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Burghers versus Bureaucrats: Enlightened Centralism, the Royal Towns, and the Case of the Propinacja Law in Poland-Lithuania, 1776-1793

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Curtis G. Murphy
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Abstract

In the eighteenth-century, European rulers embraced a common policy of enlightened centralism aimed at undermining the prerogatives of local self-government, a trend that even reached the decentralized Polish- Lithuanian Commonwealth. In this article, Curtis G. Murphy investigates an example of an Enlightenment centralist policy that failed. A new reformist king sought to convert the burghers' right to produce alcohol, known as propinacja, into a state-controlled monopoly, but the effort produced only chaos and the diminishment of self-government. Contrary to the center's complaint that insufficient force undermined a beneficial effort, Murphy argues that the law failed because the priorities of the locals did not align with the government's goals and the habits of selfgovernment clashed with the bureaucratic methods of enlightened centralism. Historians of Poland have often praised the centralizing reforms of the late-eighteenth century, but the case of the propinacja law questions whether such efforts justified the costs of destroying self-government in the towns.

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Slavic Review , Volume 71 , Issue 2 , Summer 2012 , pp. 385 - 409
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Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. 2012 

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References

The research for this study was made possible by a Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad fellowship and a stipend from Lazarski University in Warsaw, Poland. I would like to thank Mark D. Steinberg, Andrzej S. Kaminski, Barbara Skinner, Theodore Weeks, Cathy McKenna, and the anonymous readers for their extremely helpful comments and suggestions.

1. On Joseph II, see Helmut Reinalter, “Der Josephinismus als Variante des Aufgeklarten Absolutismus und seine Reformkomplexe,” and Planner, Irmgard, ‘Josephinismus und Biirokratie,” both in Reinalter, Helmut, ed., Josephinismus als Aufgekldrter Absolutismus (Vienna, 2008), 9-16, 53-69Google Scholar; Beales, Derek, “WasJoseph II an Enlightened Despot?” in Robertson, Ritchie and Timms, Edward, eds., The Austrian Enlightenment and Its Aftermath (Edinburgh, 1991), 1-21.Google Scholar On other centralizing polices in eighteenth-century Europe, see Wakefield, Andre, The Disordered Police State: German Cameralism as Science and Practice (Chicago, 2009)Google Scholar; Walker, Mack, German Home Towns: Community, State, and General Estate 1648-1871 (Ithaca, 1971), 126-200 Google Scholar; Anderson, M. S., “The Italian Reformers,” in Scott, H. M., ed., Enlightened Absolutism: Reform and Reformers in Later Eighteenth-Century Europe (Ann Arbor, 1990), 56-73 Google Scholar; Behrens, C. B. A., Society, Government and the Enlightenment: The Experiences of Eighteenth-Century France and Prussia (London, 1985).Google Scholar

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3. Stanislaw Wegrzecki, the mayor of Warsaw under the Napoleonic government, was particularly hostile to the commonwealth and a proponent of centralization. See Biblioteka Ksia/at Czartoryskich (BC), ms. 2620 (Miscellaneous letters and publications, 1807-1815), 43-44; Stefan Kieniewicz, Taduesz Mencel, and Wladyslaw Rostocki, eds., Wybor tekstowzrodlowych z historiiPolski w latach 1795—1864 (Warsaw, 1956), 187-88; Maciej Jablonowski, prefect for Lublin province in the Duchy of Warsaw, echoed this disdain for the former system in his reports. See Archiwum Glowny Akt Dawnych (AGAD), Komisja Rza.dowa Spraw Wewnetrznych (KRSW) 33 (On towns, 1809-1812), 183.

4. Kollataj, Hugo, Uwagi nad teraznieyszym polozeniem tey czesci ziemi polskiey, ktorq od pokoiu tylzyckiego zaczetozwacXiestwem Warszawskim (Leipzig, 1808), 160-86, 192-200.Google Scholar

5. For a representative study of the Krakow School, see Michal Bobrzynski, DziejePolski w zarysie, ed. M. H. Serejski and A. F. Grabski (Warsaw, 1974). Other works following in this tradition, include Stanislaw Kutrzeba, Historya ustrojupolski wzarysie (Lwow, 1917), vol. 1; Wladyslaw Konopczynski, Geneza i ustanowienie Rady Nieustajqcej (Krakow, 1919), 10-45; Emanuel Rostworowski, Ostatni krol Rzeczypospolitej: Geneza i upadek Konstylucji 3 maja (Warsaw, 1966), 17-42. For the most recent iteration of this tradition, Lukowski, seejerzy, Disorderly Liberty: The Political Culture of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in theEighteenth Century (London, 2010).Google Scholar Jozef Andrzej Gierowski has argued that the centralizing reforms of the Constitution of the Third of May have demonstrated that a country can “modernize” without absolutism, but he is nonetheless highly critical of prereform Poland-Lithuania. Gierowski, The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the XWIIth Century: From Anarchy to Well- Organized State, trans. Henry Leeming (Krakow, 1996).

6. Ajnenkiel, Andrzej, “The Influence of the Constitution of 3 May on Constitutional Life of the Second Republic (1919-1939): Reality and Myth,” in Fiszman, Samuel, ed., Constitution and Reform in Eighteenth Century Poland: The Constitution of 3 May 1791 (Bloomington, 1997), 519-26Google Scholar; Rothschild, Joseph, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle, 1974), 27-72.Google Scholar For the current constitution of the Republic of Poland, seeDziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej polskiej, no. 78 (1997): 483. See also Yoder, Jennifer A., “Decentralization and Regionalism after Communism: Administrative and Territorial Reform in Poland and the Czech Republic,” Europe-Asia Studies 55, no. 2 (March 2003): 263-86.Google Scholar

7. In particular, historians make this claim with regard to the reforms contained in the Constitution of the Third of May. See Jozef Gierowski, “Reforms in Poland after the ‘Dumb Diet’ (1717),” in Fiszman, ed., Constitution and Reform, 66-78; Jerzy Lukowski, The Partitions of Poland, 1772, 1793, 1795 (New York, 1999). For reforms relating to the urban estate, see Ignacy Baranowski, Komisye porzqdhowe (1765-1788) (Krakow, 1907); Jozef Kermisz, Lublin i lubelskie w ostatnich latach Rzeczypospolilej (1788-1794), vol. 1, W czasie Sejmu Wielkiego i wojny Polsko-Rosyskiej 1792 r. oraz pod rzqdami Targowo-Grodzieriskimi (Lublin, 1939); Taduesz Korzon, Wewngtrzne dzieje Polski za Stanislawa Augusta (1764-1794), 6 vols. (Warsaw, 1897); Jerzy Michalski, “Zagadnienie polityki antycechowej w czasach Stanislawa Augusta,” Przeglqd Historzyczny 45 (1954): 635-51.

8. Andrzej Zahorski and Wladyslaw Cwik specifically discuss the propinacja law, and Zahorski made use of several files held by the Department of Police. Zahorski, Andrzej, Centralne instytucjepolicyjne wPolsce w dobie rozbiorow (Warsaw, 1959), 35-50 Google Scholar; Cwik, Wladyslaw, Miasta krolewskie lubelszayzny w drugiej potowie XVIII wieku (Lublin, 1968), 50-63 Google Scholar. For the burgher .rights movement and the urban reform law, see Zienkowska, Krystyna, Stawetni i urodzeni: Ruch polityczny mieszczanstwa w dobie Sejmu Czteroletniego (Warsaw, 1976)Google Scholar; Zienkowska, , “Reforms Relating to the Third Estate,” in Fiszman, , ed., Constitution and Reform, 330-51Google Scholar; Korzon, Wevmetrzne dziejePolski, 2:282-405; Kermisz, Lublin i lubelskie, 1:27-80.

9. Many of the individualistic, corporate privileges were cited in complaints to the Department of Police. See also Goldberg, Jacob, ed., Jewish Privileges in the Polish Commonwealth: Charters of Rights Granted to Jewish Communities in the Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries (Jerusalem, 1985).Google Scholar In 1703, August II granted Lublin the same civic privileges enjoyed by Krakow as a reward for its loyalty to him in the Great Northern War. See Riabinin, Jan, Rada miejska lubelska w XVIII wieku (Lublin, 1933), 6-8.Google Scholar The papers of the Assessor Court were destroyed by the Nazis in 1944, but echoes of their decisions appear in the files of the Department of Police. For royal commissions, see Stanowka, Maria, “Zmierzch znaczenia Lublina: Upadek (1648-1764),” in Mazurkiewicz, Jozef, Dobrzanski, Jan, and Kloczowski, jerzy, eds., Dzieje Lublina: Proba syntezy (Lublin, 1965), 127-48Google Scholar; Ptasnik, Jan, “Walki o demokratyzacje Lwowa od XVI do XVIII wieku,” Kwartalnik Historyczny 39, no. 2 (1925): 228-57.Google Scholar

10. My focus here is only on royal towns, i.e., those legally under the jurisdiction of the king. Private towns, which belonged to individual nobles, often shared many of the features of royal towns but were notaffected by this legislation. As in other countries of east central Europe, the towns of Poland-Lithuanian typically had only a few thousand inhabitants, and many of them were called “agricultural towns,” meaning the inhabitants made their living primarily from agriculture rather than from trade and handicrafts. See Miller, Jaroslav, Urban Societies in East-Central Europe, 1500-1700 (Burlington, Vt., 2008), 7-27.Google Scholar See also Walker, , German Home Towns, 19-64 Google Scholar; Bogucka, Maria and Samsonowicz, Henryk, Dzieje miast i mieszczanstxua w Polsce przedrozbiorowej (Warsaw, 1986), 325-75.Google Scholar

11. King Kazimierz the Great established urban self-government in Poland, based on the thirteenth-century model of Magdeburg in Saxony. In the sixteenth century, Bartolomej Groicki made the first Polish-language translation of the legal procedures governed by Magdeburg Law. This law of self-government was applied to all towns, royal and private, and placed burghers in each town under the immediate power of the king or their lord, exempting them from feudal law. See Groicki, Bartolomej, Porzqdek sqdoiu miejskichprawa majdeburskiego w KoroniePolskiej, ed. Koranyi, Karol (Warsaw, 1953)Google Scholar; Bogucka, and Samsonowicz, , Dzieje miast, 58-82 Google Scholar; Walker, , German Home Towns, 19-20, 34-71.Google Scholar

12. AGAD, Tak zwana Metryka Litewska (ML) VII 78 (Regular minutes of the Permanent Council [hereafter Minutes], March-May 1777), 18, 20-29.

13. Over the centuries, burghers paid a variety of taxes, but the 1773-1775 parliament regularized town duties as a hearth tax (podymny), as well as an excise tax on alcohol (czopowe). See Volumina Legum: Przedruk zbioru praw staraniem XX. pijarow w Warszawie od roku 1732 do roku 1793 (VL), vols. 7-8 (St. Petersburg, 1859), 8:88-90, 93.

14. Examples of towns where Jews enjoyed privileges equating them to burghers include Kazimierz Dolny, Checiny, and Chelm. Nonetheless, Hundert argues that residential segregation was the norm in royal towns. Hundert, Gershon David, Jews in Poland-Lithuania in the Eighteenth Century: A Genealogy of Modernity (Berkeley, 2004), 21-45 Google Scholar; Goldberg, , ed., Jewish Privileges in the Polish Commonwealth, 119-20, 151-55Google Scholar; AGAD, ML VII 78, 253-54, 375-76; ML VII 79 (Minutes, May-September 1777), 111-21.

15. The classic study on jurydyki is Jozef Mazurkiewicz, Jurydyki lubelskie (Wroclaw, 1956).

16. The rivalry between Christian burghers and Jews, in particular, found expression in the polemics of burgher-rights polemicists, who blamed Jewish competition for the apparent poverty of most towns. See Swinarski, Michal, Wiadomosc o pierwiastkowey miast zasadzie w Polszcze, ich szczegulnych przywileiach i wolnosciach oraz o przyczynach upadku tyclize miast (Warsaw, 1789), 43-59 Google Scholar; Adam Medrzecki, Zbirpraw, dowodow i uwagdla obiasnienia zaszczytow stanowi mieyskiemu ex juribus municipalibus stuzqcych (Warsaw, 1790), pt. V, 22. Kolta,taj accepted this perspective as well: Hugo Kolla,taj, Listy anonima i prawo polityczne narodu polskiego, ed. B. Lesnorodski and H. Wereszycka (Warsaw, 1952), 328-33.

17. On the political stalemate in Poland before Stanislaw August, see Kitowicz, jedrzej, Pamietniki, czyliHistoriapolska, ed. Matuszewska, Przemyslawa (Warsaw, 2005), 46-126 Google Scholar; Rostworowski, , OstatnikrolRzeaypospolitej, 19-43.Google Scholar

18. Konarski, Stanislaw, O skutecznym rad sposobie albo o utrzymyxvaniu ordynaryinych Seyrnow, vols. 1 and 4 (Warsaw, 1923), 4:175-93Google Scholar; Leszczynski, Stanislaw, Gtos wolny wolnosc ubezpieczajqcy, ed. Jedynak, Stanislaw (Lublin, 1987), 95-98 Google Scholar; Stanislaw Poniatowski (the elder), List ziemianina do pewnego pnyiaciela z inszego woiewodztwa (n.p., 1740). See also Konopczynski, Geneza i ustanowienie, 72-89, 138, 185-280.

19. Stanislaw August outlined his plans as a ruler in a series of “Anecdotes” composed for his then lover, the future Catherine the Great, in which he envisioned some form of political participation for townspeople in the national government. Rostworowski, , Ostatni krol Rzeczypospolitej, 41-43 Google Scholar; another member of the reform party, Andrzej Zamoyski, composed an unsuccessful reform of the law code in 1778, which proposed a strengthened central government providing greater protection to peasants and burghers. See Orlowski, Ryszard, Mifdzy obowiqzkiem obywatelskim a interesem wlasnym: Andrzej Zamoyski 1717-1792 (Lublin, 1974), 139-50.Google Scholar

20. For the sake of clarity, I use the term starosta as a catch-all to encompass the wide array of titles that existed in the commonwealth entailing starosta-like benefits and obligations, such as starosta, dzierzawca starostwa, uprzywilejowany possessor, and so on. Both judicial (grodowy) and nonjudicial (niegrodowy) starostas played a role in towns. For example, the town of Urzedow was subordinate to a nonjudicial starosta. See Marian Surdacki, Urzedow w XVII i XVIII wieku: Miasto—Spoleczenstwo—zycie codzienne (Lublin, 2007), 205-23.

21. The starostas did have to pay the commonwealth one-fifth of their income, which was raised to three-eights in 1776. In addition, the parliament of 1775 ordered that royal lands be governed by emphyteutic law, under which nobles would bid to hold vacant starosta positions on fifty-year contracts, but this reform would only take effect following the death of the current starosta. VL, 8:91-92. On the origins of the starosta, see Wejnert, Aleksander, O starostwach w Polsce do konca XVIII wieku z dolqczeniem wykazu ich miejscowosci (Warsaw, 1877), 1-34.Google Scholar

22. On intendants, see Gruder, Vivian R., The Royal Provincial Intendants: A Governing Elite in Eighteenth-Century France (Ithaca, 1968)Google Scholar. On Austrian Kreisamter, see Mencel, Tadeusz, Galicja Zachodnia 1795-1809: Studium z dziejow ziem polskich zaboru austriackiego po IIrozbiorze (Lublin, 1976), 33-66 Google Scholar. Lukowski charges that starostas would have been a useful force of town supervision in a Veil-ordered state.“Jerzy Lukowski, Liberty's Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Eighteenth Century, 1697-1795 (New York, 1991), 68. See also Cwik, Miasta krolewskie lubelszczyzny, 74-106; Surdacki, Urzedow, 206-22.

23. Bogucka, and Samsonowicz, , Dzieje miast, 323-25Google Scholar; Cwik, Miasta krolewskie lubelszczyzny, 40, 45, 106; Surdacki, Urzedow, 217-67.

24. AGAD, ML VII 79, 122-27, 150-55; ML VII 78, 425-28.

25. The question of starosta abuse was the subject of numerous debates even before the creation of the Department of Police in 1775. A common proposal was to convert all starosta lands into hereditary property, thus giving these officials the economic incentive to manage the property more effectively. One deputy at the 1776 parliament even suggested turning royal towns into private towns as a means of encouraging starostas to better care for the property. Dyaryusz seymu ordinaryinego pod zwiazkiem konfederacyi generalney oboyga narodow agituiqcego sie (Warsaw, 1777), 264-65; BC, ms. 804 (Compilation of cities, towns, and villages), 143; Staszic, Stanislaw, “Przestrogi dla Polski,” in Bobinska, Celina, ed., Wyborpism (Warsaw, 1948), 71.Google Scholar On Catherine the Great and enlightened centralism, see Kohut, Zenon E., Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s-1830s (Cambridge, Mass., 1988), 101-15, 277-85.Google Scholar

26. This fact was noted by Medrzecki, but a glance at the members of the Permanent Council shows that even the lower-ranking members (i.e., those possessing no official title, such as chancellor, bishop, palatine, castellan, and so on) were listed as starostas. Medrzecki, Zbidrpraw, dowoddw i uiuag, pt. V, 20-22; Dyaryusz seymu ordinaryinego, 458-59. The subject of the king's power to distribute offices and grants (his ius distributivum) was the subject of much debate. Republican reformist thinkers such as Stanislaw Dunin Karwicki called for this power to be transferred to the parliament, and many deputies during the partition parliament made similar demands. See Dunin-Karwicki, Stanislaw, Dziela polityczne z poczqtku XVIII wieku, ed. Przybos, Adam (Wroclaw, 1992)Google Scholar; Konopczynski, , Geneza i ustanowienie, 227-36.Google Scholar

27. An anonymous justification for ending burghers’ right of direct appeal appears in BC, ms. 817 (Internal politics, 1760-1770), 277. For the burgher perspective, see Swinarski, Wiadomosc o pierwiastkowey miast zasadzie, 27-28, 32; Medrzecki, Zbidrpraw, dowodow i uwag, pt. V, 4-22. Cwik argues that this law merely codified the starosta's de facto powers, while Zienkowska notes that this lawjslayed a role in provoking the burghers to collective action in defense of their rights. Cwik, Miasta krolewskie lubehzczyzny, 106; Zienkowska, Slawetni i urodzeni, 21-23. For the law itself, see VL, 7:351-52.

28. Konopczynski, Geneza i ustanoivienie, 125-98, 227-36; Rostworowski, Ostatni krol Rzeaypospolitej, 69-77.

29. The acting chairman always signed the resolutions. All were either members of the Permanent Council or ministers of the king. The acting chairmen of the Department of Police from 1777 to 1778 include Bazyli Walicki.Jan Kicki, Antoni Gielgud, Bishop Ignacy Massalski, Bazyli Grochowski, and Franciszek Rzewuski. Of these, Massalski and Grochowski specifically fought against the king's plans at the 1773-1775 partition parliament. See Konopczynski, Geneza i ustanowienie, 200-236. For a list of members of the Permanent Council, see AGAD, ML VII 84 (Minutes, July-September 1778), 265.

30. At die 1776 parliament, the department pressed for more power dian it ultimately received. For the debate, see Dyaryusz seymu ordynaryinego, 122, 182. For the law, AGAD, MLVTI78,18.

31. Each person who used this image naturally had a reason for doing so. Publicists such as Konarski wanted to spur reforms in the central government, while towns hoped for tax holidays. See Konarski, O skuteanym rod sposobie, 1:8-10. For examples of burghers’ petitions that refer to ruin and poverty, see AGAD, Archiwum Zamoyskich 73 (Supplications of burghers from various towns to Crown Chancellor Andrzej Zamoyski, 1765), 106, 113-15,147-50.

32. AGAD, ML VII 84, 264.

33. See, for example, AGAD, ML VII 83 (Minutes, April-June 1778), 282, 286, 298. Staszic mocked this obsession with external improvements in his influential 1790 pamphlet, “Warnings for Poland.” Staszic, “Przestrogi dla Polski,” 105.

34. The law only applied to the Polish “Crown” territories, meaning that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was exempt.

35. The law also ordered towns to transfer their breweries and distilleries to the suburbs as a means of fire prevention, a provision that appears to have been the original purpose of the legislation. VL, 8:562. On the Russian model, see Christian, David, “A Neglected Great Reform,” in Eklof, Ben, Bushnell, John, and Zakharova, Larissa, eds., Russia's Great Reforms: 1855-1871 (Bloomington, 1994), 102-12.Google Scholar

36. In contrast, seventeenth-century kings viewed Jewish settlement as positive for economic development and granted numerous privileges to individual Jewish communities. The first indication of a conceptual shift appeared in 1764, when the parliament abolished the Jewish Va ‘ad, in which representatives from across Poland-Lithuania gathered to allot the annual tax burden on Jewish communities. In its place, the parliament decreed a head tax on all Jews. An eighteenth-century Jewish writer, Ber of Bolechow, complained that this robbed the Jewish community of its “litde position of importance.” See Vishnitzer, M., trans., The Memoirs of Ber of Bolechow (1723-1805) (New York, 1973), 143-50.Google Scholar See also Kollajaj, Listy anonima, 329-32; Hundert./enw in Poland-Lithuania, 75-76, 214-23.

37. BC, ms. 2619 (Miscellaneous letters and publications, 1774-1782), 237. See also Stone, Daniel, ‘Jews and the Urban Question in Late Eighteenth Century Poland,” Slavic Revieio 50, no. 3 (Fall 1991): 533.Google Scholar

38. Lubomirski further warned that the “public benefit” would justify the creation of monopolies. In a separate speech, the Crown Marshall acknowledged that he served on these government bodies out of a conviction that one must obey the laws regardless of one's personal feelings. Dyaryusz seymu ordynaryniego,182; Zbior mow roinych w aasie dwoch ostatnich seymow roku 1775 y 1776 mianych (Poznari, 1777), 3:19.

39. AGAD, ML VII 78,18.

40. AGAD, ML VII 78, 20-29. For the final decree, see AGAD, ML VII 19 (Public record of the Permanent Council, March-May, 1777), 289.

41. As a result of the first partition, Poland-Lithuania lost one-third of her territory and one-fourth of her population to Russia, Prussia, and Austria. See Korzon, Wewnftrzne dzieje Polski, 1:61-78. A count of all towns remaining in the commonwealth after 1772 can be found in: BC, ms. 804, 621-47.

42. When I refer to additional towns in the footnotes, I will make note of the palatinate (wojewodztwo) in which they were located.

43. AGAD, ML VII 79, 21-23, 238-742; ML VII 84, 9-10; ML VII 82 (Minutes, December 1777-March 1778), 292-94; ML VII 91 (Minutes, November 1782-March 1783), 223-25.

44. The towns of Tuszyn (Sieradz palatinate), Dubienka (Belz palatinate), and Wlodzimierz used stalling tactics two years in a row. AGAD, ML VII 78, 377-79; ML VII 83, 363-68; ML VII 79, 738-42; ML VII 82, 292-94; ML VII 86 (Minutes, May-October 1779), 7-8.

45. Some towns probably did hold the auction without informing the starosta, but the rival petitions are often so widely contradictory that one cannot tell what actually happened. Examples of this particular problem arose in 1777 in Mielnik (Podlasie palatinate) and Urzedow. AGAD, ML VII 79, 187-88, 622-33.

46. The government established the minimum bid as the amount collected annually by the government's alcohol tax. In 1777, the starostas of Przrow (Krakow palatinate), Przedecz (Brzesc-Kujawski palatinate), Rozan (Mazovia palatinate), and Stawiszyn (Kalisz palatinate) claimed to have bid higher or to have been absent from the auction, though the towns managed to convince die department otherwise. In Lukow (Lublin palatinate), Janow (Ruthenia palatinate), and Tuszyn (Sieradz palatinate), the starosta charged that the magistracy had awarded the contract to a burgher without sufficient collateral. AGAD, ML VII 78, 310-11, 314-15, 316-17; ML VII 79, 9-14, 263-72, 238-341, 488-95, 542-48.

47. AGAD, ML VII 78, 318-19.

48. Burgher-contractors in Ryczwol and Zwolen (both Sandomierz palatinate) wrote to the department in 1777 to complain that the starosta was blocking their operations under the pretense of enforcing the law denying Jews propinacja rights, an example of the confusion caused by these new regulations. AGAD, ML VII 79, 744-48; ML VII 80 (Minutes, September-December 1777), 126-28.

49. AGAD, ML VII 78, 310-11, 314-15; ML VII 79, 9-14; ML VII 82, 92-294.

50. These towns, Janow and Sochocin (Mazovia palatinate), requested permission to collect only half the amount pledged, which the starostas in this case supported. AGAD, ML VII 84, 87-88,196-98.

51. AGAD, ML VII 86, 39-41.

52. Other examples of starostas complaining that burghers were not obeying them occurred in Chehn, Gostynin (Mazovia palatinate), and Rypin (Dobrzyri palatinate), AGAD, ML VII 82, 351-53; ML VII 83, 217-18; ML VII 84, 5-7.

53. AGAD, ML VII 78, 377-78.

54. Between 1777 and 1778, six Jewish communities sought exemption on the basis of parliament-approved privileges: Checiny (Sandomierz palatinate), Kazimierz Dolny, Dubienka, Chelm, Krzemieniec, and Leczyca. AGAD, ML VII 78, 253-54, 312, 375-76; ML VII 79,111-21, 219-37, 331-34.

55. Kievskaia starina, 1883, no. 6:317-43. See also Kohut, Russian Centralism, 277-85.

56. Such claims can be found in petitions from Warta (Sieradz palatinate) in 1777 and from Zakroczym (Mazovia palatinate) and Wyszogrod (Plock palatinate) in 1778. AGAD, ML VII 79, 481-87; ML VII 84, 152-54, 172-73.

57. AGAD, ML VII 79, 738-42; ML VII 82, 292-94.

58. The department approved a similar compromise for Kolo and Brdow (both Kalisz palatinate), as well as Chelm. The town of Kleck (Gniezno palatinate) specifically requested this solution. AGAD, ML VII 82, 351-53; ML VII 83, 29-30, 33-34, 88-89.

59. For town petitions at the turn of the eighteenth century, see AGAD, Archiwum Publiczne Potockich 132 (Letters of Polish towns to Lithuanian Vice Chancellor Stanislaw Szczuka, 1680-1720), 35-95.

60. Contractors also complained about nobles and religious orders maintaining distilling operations within town limits, as in Wyszogrod and Piaseczno (Mazovia palatinate) in 1777, Przyrow and Ryczwol (Sandomierz palatinate) in 1778. AGAD, ML VII 78, 308-9; ML VII 83,180-90, 245-46; ML VII 84,17-20.

61. The latter accusation was made by Przedecz in 1777. Other complaints were forwarded by Babimost (Poznan palatinate), Zwolen (Sandomierz palatinate), and Przyrow in 1777. AGAD, ML VII 78, 425-28; ML VII 79,122-27, 264-65, 365-66.

62. These complaints appear in 1777 in Szydlow (Sieradz palatinate) and janow, and in 1778 in Zgierz and Klodowa (both Leczyca palatinate). AGAD, ML VII 78, 310-11; ML VII 79, 288-94; ML VII 83, 35-37; ML VII 84, 128-31.

63. AGAD, ML VII84, 263.

64. AGAD, ML VII 90 (Minutes, June-September 1782), 401-2.

65. “Inveterate disorder” (Zastarzaiy nierzqd) appears in the 1778 report. AGAD, ML VII 90, 389-90. On auctioning revenues in Napoleonic Poland, see KRSW 3634 (Lublin, 1811), 7-15. For the situation in the Russian partition, see Tsentral'nyi dezhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv Ukraini m. Kyeva, f. Kollektsia mikrofilmov 11, op. 1, d. 94 (Reports of the Podolia Civil Governor, 1804-1809), 131-32.

66. According to Szydlowski's proposal, the Treasury Commission, which had been established in 1764, already disposed of intendants. AGAD, ML VII 90, 389-90.

67. Dziennik Handlowy y Ekonomiany, 1788, no. 10:697.

68. On at least one occasion, the department explicitly rejected a petition due to a town's failure to submit its financial report. For this regulation, see AGAD, ML VII 19, 256-57; ML VII 79,156-58.

69. The decree of 7 March 1777 did not make these conditions explicit, but they were applied in practice. Some of the first requests, in the spring of 1778, come from Zambrow (Mazovia palatinate), Podgorze (palatinate unknown), Wyszogrod, and Zakroczym. AGAD, ML VII 83, 90-91,187-88, 215-16, 280-81.

70. Dzimnik Handkrwy y Ekonomiany, 1788, no. 10:693; AGAD, ML VII 95 (Minutes, May-August 1784), 31.

71. Examples of such wording can be found in Podgorze, Lomza (Mazovia palatinate), Kazimierz Dolny, Dobrzyfi (Brzesc-Kujawski palatinate), Szulmierzyce (Mazovia palatinate), Brzeznica (Sieradz palatinate), and Plock, among others. AGAD, ML VII 83, 280-82; ML VII 84, 25,112-13,132-35,146-47.

72. The following towns, among others, presented specific amounts in zlotys, only to be told they could use half: Drohiczyn (Podlasie palatinate), Plohsk (Plock palatinate), Warka, and Ryczwot. AGAD, ML VII 83, 296, 298-99, 369-70, 375; ML VII 84, 17-20.

73. This happened with the requests of Urzedow in 1779, Bielsk in 1780, and Leczyca in 1781. AGAD, ML VII 86, 87-88; ML VII 87 (Minutes, May-September 1780), 81-82; ML VII 88 (Minutes, November 1780-March 1781), 525-26.

74. Warka's request to rebuild the town hall had to be followed with additional petitions for money, as did Bielsk's project to build a parish church. In these cases, the cooperation of the starosta was a key element in obtaining permission to expend further money. AGAD, ML VII 87, 198-200; ML VII 85 (Minutes, October 1785-February 1786), 245.

75. AGAD, ML VII 79, 21-23; ML VII84,9-10; ML VII86,155-56; ML VII86, 81-82; ML VII 87, 144-47.

76. Until the end of its existence, the commonwealth functioned on a kind of “payto-play” system of justice. Commissions dispatched by the royal Assessor Court, as well as the Commissions of Good Order, operated on funds provided by the towns in which they worked. Lublin, Kazimierz Dolny, Plock, Piotrkow, and Urzedow all readily exploited this fact when requesting money from the department. AGAD, ML VII 88, 316-17; ML VII 95, 324-25; ML VII 89 (Minutes, February-April 1782), 516-17; ML VII92 (Minutes, December 1784-April 1785), 288; ML VII 96 (Minutes, May-August 1785), 265-67.

77. AGAD, ML VII 95, 31; Dziennik Handlcrwy y Ekonomiany, 1788, no. 10:697-99.

78. AGAD, ML VII 85, 342-44; ML VII 93 (Minutes, February-April 1784), 357-62.

79. AGAD, ML VII 90, 400.

80. AGAD, ML VII156 (Minutes, April-September 1786), 390.

81. Dziennik Handloiuy y Ekonomiany, 1788.no. 10:697-99.

82. AGAD, ML VII 101 (Minutes, September 1787-February 1788), 55-56.

83. In the handwritten version of the report, the number is thirty-three. Dziennik Handhwyy Ekonomiany, 1788, no. 10:694; AGAD, ML VII155 (Minutes, March-September 1788), 166.

84. AGAD, ML VII 101, 381-83.

85. Dziennik Handlowy y Ekonomiany, 1788, no. 10:694.

86. AGAD, MLVII 83,101-2.

87. For the petitions of the burghers, see Medrzecki, Zbiorpraw, dowodow i uwag, pt. I. See also Zienkowska, Slawetni i urodteni, 34-90.

88. Swinarski, Wiadomosc o pierwiastkowey miast zasadzie, 29-30.

89. Ibid.

90. Kollataj, Listy anonima, 80-81.

91. Neither Zienkowska nor Korzon mention this connection. Zienkowska, Slawetni i urodzeni, 196-269; Zienkowska, “Reforms Relating to the Third Estate,” 330-51; Korzon, , Wewnetrzne dzieje Polski, 2:380-405.Google Scholar Only Kermisz acknowledges that this new commission deprived towns of their previous autonomy, such as the right to legislate and decree taxes. Kermisz, Lublin i lubelskie, 1:63, 80.

92. After 1791, towns often began letters to the government with indications of gratefulness, as with Lublin and Smotryca (Podolia palatinate) in 1792. Archiwum Panstwowe w Lublinie (APL), Ksiegi miejskie Lublina (KML) 253 (1792), 2; AG AD, ML VII 192 (Legal watch, 1792), 183. See also Korzon, Wewnetrzne dzieje Polski, 2:405; Zienkowska, Slawetni i urodzeni, 198.

93. VL, vol. 9 (Krakow, 1889), 9:277-81.

94. On the 1793 law, see APL, KML 261 (1794-1796), 27-28; Zahorski, Central? instytucjepolicyjne, 228-31.

95. As with the propinacja law, towns sought to use the Police Commission for their own ends. In a 1791 petition from Leczyca, the citizens sought to play the commission against the magistracy. AGAD, Archiwum Krolestwa Polskiego 86, 1:31, 52.

96. AGAD, ML VII173 (Legal watch, 1792), 216.

97. Zienkowska, “Reforms Relating to the Third Estate,” 347-51.

98. APL, KML253, 14-17.

99. See Woolf, Stuart, Napoleon's Integration of Europe (New York, 1991), 12-15, 38-40, 69-75, 97.Google Scholar