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Draining the Swamp: Understanding the Crisis in Mainstream Politics as a Crisis of the State

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2017

Abstract

This paper examines Poland, Hungary, the UK and the US the most surprising cases of populist reaction. It argues that the social polarization caused by the failures of hyper-liberal reforms to the state, and the association of Social Democratic parties with those reforms, has provoked alienation from liberal democratic politics.

Type
Critical Forum: Global Populisms
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies 2017 

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