transport it through Batum through Georgian territory, so it will be a one economic center.”

57. There is virtually no literature on the role of these Muslim elites in the invasion. For an exception see, Pipes, Richard, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917–1923, (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), 267Google Scholar; and Altstadt, Audrey L., The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule (Stanford, 1992), 109Google Scholar.

58. In May 1919 the Kavkraikom decided the economies should unify; Kharmandarian, Lenin i stanovlenie, 30–31. During the invasion of Azerbaijan, on May 4, 1920, Ordzhonikidze and Kirov sent Lenin a telegram stating: “We will carry out military-economic unification with Soviet Russia. Experience requires us to supply the Sovnarkom with authority over all of Caucasia and further…. Don't give Narimanov that kind of authority.” RGASPI, f. 85, op. 13, d. 12, l. 10.

59. Baberowski, Vrag est' vezde, 234.

60. RGASPI, f. 85, op. 5, d. 46, l. 1.

61. Ibid., l. 9.

62. Ibid., l. 2; The delegates also discussed the unification of the railroads, with parallel proposals on coordination from Huseynov and formal unification from Ordzhonikidze.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., l. 28.

65. Igolkin, Otechestvennaia, 130.

66. That is, the remaining oil that was not shipped to Moscow.

67. RGASPI, f. 85, op. 5, d. 46, l. 15.

68. The Mountain Republic was a state formed after the collapse of the Russian Empire and subsequently captured by the Bolsheviks and incorporated into the USSR as the Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, see, Marshall, Alex, The Caucasus under Soviet Rule (New York, 2010)Google Scholar.

69. RGASPI, f. 85, op. 5, d. 46, l. 13.

70. Akhundov and Huseynov, despite other disagreements, initially agreed with Narimanov that unification was moving too quickly. Baberowski, Vrag est' vezde, 247–48.

71. Narimanov, Izbrannye, 489. From “Rech' na tret'em zassedanii 1 vsezaerbaidzhanskogo s'ezda sovetov rabochikh, kresti'ianskikh, krasnoarmeiskikh i matrosskikh deputatov” May 8, 1921.

72. Narimanov's faction: Sultan-Masjid Afendiev, Dadash Buniatzade, Mirbashir Kasumov, Teymur Aliev, Gazanfar Musabekov, Mustafabekov Shirvani, Movsum (Israfilbekov) Kadyrli. Versus: Ruhulla Akhundov, Mirza-Davud Huseynov, Sarkis Sarkisov, Anastas Mikoian, Levon Mirzoyan, Sergei Kirov, (Aleksandr Ivanovich) Egorov, Alihaidar Garayev, Beybut Shakhtakhtinkii (switched sides, former friend of Narimanov). For factions, see Baberowski, Vrag est' vezde, 272.

73. Baberowski, Vrag est' vezde, 224–34.

74. On centralization, see, Blank, “Bolshevik Organizational Development.” This is a simplified breakdown of the factions, and much more work remains to be done on the topic.

75. RGASPI, f. 588, op. 2, d. 176, ll. 33–35. Narimanov's account. RGASPI, f. 588, op. 2, d. 177, l. 25 (Report on the Central Control Commission [CCC]) favoring a more aggressive approach than Narimanov's. On the impression this created, see RGASPI, f. 588, op. 2, d. 176, l. 83. Akhundov accused Narimanov of “to a certain extent supporting Shekhsi-Vekhsi,” RGASPI, f. 588, op. 2, d. 176, l. 76.

76. Kharmandarian, Lenin i stanovlenie, 78. Ordzhonikidze claims he requested the directive, not Narimanov. RGASPI f. 588, op. 2, d. 176, ll. 63–64 (Protocol of the meeting on the Commission on the investigation into the report and petition of com. Narimanov).

77. Ibid.

78. Kharmandarian, Lenin i stanovlenie, 76–78.

79. Ibid.,79; RGASPI, f. 588, op. 2, d. 176, l. 64.

80. Ibid.; Baberowski, Vrag est' vezde, 274.

81. Baberowski, Vrag est' vezde, 276–77.

82. There is a robust literature on nationalities policy. To name only a few: Edgar, Adrienne Lynn, Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan (Princeton, 2004)Google Scholar; Hirsch, Francine, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca, 2005)Google Scholar; Martin, Terry, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939 (Ithaca, 2001)Google Scholar.

83. The commission was composed of members of the CCC Presidium Emel'ian Iaroslavskii, Matvei Shkiriatov, Janis Rudzutak, Abdullo Rakhimbaev, and V. Ibragimov. RGASPI, f. 588, op. 2, d. 177, l. 9.

84. RGASPI, f. 588, op. 2, d. 178, ll. 50–51. Iaroslavskii claimed there is little in common between Narimanov and Sultan-Galiev but they had to make sure “net li zdes' i v doklade Narimanova kornii Sultangalievshchiny” (that there are no roots of Sultan-Galiev's ideas in Narimanov's manifesto). Narimanov's relationship to Sultan Galiev remains unclear.

85. A copy of the original manifesto and Control Commission transcript can be found in RGASPI, f. 588, op. 2, d. 176, ll. 2–49 and 58–86, respectively. Further supporting materials can be found in, RGASPSI, f. 588, op. 2, d. 177, 178, 179. These debates are extensively covered, from a different angle, by Baberowski, Vrag est' vezde, 217–302.

86. RGASPI f. 588, op. 2, d. 178, l. 49.

87. Baberowski says it was revenge. This is possible but when Narimanov accused Shahtakhtinski of stealing, Shahtakhtinski did not get into any trouble. In fact, Ordzhonikidze told the CCC committee that it was not an offense at all and that “takie veshchi u nas praktikuiutsa” (we practice such things) so he would not have had much reason to seek revenge, RGASPI, f. 588, op. 2, d. 176, l. 66.

88. One indication that Narimanov believed that the process was rigged was his refusal to engage his accusers on any real level verbally. Instead, he submitted written reports to be added to the record after the investigations, much as Shliapnikov and Medvedev did leading up to the “Baku Affair” in 1926. As Barbara Allen notes, this went against standard procedure, which relied on discussion. Allen, Barbara, “Transforming Factions into Blocs: Alexander Shliapnikov, Sergei Medvedev, and the CCC investigation of the ‘Baku Affair’ in 1926,” in Filtzer, Donald et al. ., eds., A Dream Deferred: New Studies in Russian and Soviet Labour History (Bern, 2008), 138Google Scholar. Also, RGASPI, f. 588, op. 2, d. 177, l. 192.

89. RGASPI, f. 588, op. 2, d. 176, l. 58.

90. Ibid., ll. 58–86. These transcripts support the argument of Blank's “Bolshevik Organizational Development.” Adeeb Khalid notes a generational divide in Uzbekistan as well, Khalid, Making Uzbekistan.

91. RGASPI, f. 588, op. 2, d. 176, l. 3.

92. RGASPI, f. 588, op. 2, d. 177, l. 32.

93. Mikoian echoed the sentiment: “We viewed Narimanov as a starik [old man] and knew that he wouldn't be able to lead the masses. But let him do his work. We needed him/He was necessary for us…” RGASPI, f. 588, op. 2, d. 176, l. 69.

94. Narimanov's faction was exclusively Muslim while Akhundov and Huseynov's faction was more ethnically diverse and had the backing of Stalin's faction. See footnote 81 for the members of each faction.

95. For example, Sheila Fitzpatrick, “The Civil War as a Formative Experience,” in Abbott Gleason, Peter Kenez, and Richard Stites, eds., Bolshevik Culture: Experiment and Order in the Russian Revolution (Bloomington, 1985), 57–76.

96. RGASPI, f. 588, op. 2, d. 76, ll. 61, 66.

97. RGASPI, f. 588, op. 2, d. 176, l. 69. Mikoian was the only surviving Commissar from the so-called 26 Commissars of the Baku Commune.

98. RGASPI, f. 588, op. 2, d. 176, l. 62.

99. Ibid., ll. 25, 27–28.

100. RGASPI, f. 588, op. 2, d. 177, ll. 33–34.

101. RGASPI, f. 177, op. 2, d. 177, l. 37.

102. RGASPI, f. 588, op. 2, d. 177, l. 193.

103. Baberowski, Vrag est' vezde, 270.

104. Izvestiia, March 20, 1925, 1; March 22, 1925, 1–2; March 24, 1925 page illegible; Pravda, March 24, 1925, page illegible.

105. Hirsch, Empire of Nations; Khalid, Adeeb, “Between Empire and Revolution: New Work on Soviet Central Asia,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 7, no. 4 (Fall 2006): 865–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Khalid, Adeeb, “Backwardness and the Quest for Civilization: Early Soviet Central Asia in Comparative Perspective,” Slavic Review 65, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 231–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar.