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The Campaign to Eliminate the Kulak as a Class, Winter 1929–1930: A Reevaluation of the Legislation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2017

Lynne Viola
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Extract

The drive to collectivize Soviet agriculture in the winter of 1930 was “spontaneous“ (stikhiinyi) in the extreme. Spontaneous, in this context, is not a synonym for voluntary; instead, it denotes the process by which collectivization was implemented from January to March 1930. This process was characterized by a deficit in organization and order, a revolutionary impulsiveness tempered by neither law nor legality, and, perhaps most of all, “teleological planning“ based on constant upward revisions of numerical indicators as plans and directives were passed down the hierarchical chain of regional command. Central control, in the traditional sense, was nonexistent or ineffective; control, central or otherwise, seemingly so pervasive in “Stalinist” collectivization, is simply a misnomer for the arbitrary coercion that prevailed at the time and was predicated, in large part, upon the very absence of such control.

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Articles
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Slavic Review , Volume 45 , Issue 3 , Fall 1986 , pp. 503 - 524
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Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. 1986

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References

This article is dedicated to Cyril Black on the occasion of his retirement from the Department of History, Princeton University.

1. For a discussion of the phenomenon of teleological planning (in relation to the First Five-Year Plan in industry), see Carr, E. H. and Davies, R. W., Foundations of a Planned Economy, 2 vols, (vol. 1 in 2 parts) (New York: Macmillan, 1969) 1(2): 790–794 Google Scholar.

2. Davies, R. W., The Socialist Offensive. The Collectivization of Soviet Agriculture, 1929–1930 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980, pp. 177–180 Google Scholar; for Soviet works, see Bogdenko, M. L., “Kolkhoznoe stroitel'stvo vesnoi i letom 1930 g.,” Istoricheskie zapiski 76 (1965): 20 Google Scholar; and, in particular, regional studies of collectivization, such as Chernopitskii, P. G., Na velikom perelome. Sel'skie sovety Dona v eriod podgotovki i provedeniia massovoi kollektivizatsii (1928–1931 gg.) (Rostov-na-Donu: Rostovskii gos. universitet, 1965), pp. 86–91 Google Scholar; L. Kozlova, K pobede kolkhoznbgo stroia. Bor'ba Moskovskoi partiinoi organizatsii za podgotovku i provedenie kollektivizatsii (Moscow: Moskovskiirabochii, 1971, pp. 193–196 Google Scholar; Medvedev, V. K., Krutoi povorot (Iz istorii kollektivizatsii sel'skogo khoziaistva Nizhnego Povolzh'ia) (Saratov: Knizhnoe izd-vo, 1961), pp. 80–87Google Scholar; and P. N.Sharova, Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva v Tsentral'noi Chernozemnoi Oblasti, 1928–1932 gg. (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1963, pp. 153–154 Google Scholar, to name but a few works from the relatively extensiveregional literature on collectivization that best illustrates these processes.

3. Davies, Socialist Offensive, pp. 243–245; Lewin, M., Russian Peasants and Soviet Power. A Study of Collectivization (New York: Norton, 1975, pp. 495–496 Google Scholar; Bogdenko, M. L. and Zelenin, I. E., “Osnovnye problemy istorii kollektivizatsii sel'skogo khoziaistva v sovremennoi sovetskoi istoricheskoiliterature,” in Istoriia Sovetskogo krest'ianstva i kolkhoznogo stroitel'stva v SSSR. Materialy nauchnoi sessii, sostoiavsheisia 18–21 aprelia 1961 g. v Moskve (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1963, p. 213 Google Scholar; Danilov, V. P., Kim, M. P., and Tropkin, N. V., Sovetskoe krest'ianstvo. Kratkii ocherk istorii, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1973, pp. 284–286 Google Scholar. It should be noted that Lewin also maintains thatdekulakization was intended by Stalin and, one presumes, the Politburo as the “means” for “drivingthe mass of the peasantry to join the kolkhozes” (Russian Peasants and Soviet Power, p. 519). Thiscertainly was the intention of many okrug and raion authorities before and after the central legislationon dekulakization. It is, however, questionable whether the central leadership shared this intention, for the central legislation on dekulakization was intended explicitly only for raions of wholesalecollectivization and, more importantly, the country's leading grain-producing regions (North Caucasus, Middle Volga, Lower Volga) achieved their highest percentage leaps in collectivized householdsbefore 1 February—that is, before the central legislation on dekulakization. See table 17 in Davies, Socialist Offensive, p. 442.

4. For examples, see Davies, Socialist Offensive, pp. 261–268, and Sharova, Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva, p. 162, both of whom argue that central policy gradually began to shift towardthe retreat of early March during the second half of February. See Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power, p. 515, for an account that emphasizes the pivotal role of Stalin's article, “Dizzynessfrom Success.“

5. For examples, see Davies, Socialist Offensive, pp. 254–257; Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power, p. 515; I. la. Trifonov, Ocherki istorii klassovoi bor'by v SSSR v gody NEPa (1921–1937) (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1960, p. 245 Google Scholar; and the official account in lstoriia KPSS, 2nd ed.(Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1962), p. 444.

6. For a discussion of this problem, see Bogdenko and Zelenin, “Osnovnye problemy,” p. 213;and N. la. Gushchin, “Likvidatsiia kulachestva kak klassa v sibirskoi derevne,” Sotsial'naia struktura naseleniia Sibiri (Novosibirsk: Nauka, Sibirskoe otdelenie, 1970), pp. 125–126Google Scholar. Gushchin offers someanswers to this problem.

7. The Politburo commission began work on 8 December and sent its proposals to the Politburoon 22 December. For information on the Bauman subcommission, see B. A. Abramov, “O rabotekomissii Politbiuro TsK VKP (b) po voprosam sploshnoi kollektivizatsii,” Voprosy istorii KPSS, no. 1(1964); M. L. Bogdenko, “K istorii nachal'nogo etapa sploshnoi kollektivizatsii sel'skogo khoziaistvaSSSR,” Voprosy istorii, no. 5 (1963); Ivnitskii, N. A., “Istoriia podgotovki postanovleniia TsK VKP(b) o tempakh kollektivizatsii sel'skogo khoziaistva ot 5 ianvaria 1930 g.,” Istochnikovedenie istorii sovetskogo obshchestva (Moscow: Nauka, 1964 Google Scholar; idem, Klassovaia bor'ba v derevne i likvidatsiia kulachestva kak klassa (Moscow: Nauka, 1972), pp. 169–178; idem, “O kriticheskom analize istochnikovpo istorii nachal'nogo etapa sploshnoi kollektivizatsii (osen’ 1929-vesna 1930 gg.),” Istoricheskii arkhiv, no. 2 (1962); idem, “O nachal'nom etape sploshnoi kollektivizatsii (osen’ 1929-vesna1930 gg.),” Voprosy istorii KPSS, no. 4 (1962); Nemakov, N. I., Kommunisticheskaia partiia—organizator massovogo kolkhoznogo dvizheniia (Moscow: MGU, 1966, pp. 93–102 Google Scholar; and M. A. Vyltsan, N. A, Ivnitskii, and Iu. A. Poliakov, “Nekotorye problemy istorii kollektivizatsii v SSSR,” Voprosy istorii, no. 3 (1965).

8. Semernin, P. V., “O likvidatsii kulachestva kak klassa,” Voprosy istorii KPSS, no. 4 (1958): 80.Google Scholar

9. Stalin, I., “K voprosam agrarnoi politiki v SSSR (Rech’ na konferentsii agrarnikov-marksistov.27 dekabria 1929 g.),” Sochineniia, 13 vols. (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1952), 12: 169–170 Google Scholar.

10. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh s “ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK, 7th ed. (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1953), part 2: 544–547.

11. Abramov, B. A., Vagonov, F. M., and Golikov, V. A., “O nekotorykh voprosakh istoriipervogo etapa sploshnoi kollektivizatsii sel'skogo khoziaistva,” Voprosy istorii KPSS, no. 4 (1972): 27–28 Google Scholar; and Ivnitskii, Klassovaia bor'ba, pp. 177–178.

12. This decree was never published, but a regional variant of it can be found in the decree ofthe Western Regional Party Committee, “On the Elimination of the Kulak as a Class in Regions ofWholesale Collectivization” (2 February 1930) in Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva v Zapadnom raione RSFSR (1927–1937 gg.) (Smolensk: Arkhivnye otdely, gos. i partiinye arkhivy Smolenskoi iBrianskoi oblastei, 1968), pp. 246–250.

13. ‘Sobranie zakonov i rasporiazhenii raboche-krest'ianskogo pravitel'stva SSSR, no. 9(24 February 1930): 187–188.

14. These instructions were never published but regional legislation, which appears to haveclosely followed central instructions, is available in the Soviet archival document series on collectivization.The regional instructions (with variations in form and content) were issued by regional sovietexecutive committees and may be found in Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva na Severnom Kavkaze (1927–1937) (Krasnodar: Krasnodarskoe knizhnoe izd-vo, 1972), pp. 248–252; Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva v Srednem Povolzh'e (Kuibyshev: Kuibyshevskoe knizhnoe izd-vo, 1970), pp. 156–158; and Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva Zapadnoi Sibiri (1927–1937 gg.) (Tomsk: Zapadno-Sibirskoe knizhnoe izd-vo, 1972), pp. 135–138.

15. Consult Davies, Socialist Offensive, pp. 232–237, for further information.

16. Abramov, Vagonov, and Golikov, “O nekotorykh voprosakh istorii pervogo etapa sploshnoikollektivizatsii sel'skogo khoziaistva,” pp. 27–28; and Danilov, Kim, and Tropkin, Sovetskoe kresf ianstvo, p. 228.

17. Ivnitskii, Klassovaia bor'ba, p. 180.

18. Ibid., p. 213; Efremenkov, N. V., “Deiatel'nosf partiinykh organizatsii Urala po likvidatsiikulachestva i trudovomu perevospitaniiu byvshikh kulakov,” in Pobeda Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii na Urale i uspekhi sotsialisticheskogo stroitelstva za 50 let Sovetskoi vlasti. Materialy nauchnoi sessii prepodavatelei kafedr istorii KPSS vuzov Urala, posviashchennoi 50-letiiu Velikoi Oktiabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii (Sverdlovsk: Ural'skii gos. universitet, 1968), pp. 351–352 Google Scholar; and Lomashvili, P. N., Velikii perevorot (Tbilisi: Sabchota sakartvelo, 1972, pp. 198–199 Google Scholar.

19. Gushchin, “Likvidatsiia,” p. 127; Ivnitskii, Klassovaia bor'ba, pp. 210–212; and Lomashvili, Velikii perevorot, p. 187.

20. For a discussion of the legislation on kulaks that evolved in 1928–1929, see Danilov, V P., “K kharakteristike obshchestvenno-politicheskoi obstanovki v sovetskoi derevne nakanune kollektivizatsii,” Istoricheskie zapiski 79 (1967): 30–31, 32, 34, 40, 44.Google Scholar

21. P. V Semernin, “O likvidatsii kulachestva kak klassa,” pp. 75–78; V A. Sidorov, “Likvidatsiiav SSSR kulachestva kak klassa,” Voprosy istorii, no. 7 (1968): 27; and also see Derevenskii kommunist, no. 15–16 (21 August 1929): 17, and no. 19 (14 October 1929): 13–14 for further detailson local decisions not to admit kulaks into collective farms.

22. Danilov, “K kharakteristike obshchestvenno-politicheskoi obstanovki,” p. 44; Gushchin, “Likvidatsiia,” pp. 125–126; and Moshkov, Iu. A., Zernovaia problema v gody sploshnoi kollektivizatsii sel'skogo khoziaistva SSSR (1929–1932 gg.) (Moscow: MGU, 1966, pp. 63–65 Google Scholar. The decreewas published in Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporiazhenii raboche-krest’ ianskogo pravitel'stva RSFSR, no. 60 (5 September 1929): 846. Similar legislation was passed in the Ukraine.

23. Gushchin, “Likvidatsita,” pp. 125–126; The Penal Code of the RSFSR (Text of 1926 with Amendments up to Dec. 1, 1932) (London: Foreign Office, 1934), pp. 30–32, 36–38, 46, 61.

24. Sobranie uzakonenii, no. 5 (25 February 1930): 74–75.

25. These decrees also forbid the entry into collective farms of peasants who “squandered” their livestock or inventory and, if they were already in the collective farms, called for their expulsion.Sobranie zakonov, no. 6 (13 February 1930): 137–138; Sobranie uzakonenii, no. 3 (10 February1930): 39–40.

26. Davies, Socialist Offensive, p. 231; Selunskaia, V. M. et al., Izmeneniia sotsial'noi struktury sovetskogo obshchestva v 1921-seredine 30-kh godov (Moscow: Mysl', 1979), p. 247 Google Scholar; and Trifonov, I. la., Likvidatsiia ekspluatatorskikh klassov v SSSR (Moscow: Politizdat, 1975, pp. 338–340 Google Scholar.

27. Istoriia KPSS, 3rd ed. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1969), pp. 403–404.

28. Medvedev, V. K., “Likvidatsiia kulachestva v Nizhne-Volzhskom krae,” Istoriia SSSR, no. 6(1958): 18.Google Scholar

29. Karevskii, F. A., Sotsialisticheskoepreobrazovanie sel'skogo khoziaistva Srednego Povolzh'ia (Kuibyshev: Kuibyshevskii gos. universitet, 1975), pp. 88–89 Google Scholar.

30. Gushchin, “Likvidatsiia,” p. 127; idem, Sibirskaia derevnia naputi ksotsializmu (Sotsial'noekonomicheskoe razvitie Sibirskoi derevni v gody sotsialisticheskoi rekonstruktsii narodnogo khoziaistva, 1926–1937 gg.) (Novosibirsk: Nauka, Sibirskoe otdelenie, 1973), p. 418.

31. This figure was based on incomplete data for the Ukraine and is therefore somewhere belowthe figure for the Ukraine as a whole. See Kosior's report of 8 June 1930 in XI z'izd KP (b) Ukraini (5–15 chervnia 1930 roku). Sten. zvit (Kharkiv: Derzhavne vidavnitsvo Ukraini, 1930), p. 262. Seealso Sidorov, “Likvidatsiia,” p. 26.

32. According to Gushchin, “Likvidatsiia,” p. 130, in Siberia (data on seventeen okrugs), 4, 000 “kulak” families self-dekulakized and more than 8, 000 individuals (3, 600 with family and 4, 600without family) fled in the period from the end of 1929 to mid-1930. For the period, Gushchinpresents the following breakdown on the dekulakization of Siberia's estimated 76, 300 kulak farms, of which 59, 200 were dekulakized: 14, 700 dekulakized on the basis of the piatikratnoe tax; 10, 600according to court decisions; 26, 200 in direct consequence of the TsIK-Sovnarkom decree of1 February 1930; 4, 000 self-dekulakized; 3, 700 placed in a miscellaneous category; 3, 600 fled withfamily; and 4, 600 fled without family. (Families or individuals who fled are not included in the 59, 200total of dekulakized.) See also Krest'ianstvo Sibiri v period stroitel'stva sotsializma (1917–1937 gg.) (Novosibirsk: Nauka, Sibirskoe otdelenie, 1983), pp. 261–262, which also emphasizes the influencethat samoraskulachivanie had in encouraging the dekulakization actions of local cadres in late 1929and early 1930. According to this same source, R. I. Eikhe, the first party secretary of the SiberianRegional Party Committee, in fact, emphasized the need to carry out collectivization and dekulakizationin all haste precisely in order to prevent economic damage resulting from peasant sale anddestruction of property (speech of 27 January 1930 at meeting of Novosibirsk Okrug Party Committee).This situation was also reported in Lower Volga, where at a meeting of the regional partycommittee, convened in order to discuss the central legislation on dekulakization, local authorities(authorities na mestakh) objected to what they considered “a rather lengthy period” for the implementationof the operation, arguing that if they were to wait that long, the kulaks would divide theirproperty and flee. Therefore, some argued that dekulakization should be carried out in five days.This meeting is reported in Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 24–25 (10–20 September 1930): 6., 33. See Proletarii [organ of Moscow okrug party committee, soviet executive committee, andtrade union council], 14 January 1930, p. 1, on the use of article 58(10) for razbazarivanie. Forinformation on the decline of livestock herds, see A. P. Finarov, “K voprosu o likvidatsii kulachestvakak klassa i sud'ba byvshikh kulakov v SSSR,” in Istoriia sovetskogo krest'ianstva i kolkhoznogo stroitel'stva, p.’ 275. For further data, see Ivnitskii, Klassovaia bor'ba, pp. 122–124;Sel'skokhoziaistvennaia gazeta, 15 December 1929, p. 3; and Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 29 (30 October1930): 3. The decline in herds led to a temporary glut in the private market at this time and wasreflected in a steep fall in prices. For example, in the Kuban', the price of horses fell from a rangeof 80 to 100 rubles to 20 rubles by early January 1930 (Molot, 7 January 1930, p. 5); at the Voskresenskaiaiarmarka in the Moscow region, cows cost 200 rubles to 250 rubles and horses 175 rublesto 200 rubles in October but fell to 125 rubles to 150 rubles and 25 rubles to 30 rubles by January(Proletarii, 8 January 1930, p. 1). In Chapaevskii raion in the Middle Volga, the fall in prices wasso drastic that peasants allowed their horses to starve to death and then, acting in collusion with thelocal veterinarian, claimed insurance premiums that were four to five times higher than market prices, since declared prices had never been readjusted to correspond to the changing market prices. Therewere 360 such cases, according to the report in Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 2 (20 January 1930): 4. Itshould be noted, however, that in parts of the country, fodder shortages were an important contributingfactor to these declines as well.

34. Proletarii, 24 January 1930, p. 1.

35. By 1 February 1930, only 24.4 percent of collective farm seed had been gathered accordingto Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 5 (20 February 1930): 3.

36. Pravda, 27 April 1930, pp. 2–3.

37. XI z'izd KP (b) Ukraini. Sten. zvit, pp. 263–265. (Also see p. 348 of report of Vainov, discussing this conference.)

38. Mariagin, G. A., Postyshev (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1965, p. 217 Google Scholar.

39. See Stepichev, I. S., Pobeda Leninskogo kooperativnogo plana v Vostochnosibirskoi derevne (Irkutsk: Vostochno-Sibirskoe knizhnoe izd-vo, 1966), pp. 493–495 Google Scholar. The use of administrative measuresis described in a March 1930 report to Khlebotsentr on dekulakization in Krasnoiarskii okrug in TsGANKh, f. 4, 108, op. 16, d. 48, 1. 87.

40. Oskolkov, E. N., Pobeda kolkhoznogo stroia v zernovykh raionakh Severnogo Kavkaza (Rostov-na-Donu: Rostovskii universitet, 1973), pp. 207–208 Google Scholar.

41. Strong, Anna Louise, I Change Worlds (New York: Garden City, 1937, p. 292 Google Scholar.

42. Lomashvili, Velikii perevorot, p. 247.

43. Bogdenko, “Kolkhoznoe stroitel'stvo,” p. 21.

44. Ivnitskii, Klassovaia bor'ba, p. 179; Davies, Socialist Offensive, pp. 243–249. See also thereferences in note 14 for the regional decrees.

45. For examples, see Izvestiia, 1 February 1930, p. 1; 2 February 1930, p. 1; Krest'ianskaia pravda, 5 February 1930, pp. 1, 3; Molot, 2 February 1930, p. 1; 4 February 1930, p. 1; 6 February1930, p. 1; 7 February 1930, p. 1; Moskovskaia derevnia, 2 February 1930, p. 1; Na fronte kollektivizatsii, no. 4–5 (1–15 January 1930): 12–13; Partiinoe stroitel'stvo, no. 3–4 (February 1930): 16–17; Pravda, 1 February 1930, p. 4; 2 February 1930, p. 3; Rabochaia gazeta, 2 February 1930, p. 3;4 February 1930, p. 1; Rabochaia Moskva, 4 February 1930, p. 2; Sel'sko-khoziaistvennaia zhizn', no. 4 (10 February 1930): 1–2; Ural'skii rabochii, 8 February 1930, p. 3; Vechemiaia Moskva, 8 February 1930, p. 2.

Even the Pravda editorial of 3 February 1930, which has been attributed to Stalin personallyand which is singled out for pushing forward with exorbitant rates of collectivization, warned againstdekulakization apart from wholesale collectivization and the application of dekulakization to themiddle peasant. The editorial emphasized the necessity of carrying out dekulakization with maximalorganization, thereby demonstrating concern over control. For Soviet revisionist interpretations ofthis editorial, see Istoriia KPSS, 2nd ed., pp. 444–445; and Vsesoiuznoe soveshchariie o merakh uluchsheniia podgotovki nauchno-pedagogicheskikh kadrov po istoricheskim naukam. 18–21 dekabria 1962 g. (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), pp. 299–300. For Postyshev's reaction to the Pravda editorial, see Mariagin, Postyshev, p. 217.

46. Pravda, 1 February 1930, p. 4. The party's theoretical organ, Bolshevik, in its editorialannouncing the new legislation on dekulakization, warned that “nothing could be more mistakenthan to counterpose collectivization to dekulakization, the elimination of the kulak as a class;” yet, it continued, that was precisely what was occurring (ostensibly before the legislation) in some areasas collectivization was forsaken for dekulakization or vice-versa. See Bolshevik, no. 2 (31 January1930): 3.

47. Rabochaia gazeta, 7 February 1930, p. 3.

48. Stalin, , “Otvet tovarishcham Sverdlovtsam,” Sochineniia, 12: 186–188.Google Scholar

49. Krest'ianskaia pravda, 15 February 1930, p. 1. The Commissariat of Justice appears to havebeen quite concerned about the lawlessness and arbitrary repression in the countryside at this time.This topic was an important item of concern at the 15–18 February 1930 conference of representativesof judicial organs from the autonomous republics and regions (held in Moscow), which resulted incondemnation of excesses and “local improvisation” in the interpretation of the dekulakization legislation. See Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 6 (28 February 1930): 10–12; no. 7–8 (20 March 1930): 13;no. 9 (31 March 1930): 4. The people's commissar of justice, Ianson, in a speech at the thirdconference of court-procurator officials in June 1930, criticized the implementation of the campaignagainst the kulak in an exceptionally strident manner, claiming that his commissariat had, in February, “fought the battle [against excesses] in rather difficult conditions, the tendency [extremism] thenbeing fashionable.” He went on to say that the judicial organs and the procurator's office have aresponsibility to show “civic courage” and to take up battle in just such cases. Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 24–25 (10–20 September 1930): 7.

50. The first articles to appear criticizing the excesses after the 5 January decree were in Molot, 7 January 1930, p. 5; 14 January 1930, p. 2; 16 January 1930, p. 1; 18 January 1930, p. 2. Molot was the newspaper of the North Caucasus Regional Party, Soviet, and Trade Union Committees (and Rostov City Soviet) where A. A. Andreev was first party secretary. Andreev gave speeches on9 January 1930 at the congress of wholesale collectivization (Molot, 14 January 1930, p. 2) and13 January at the Third Plenum of his party regional committee (Molot, 18 January 1930, p. 2); inthese speeches he cautioned cadres against haste in the socialization of livestock and the race forpercentages. Izvestiia also published several critical articles in January (25 January 1930, p. 3;29 January 1930, p. 3).

For critical articles in the first half of February, see Krest'ianskaia pravda, 5 February 1930, pp. 1, 3; 15 February 1930, p. 1; Molot, 2 February 1930, p. 1; 4 February 1930, p. 1; 6 February 1930, p. 1; 7 February 1930, p. 1; 11 February 1930, p. 3; Moskovskaia derevnia, 2 February 1930, p. 1; 7 February 1930, p. 2; Pravda, 1 February 1930, p. 4; 3 February 1930, p. 1; Rabochaia gazeta, 7 February 1930, p. 3 (S. Syrtsov speech of 6 February at Sokol'nicheskii raion soviet, Moscow);Rabochaia Moskva, 4 February 1930, p. 2; Sel'sko-khoziaistvennaia zhizri, no. 4 (10 February1930): 1–2; Sotsialisticheskoe zemledelie, 4 February 1930, p. 2; 6 February 1930 p. 2; Ural'skii rabochii, 12 February 1930, p. 2 (Syrtsov speech at meeting of Sovnarkom RSFSR); Vecherniaia Moskva, 8 February 1930, p. 2; Za kollektivizatsiiu, 12 February 1930, p. 2. These articles stresscaution in the treatment of middle peasants, warn against the use of “administrative measures,” andremind that this campaign is not meant to be a return to war communism.

51. Stepichev, Pobeda Leninskogo kooperativnogo plana, p. 494. (See note 33)

52. Karevskii, Sotsialisticheskoe preobrazovanie, p. 97; and Stepichev, Pobeda Leninskogo kooperativnogo plana, pp. 459–460.

53. Abramov, Vagonov, and Golikov, “O nekotorykh voprosakh istorii pervogo etapa sploshnoikollektivizatsii sel'skogo khoziaistva,” pp. 34–35.

54. Ibid., p. 35; Ivnitskii, Klassovaia bor'ba, p. 214; Karevskii, F. A., “Likvidatsiia kulachestvakak klassa v Srednem Povolzh'e,” Istoricheskie zapiski 80 (1967): 94 Google Scholar. See also article in Izvestiia, 2 February 1930, p. 3, criticizing excesses in the Middle Volga.

55. Abramov, Vagonov, and Golikov, “O nekotorykh voprosakh istorii pervogo etapa sploshnoikollektivizatsii sel'skogo khoziaistva,” p. 35. See also article in Sotsialisticheskoe zemledelie, 4 February 1930, p. 2, criticizing Moscow's activities.

56. Abramov, B. A., Vagonov, F. M., and Kulikov, V. I., “N. I. Nemakov. Kommunisticheskaiapartiia—organizator massovogo kolkhoznogo dvizheniia (1929–1932 gg.)” [book review], Voprosy istorii KPSS, no. 6 (1968): 16 Google Scholar; and Vyltsan, M. A. , Danilov, V P., Kabanov, V. V, and Moshkov, Iu. A., Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva v SSSR: puti, formy, dostizheniia (Moscow: Kolos, 1982, pp. 210–211 Google Scholar.

57. See note 14 for regional decrees in Middle Volga (8 February), North Caucasus(10 February), and Siberia (12 February).

58. Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva v Srednem Povolzh'e, p. 156; and Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva Zapadnoi Sibiri, p. 137. According to Krest'ianstvo Sibiri, p. 260, note 13, thisdecree was analogous to a Siberian Regional Party Committee decree of 2 February 1930 that wasbased on the Central Committee decree of 30 January.

59. Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva na Severnom Kavkaze, p. 251; and Molot, 11 February1930, p. 2. The North Caucasus appears to have made the greatest effort to control the drive andto put a halt to the excesses. In the North Caucasus, all those guilty of applying repressive measuresto middle peasants were theoretically subject to criminal prosecution as of 11 February (see Molot). See also circular letters of the North Caucasus Regional Party Committee dated 17 and 18 Februarythat sharply criticized okrug and raion cadres for excesses in Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva na Severnom Kavkaze, pp. 255–259, 259–266.

60. Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva v Severnom raione (1927–1937 gg.) (Vologda: Severo-Zapadnoe knizhnoe izd-vo, 1964), pp. 273, 276. This decree was issued one day after a regionalparty committee directive forbidding the implementation of dekulakization before receiving thecommittee's instructions. (See ibid., pp. 679–680, n. 39.)

61. Medvedev, “Likvidatsiia,” p. 26; Pravda, 27 April 1930, pp. 2–3.

62. Chernopitskii, Na velikom perelome, pp. 102–103.

63. Gushchin, Sibirskaia derevnia na puti k sotsializmu, pp. 296–297. Party cadres in Oirotiiaare sharply criticized in TsGANKh, f. 4, 108, op. 16, d. 48, 1. 87.

64. 3-aia Leningradskaia oblastnaia konferentsiia VKP(b). 5 iiunia-12 iiunia 1930 g., Biulleten’ no. 4, p. 30.

65. Lomashvili, Velikii perevorol, pp. 250–251. The Georgian Central Committee halted massexiles and revised its legislation on the basis of the Central Committee directives in a new decreeof 6 February.

66. Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva v Severnom raione, pp. 679–680, note 39.

67. The Nizhegorodskii Regional Party Committee later claimed to have taken steps against theexcesses at this time as well. See Izvestiia Nizhegorodskogo kraevogo komiteta VKP (b), no. 11–13(June-July 1930), p. 8.

68. XVIs “ezd VKP (b). Sten. otchet (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1930), p. 360. At this time, arrests (often on the basis of article 58[10] of the criminal code) were made frequently and randomly.Moreover, institutional representatives of various types, visiting officials, and other individuals sentto work in the countryside in January and February often made arrests regardless of whether theyhad the legal or administrative authority to do so. See Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 13 (10 May 1930): 9–11; no. 17 (20 June 1930): 8. The People's Commissariat of Justice later condemned this practice, as well as the “broad interpretation” of the application of exile and expropriation measures undercriminal sentencing. See Sudebnaia praktika, no. 7 (20 May 1930): 4. A very broad use of exile, however, had been sanctioned officially by the 10 January 1930 decree of VTsIK-Sovnarkom RSFSRpublished in Sobranie uzakonenii, no. 5 (25 February 1930): 74–75.

69. Kozlova, K pobede kolkhoznogo stroia, p. 206. The Moscow Region and Central BlackEarth Region came under the heaviest criticism for excesses among RSFSR regions at the SixteenthParty Congress. See XVI s “ezd VKP (b). Sten. otchet, pp. 214–216, 226, 230, 351–352. Stalin alsoreprimanded both of these areas in “Otvet tovarishcham kolkhoznikam,” Sochineniia, 12: 208–209.

70. Ivnitskii, Klassovaia bor'ba, p. 220; Sharova, Kollektivizatsiia selskogo khoziaistva, p. 153.

71. I. Vareikis, O sploshnoi kollektivizatsii i likvidatsii kulachestva kak klassa (Voronezh: Kommuna, 1930), p. 32. The Central Black Earth Region was dubbed “region of excesses” at the SixteenthParty Congress. According to one Soviet scholar, by 25 May 1930, in the Central Black EarthRegion, 32, 583 dekulakized households had been rehabilitated—and this result depends on incompletedata (Sharova, Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva, pp. 165–166). Further, on the basis ofthe available evidence, the author has not been able to find any indication that the party leadershipin the Central Black Earth Region made any attempt to halt or moderate the excesses in the campaign.The Central Black Earth Regional Party Committee did issue a warning on 26 February toall party organizations, but it was a rather half-hearted attempt and made only vague references toexcesses. See Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva v Tsentral no-Chernozemnoi oblasti (1927–1937 gg.) (Voronezh: Tsentral'no-Chernozemnoe knizhnoe izd-vo, 1978), p. 131.

72. Platunov, N. I., Pereselencheskaia politika Sovetskogo gosudarstva i ee osushchestvlenie v SSSR (1917— iiun’ 1941 gg.) (Tomsk: Tomskii gos. universitet, 1976), pp. 216–217 Google Scholar. This observationis further confirmed by an interesting document from the Far East. In a telegram from I. Perepechko(party secretary of the Far East Regional Committee) to all party and soviet organs, dated18 February 1930, Moscow's kulak policy is outlined in some detail (with touches of regional initiative—for example, urging satisfaction of the “demands of the masses” in the closing of churches)but the okrug party committees are warned to wait on implementation of these measures until afterthe Central Committee meeting of 21 February at which time concrete directives on dekulakizationwere expected. It would seem that the only apparent explanation for this directive was that indeedthe central legislation was only intended for regions of wholesale collectivization. The Far Eastappears to be an exception in its willingness to wait for central legislation but, in so doing, hasprovided some interesting evidence in this regard. See Iz istorii kollektivizatsii sel'skogo khoziaistva Dal'nego Vostoka (1927–1937 gg.) (Khabarovsk: Khabarovskoe knizhnoe izd-vo, 1979), pp. 105—108.

73. Karevskii, “Likvidatsiia,” p. 98; Fainsod, Merle, Smolensk under Soviet Rule (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958, pp. 244–247 Google Scholar. (It should be noted that Fainsod seems to haveconcluded that the directives of late January and early February on dekulakization were an attemptto “regularize” and “legalize” seizures of kulak property. See p. 244.) The role of the OGPU indekulakization is extremely difficult to assess given the lack of visibility of the OGPU in the sources, but QGPU presence on dekulakization commissions should not be automatically interpreted as amanifestation of central control. The OGPU, like the party and soviet networks, was organized ona regional basis and there is no necessary reason to conclude that the OGPU was any more or lessresponsive to its central headquarters than the party or the Soviets. This, in any case, appears tohave been the case in Belyi raion in the Western Region according to Arch Getty, J., Origins of the Great Purges (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 152–153 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The fact remains, however, that the center seems to have intended the OGPU to represent its interests in controllingdekulakization and systematizing procedure from late January when, for the first time, the OGPU's role in dekulakization was made official and denned. In fact, it seems doubtful that the OGPU wasable to carry out this mission given the momentum of the regional campaigns, the power of the okrug and raion command headquarters in collectivization and dekulakization, and the late date in whichthe OGPU became involved in the campaign. This supposition is confirmed by the evidence presentedin Fainsod's study, in which the OGPU appears surprisingly powerless to stem the tide of disorderand illegality.

74. Medvedev, “Likvidatsiia,” p. 26. According to Istoriia KPSS, 2nd ed., p. 443, for the USSRas a whole, as many as 15 percent of peasants were dekulakized in some areas and 15 percent to 20percent disenfranchised. Gushchin in “Likvidatsiia,” p. 131, writes that in Siberia, in Krasnoiarskiiokrug, 17 percent of farms were dekulakized incorrectly. He adds that by 1 June 1930, the SiberianRegional Committee of the Communist party had received 35, 400 complaints from peasants regardingdekulakization. Of these, 28, 700 were examined and 13, 100 found to be “justified.” Trifonov inOcherki, p. 243, writes that in Stalingradskii okrug more than one-third of the dekulakized wereseredniaks and that in Moskovskii okrug 12, 500 of 18, 000 disenfranchised individuals had beendisenfranchised illegally. Reports from the Western Region in June 1930 claim that 70 percent to 80percent of the farms were dekulakized “incorrectly.” See Zapadnyi oblastnoi komitet VKP (b). Vtoraia oblastnaiapartkonferentsiia (5–12 iiunia 1930 g.). Sten. otchet (Moscow-Smolensk: Zapadnoeoblastnoe otdelenie Ogiza, 1931), p. 234. In Vladimirskii okrug, in the Ivanovo Industrial Region, far greater numbers of “kulaks” were assigned to category 2 than to category 3 of the special designationsof kulaks established by the Central Committee in late January. Here, 2, 271 “kulaks” wereassigned to category 2 and 1, 097 to category 3, thus clearly violating the orders of the CentralCommittee that indicated that about four-fifths of all kulaks1—that is, the majority—were incategory 3. See Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva Tsentralnogo Promyshlennogo raiona (1927–1937 gg.) (Riazan': Arkhivnye otdely, gos. i partiinye arkkhivy Vladimirskoi, Ivanovskoi, Kalininskoi, Kaluzhskoi, Kostromskoi, Moskovskoi, Riazanskoi, Tul'skoi, Iaroslavskoi oblastei, 1971), pp. 384–385. A special commission was set up on 9 April 1930 (apparently on the suggestion ofKalinin) to check on complaints from dekulakized households exiled to Northern Region! Similarcommissions were established in other regions of exile (e.g., Urals, Siberia, Kazakhstan, Far East).Of a reported 46, 261 exiled families in Northern Region, 35, 000 submitted petitions of complaint.Approximately 10 percent of the exiles were found to have been exiled unjustly (Ivnitskii, Klassovaia bor'ba, pp. 238–239).

In addition to the rather broad application of dekulakization measures to poor and middlepeasants, large sections of the “rural intelligentsia” were also subject to dekulakization in manyparts of the country at this time, particularly in the Central Black Earth Region. Rural intelligentsiasubject to illegal dekulakization included first and foremost teachers, doctors, veterinarians, fel'dshers, agronomists, and other similar types. See Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 7–8 (20 March 1930): 3, 9; no. 10 (10 April 1930): 31; no. 11 (20 April 1930): 4, 6–9. In most areas, lishentsy (disenfranchised)were dekulakized on a wholesale basis, leading eventually to a TsIK SSSR decree of 22 March1930 forbidding this practice. See Sovetskaia iustitsiia, no. 7–8 (20 March 1930): 9; and TsIK decreein Izvestiia, 23 March 1930, p. 1.

75. This visibility has led revisionist scholars to point to the second half of February as theperiod of policy shift. As has been demonstrated here, however, the “shift” began in the first halfof February simultaneously with the introduction of legislation on dekulakization. Because Daviesand others have so carefully documented the policy moves of this period, they will be treatedsummarily here.

76. Published in Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva na Severnom Kavkaze, pp. 259–266.

77. Pravda, 27 April 1930, pp. 2–3.

78. Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule, pp. 246–247.

79. Ordzhonikidze led a commission to the Ukraine. See Mariagin, Postyshev, p. 221; andOcherki istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii Ukrainy, 3rd ed. (Kiev: Politizdat Ukrainy, 1972), p. 412;Kalinin led the commission to the Central Black Earth Region. See Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin. Kratkaia biografiia (Moscow: Politizdat, 1975), p. 208. According to Davies, Socialist Offensive, p. 267, Kaganovich was in the Lower Volga and Iakovlev (commissar of agriculture) was in the Middle Volga.

80. Abramov, Vagonov, and Golikov, “O nekotorykh voprosakh istorii pervogo etapa sploshnoikollektivizatsii sel'skogo khoziaistva,” p. 30; Bogdenko, “Kolkhoznoe stroitel'stvo,” pp. 23, 25–26.

81. Istoriia KPSS, 2nd ed., p. 445; Mariagin, Postyshev, p. 221; and Ocherki istorii KP Ukrainy, p. 412. Also see the data presented in Haslam, Jonathan, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1930–1933 (NewYork: St. Martin's, 1983), p. 122 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Memoir material also often claims opposition to collectivizationin Red Army circles, sometimes including Kliment E. Voroshilov among the opponents. See, forexamples, Avtorkhanov, A., Tekhnologiia vlasti (Frankfurt, A.M.: Posev, 1983), p. 295 Google Scholar; and Ciliga, Anton, The Russian Enigma (London: Ink Links, 1979, p. 95 Google Scholar.

82. V Molotov, “O nashikh zadachakh,” Bolshevik, no. 5 (15 March 1930), pp. 10–25. Molotovsaid in this speech, “uspekhi kruzhat golovu,” therefore perhaps anticipating Stalin's article. Itis important to note, however, that, although this speech was originally presented on 25 February, itwas not printed until 15 March. It is quite possible that Molotov could have revised the speech inaccord with new party nuances. S. Syrtsov's speech of 20 February, “Zadachi partii v derevne,” wasalso printed in this issue and is often cited as indicative of a new critical mood in Moscow towardcollectivization despite the date of its publication and the possibilities for revision. It should be notedthat Davies indicates in a note that the article could have been revised (see Socialist Offensive, p. 266, esp. n. 274), although he appears to be inclined against this interpretation according to histextual conclusions.

83. Bogdenko and Zelenin, “Osnovnye problemy,” p. 207, n. 61.

84. Sotsialisticheskoe zemledelie, 28 February 1930, p. 1; Za kollektivizatsiiu, 2 March 1930, p. 1.

85. Stalin, , “Golovokruzhenie ot uspekhov. K voprosam kolkhoznogo dvizheniia,” Sochineniia, 12: 191–199 Google Scholar. The title was not entirely original. A similar title (“About the dizzyness from bigheights “) appeared in Pravda, 18 February 1930, p. 2, over an article by an author namedG. Kostrov; the article was extremely critical of the drive. The statement that the Central Committee requested Stalin to write “Dizzyness from Success” is found in the 14 March Central Committee decree in KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, p. 548, and in Stalin, “Otvet tovarishcham kolkhoznikam,” Sochineniia, 12: 213, where he appears especially anxious not to take the “credit” alone.

86. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, pp. 548–551.

87. Lewin, Moshe, “Taking Grain': Soviet Policies of Agricultural Procurement before theWar,” in Abramsky, C., ed., Essays in Honour of E. H. Carr (London: Macmillan, 1974, p. 284 Google Scholar.

88. See the interesting article by V. Miliutin, “Osnovnye problemy sploshnoi kollektivizatsii,” in Bolshevik, no. 6 (31 March 1930): 16, where he indicates that most excesses occurred preciselyin regions that neglected collectivization and made use of the slogan, “first, we dekulakize, thencollectivize.” Although this statement was written after the fact, it is not inconsistent with centralinstructions of February that warned against precisely these types of slogans and actions.