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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2017
Until recently, the Soviet military establishment has tended to sanctify the essential elements of what it perceived to be the reasons for its success in the Great Fatherland War. Well beyond the familiar inclination of military organizations to plan for the last war, Soviet military leadership quite consciously and rather extensively has employed the past as a model to be used for the solution of contemporary problems. That the past has become so deeply imbedded in the Soviet military is perhaps not surprising, for as a careful, western observer once noted, “No crisis born of failure has arisen that would impel a reexamination of how things ought to be done.” Today, such a crisis clearly exists. Failure in Afghanistan and collapse of the national economy, combined with the emergence of significant new weapons technologies, have unquestionably been central factors. Moreover, evidence strongly points to the fact that the Soviet authorities themselves increasingly understand the situation in crisis terms and that a genuine reexamination of Soviet military thinking has been in progress for some time, certainly since before 1985.
1. Arthur J. Alexander, “Weapons Acquisition in the Soviet Union, United States, and France,” P-4989 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, March, 1973), 10. Other western analysts have noted that even the Soviet military's postwar growth in complexity did not appreciably alter the number and shape of military leadership organs and military-industrial coordinating bodies that were largely in place before the war. See, for example, Jerry Hough, “The Historical Legacy in Soviet Weapons Development,” in Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security, ed. Jiri Valenta (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), 106.
2. For the importance of history as a tool of reform, see Thomas Sherlock, “Politics and History under Gorbachev, ,” Problems of Communism (May-August, 1988), 16–42Google Scholar.
3. As this article will indicate, Soviet military thought is currently in a very fluid state. Thus, events may have changed drastically by the time that the article goes to press. Nevertheless, if its analysis and conclusions are not wide of the mark, then it seems reasonable to conclude, that the issues it raises will likely help to explain any change that might have occurred.
4. General-Major B. Panov, “Rol’ voenno-istoricheskii distsiplin v formirovanii moral'no-boevykh kachestv kursantov i slushatelei,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 9 (September 1984): 83.
5. “XXIV s “ezd KPSS i zadachi voenno-istoricheskoi nauki,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 5 (May 1986): 4.
6. B. P., Frolov, “Razvitie taktiki oboronitel'nogo boia russkoi armi v pervuiu mirovuiu voinu,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 6 (June 1986): 63–68Google Scholar; A. M., Ageev, “Geroicheskaia oborona Ural'ska v 1919 gody,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 6 (June 1986): 69–73Google Scholar; A. P., Maryshev, “Nekotorye voprosy strategicheskoi oborony v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 6 (June 1986): 9–16Google Scholar.
7. Maryshev, “Nekotorye voprosy,” 9.
8. Ibid., 16. On the preference for offensive operations, see, for example, Nathan, Leites, Soviet Style in War (New York: Crane Russak, 1982), 205–208 Google Scholar. Leites notes that in Soviet military exercises even the side portraying the west wins if it is on the offensive.
9. See Russell, Bova, “The Soviet Military and Economic Reform,” Soviet Studies 40 (July 1988): 383–384Google Scholar and 388. See, also, the careful analysis by Abraham S. Becker, Sitting on Bayonets (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior, 1985). Becker makes a strong case for the view that the Soviet slowdown in military spending that began in the mid-1970s was probably a matter of deliberate policy choice. If this is true, then what we are observing now in the realm of strategic thought is perhaps a belated adjustment to that slowdown and the acknowledgement that it is not merely temporary or short term. According to Oleg Bogomolov, a Soviet economist, any attempt to study the potential savings that might accrue from a defensive strategy will have to contend with the fact that the Soviets have deliberately obscured their own defense expenditures for so long that the actual figures are now very difficult for them to produce confidently; see “Soviet Experts Say Their Economy Is Worse than U.S. Has Estimated,” New York Times, 24 April 1990.
10. L. G., Ivashov, “Iz opyta perevoda narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR s mirnogo na voennoe polozhenie,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 6 (June 1987): 38 Google Scholar.
11. A. P., Ivanov, “M. V. Frunze o role ekonomiki v voine,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 10 (October 1987): 77–78Google Scholar; N. N., Azovtsev, “V. I. Lenin—osnovopolozhnik sovetskoi voennoi nauke,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 4 (April 1988): 17 Google Scholar.
12. The military literature, however, now contains ample reference to the importance of perestroika in the armed forces. Though it emphasizes the need to work efficiently and employ resources economically, it nowhere addresses the relative savings that might accrue from a change in strategy. See, for example, General-Major Tsagolov, K, “Za printsipy perestroiki,” Krasnaia Zvezda, 19 April 1988, 1 Google Scholar. Tsagolov notes, “yes, there are no alternatives to perestroika. “
13. B.N. Petrov, “Analiz prichin nezavershennosti nekotorykh nastupatel'nykh operatsii Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 1 (January 1987): 13-22. Petrov employs carefully constructed charts to document the balance of forces in each operation. Petrov was also a contributor to an earlier volume that examined offensive operations; see Kir'ian, M. M., ed., Fronty nastupali: po opytu Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (Moscow: Nauka, 1987 Google Scholar.
14. Italics mine. With his reference to the two- or three-to-one ratio necessary for offensive operations, Petrov could be suggesting the magnitude of force reductions that could be made by converting to a defensive posture. See, also, A. V. Basov, “O nachale korennogo pereloma vo vtoroi mirovoi voine” Voprosy istorii, no. 5 (May 1988), 68. Basov writes that in the latter half of 1942 an “economic miracle” took place that saw Soviet production outpacing that of Germany. He then notes, “and superiority in production of the means of battle is a necessary precondition for the attainment of military superiority. The successes of the Soviet economy permitted it not only to improve supply of the Red Army with armaments, equipment, and ammunition, but also to reorganize it in conformity with the requirements of war. “
15. S. F., Begunov, “Chto proizoshlo pod Khar'kovom v mae 1942,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 10 (October 1987): 45–53Google Scholar. As Begunov is certainly aware, the reference to a “relative equality of forces” is one that Soviet military and political observers have increasingly employed to describe the current Soviet-United States balance of forces.
16. Sokolov, S. L., ed., Vtoraia mirovaia voina, itogi i uroki (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985), 399 Google Scholar. The fate of the socialist camp, especially the Warsaw Pact, since the Sokolov volume appeared tends to place even more emphasis on the importance attached to equilibrium in Soviet military thinking and the related matter of balanced force reductions.
17. Ibid.
18. Sergei Akhromeev, “Velikaia pobeda i uroki istorii,” 18. Akhromeev's position in this regard sharply contrasts to that of his predecessor Nikolai Ogarkov. See, for example, Jeremy Azrael's analysis of Ogarkov's “unparty-like” behavior in “The Soviet Civilian Leadership and the Military High Command, 1976-1986,” R-3521-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, June 1987), 22-37. As noted by Azrael, Ogarkov took the position not only that military readiness should be increased, but also that the consequence of inhibited economic and social development should be accepted.
19. See, for example, Babakov, A. A., Vooruzhennye Sil SSSR posle voiny (1945-1986): istoriia stroitel'stva (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987), 231–232 Google Scholar. See, also, the statement by the defense minister at the time, S. L. Sokolov, “Security: Problems and Opportunities,” FB1S 3, no. 014 (22 January 1987): AA3, where Sokolov states that “military potentials should be curtailed to be within the limits which are essential for defensive purposes alone “; and FB1S 3, no. 016 (30 March 1987): AA3, where M. Ponomarev notes that parity “is not a question of arithmetical correspondence between the two sides’ armed forces and arms, but of the equality of their combat potentials and capabilities. “
20. V. P., Krikunov and B. E., Pestov, “Voenno-istoricheskuiu rabotu na uroven’ sovremennykh trebovanii,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 9 (September 1987): 14 Google Scholar. It is reported that Marshal Akhromeev indicated that a reassessment of strategic doctrine was initiated by the defense council as early as spring of 1985.
21. See, especially, Maryshev, “Nekotorye voprosy,” 12.
22. See, for example, S. I. Postnikov, “Razvitie sovetskogo voennogo iskusstva v Kurskoi bitve,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 7 (July 1988): 10-18.
23. The defensive posture was arrived at only after recommendations from front commanders for a preemptive offensive were considered and rejected.
24. V. N., Lobov, “Strategiia pobedy,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 5 (May 1988): 6 Google Scholar. Lobov's quotations are taken from the 1936 Field Regulations. This is doubly significant, for he thereby not only challenges the strong attachment to the offensive strategy that he correctly attributes to these regulations, but in so doing he argues a position in sharp contrast to that taken by other writers who have defended the 1936 Field Regulations as “essentially correct,” especially with respect to “deep offensive combat.” See, for example, M. V., Novikov, “Znachenie opita boevykh deistvii v paione ozera Khasan i na reke Khalkin-Gol dlia pazvitiia sovetskogo voennogo iskusstva,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 9 (September 1986): 73–77Google Scholar.
25. Iu. Perechnev, G, “O nekotorykh problemakh podgotovki strany i Vooruzhennykh Sil k otrazheniiu fashistskoi agressii,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 4 (April 1988), 45 Google Scholar. Recently, publication of newly discovered memoir material by Marshal G. K. Zhukov portrays Stalin as unknowledgeable about the details of military matters and willing to sacrifice postwar military development to the preferences of Nikolai Bulganin, his “idolator” and “right hand man in the Defense Commisariat “—a person who “poorly understood military affairs and, of course, never thought about operational-strategic questions.” See “ Staline, Korotko o,” Pravda, 20 January 1989 Google Scholar.
26. Lobov, “Strategiia pobedy,” 11.
27. Novikov, M. V., Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 9 (September 1986): 73–77Google Scholar.
28. P. A., Savushkin, “Evoliutsiia vzgliadov na oboronu v mezhvoennye gody,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 1 (January 1987): 37–42Google Scholar.
29. Ibid., 42.
30. Ul'ianov, V. I., “Razvitie teorii glubokogo nastupatel'nogo boia v predvoennye gody,” Voennoistoricheskii zhurnal, no. 3 (March 1988), 27 Google Scholar.
31. Ibid., 26.
32. General S. I., Postnikov, “Razvitie sovetskogo voennogo iskusstva v Kurskoi bitve,” Voennoistoricheskii zhurnal, no. 7 (July 1988): 18 Google Scholar.
33. V. P., Krikunov and V. G., Matveev, “Iz opyta armeiskikh oboronitel'nykh operatsii,” Voennoistoricheskii zhurnal, no. 4 (April 1988): 75 Google Scholar.
34. Colonel V. V., Kulikovskii, “Ukreplennye raiony v grazhdanskoi voine,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 4 (April 1988): 41 Google Scholar.
35. Reference to Aesopian language is not intended to imply that competing political factions are attempting to employ hidden messages in an effort to mobilize disparate but sympathetic followers. Instead, Aesopian language seems to be used in this instance in order to discuss rather broadly but, nevertheless, antiseptically a potentially volatile matter. See Lilita Dzirkals, Thane Gustafson, and A. Ross Johnson, “The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in the USSR” (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1982), 76-88, for a narrower interpretation of esoteric communications in Soviet writings.
36. Ivashov, “Iz opyta perevoda narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR s mirnogo na voennoe polozhenie,” 45.
37. The balance that Soviet military authorities speak of rests on present Soviet offensive capabilities. Nothing in the defense debate seems to address the notion of shifting the basis for equilibrium.
38. See, for example, Bruce Parrott, “Soviet National Security under Gorbachev, ,” Problems of Communism (November-December, 1988), 28 Google Scholar.
39. “ Gorbachev, Tells of Military Cuts,” New York Times, 19 January 1989 Google Scholar.
40. “Soviet Arms Expert Tells Congress of Sweeping Changes in Military,” New York Times, 11 March 1989.
41. While visiting the United States in early July 1988, Akhromeev noted that perestroika has made Soviet military doctrine “purely defensive in form and in content.” Nevertheless, before his visit he was on record as strongly opposed to unilateral Soviet force reductions. See Parrott, “Soviet National Security under Gorbachev,” 24. Immediately following Akhromeev's visit, Krasnaia Zvezda carried a prominent two-part article by Colonel V. Slipchenko, entitled “Strategicheskoe ravnovesie” in which the United States was portrayed as threatening the international balance of forces with its development of new weapons, especially the Strategic Defense Initiative. See Krasnaia Zvezda, 17 and 18 June 1988.
42. Whether or not the differences between Akhromeev and the political elite were as serious as they appeared, his removal unquestionably sent a message concerning Gorbachev's determination with regard to the need for change in military doctrine. On the political elite's relationship with the General Staff, see Shane Mahoney, “The Role of the Soviet General Staff in Military Management,” prepared for the National Council on Soviet and East European Research. Since Akhromeev's “retirement” as chief of the General Staff, he has apparently been a close personal advisor to Gorbachev, especially with respect to arms control negotiations. While this new role would seem to give him more leverage in defense issues, there is little in Akhromeev's history that would identify him as a personal political supporter of the general secretary.
43. Additional themes in the military literature make it likely that the matter of appropriate doctrine is entwined with the ongoing debate concerning the proper spheres of responsibility for military and political professionals regarding military management. See, for example, F. F. Gaivoronskii, ed., Evoliutsiia voennogo iskusstva: etapy, tendentsii, printsipy (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987), 242-244. Contributors to this volume include Maryshev, who was among the first to initiate discussion of defense.
44. This point was, of course, one of the main issues in Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov's confrontational relationship with the political leadership when he served as chief of the General Staff. For a discussion of Ogarkov's attempt to secure budget outlays to support advanced conventional technologies, see Herspring, Dale R., The Soviet High Command, 1967-1989: Personalities and Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), 174–178 Google Scholar.