Migration and Hybrid Political Regimes: Navigating the Legal Landscape in Russia

Migration Seen through a Diversity, Security, and Cohesion Lens

In recent years, migration, foreign, and domestic policies to regulate movement and international relations have become embedded fields of study. Myron Weiner examined state-to-state relations depending on actions or inactions vis-a-vis international migration and concluded that the internationalization of migration highlighted “new and conflicting interests into considerations of policies affecting migration in both sending and receiving countries.”¹ Stephen Castles, Mark J. Miller, and Ammendola Giuseppe wrote about “globalization of migration,” which is “the tendency” of getting the countries’ foreign and national politics “crucially affected by migratory movements.”² Some scholars tried to theorize the relationship between migration, foreign, and domestic policies.³ Kelly Greenhill investigated widely deployed but largely unrecognized instruments of state influence on “cross-border population movements that are deliberately created or manipulated in order to induce political, military and/or economic concessions from a target state or states.”⁴ Andrew Geddes determined that migration is shaped not only by states’ foreign policy interests but also by changes in states’ domestic politics.⁵

A growing number of scholars are researching how geopolitical preferences define migration flows, how international relations impact migration and its legal framework, and how the movement of people impacts foreign and domestic policies of countries. Rustamjon Urinboeyev is one of them. His book Migration and Hybrid Political Regimes highlights the complexity and nuance of Central Asian migrants’ everyday experiences and how these migrants create (in)formal procedures and institutions of migration governance in Russia. Based on extensive fieldwork in various construction places in and around Moscow, as well as in the Fergana Valley, the author focuses on Uzbek labor migrants and their stories and experiences with Russian officials, employers, middlemen, and also family members back home.

Over the last three decades, Russia has served as a host country for millions of migrant workers coming to the country in search of a job and a better life. Uzbekistan is a Central Asian country rich in natural resources, albeit weak in labor market capacities and higher education opportunities. Therefore, the country persistently exports labor abroad, predominantly to Russia. From January to December 2021, over 4.5 million Uzbek nationals—as well as 2.4 million citizens from Tajikistan; 884,000 citizens from Kyrgyzstan; 163,000 citizens from Kazakhstan—entered Russia with migratory purpose employment.⁶ It is a challenging experience to be a Central Asian migrant in Russia. The life of migrant worker, as the book author explains in detail, is overshadowed by hard work, fear, non-irrevocable obligations to send money back home, and “insecurity, threatened by exploitation, deportation, police corruption, racism, physical violence, and even death” (47).

In Chapters 2 and 7, Urinboyev explains why Central Asian migrants were and remain “Others” in Russia. Significantly, xenophobia is widespread and increasing, with 58% of respondents in 2015 and 72% of respondents in 2019 supporting restrictive measures towards migrants and their entrance into Russia.⁷ Experts argue that migrant phobia, radicalism, and racism have become a “social glue that is holding… Russian society together.”⁸ Today's Russia right-wing radicalism is based on anti-immigrant rhetoric planted by the state authorities. Creating an identity of “Others” vs. “Us” became part of a political strategy that includes nation branding under the motto “Russia for Russians” and anti-migrant sentiments in order to meet the electorate demand.

The term “crimigration” broadly used by American scholars can apply to widely used Russian state practices towards Central Asian migrants, described by Urinboeyev, with the purpose of instrumentalizing them as a fungible source of cheap labor.⁹ Caress Schenk refers to these practices in her research and indicates that “legal uniformity” throughout Russia is undermined by contrasts between law on paper and law enforcement practices. This gap produces an “equilibrium where social, economic, and state actors are relatively satisfied by their ability to access a mix of formal and informal mechanisms” in order to manage labor and migration flows.¹⁰

It is well known that many migrant workers from Central Asian countries who desire legal status are pushed into a “non-rule-of -law-environment” by their employers, middlemen, and landlords, refusing to provide them legal contracts, official migratory registration (propiska), and adequate and qualifying salary payments (Chapters 4–6). Additionally, there are such constant changes in the requirements for employment, residence, and migration registration of foreigners in the Russian Federation that even professionals struggle to understand the dynamic and unstable migration regulation. Joan Round and Irina Kuznetsova correctly point out that is always a “… state of exception, within which legal frameworks protecting migrants are ignored or misinterpreted to the benefit of the [labor] market.”¹¹

Significant research has been done about Russia's migration policy, but few publications in English have tackled this controversial issue. In the last few years, some scholars published books and papers that examined migration dynamics and migrants’ lives within Russia: Matthew Light studied the phenomena of deportation, exile, and migration in building Russia's statehood in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries; Ekaterina Demintseva looked into the challenges and perspectives of Russia's migration policies in comparison to the European experience; Leah Utyasheva and I have examined how the deeply embedded desire to limit an influx of the “Other” presents a serious threat to migration policy and the future economic development of Russia; and Agnieszka Kubal probed the causes, effects, and experiences of human mobility in modern Russia.¹²

Urinboeyev goes beyond the existing research framework and interprets migrants’ activities when they are in search of law and justice through formal institutions and informal, self-created authorities. Following the author's understanding, Russia's labor market is a “state within the state” (86), where different roles such as “managers,” “racketeers,” and “middlemen” are performed by the migrants themselves. According to the predetermined labor market hierarchy, Armenian and Azeri migrants are ranked higher than Central Asian migrants. Chechens and Dagestanis with a reputation as “violent lawless individuals” are often acting as a gozi (literally judge). Interestingly, policemen and FSB representatives also play a role as curators of migrants’ workplaces or advocates “defending middlemen and Russian employers vis á vis Chechen or Dagestani racketeers” (88).

Chapter by chapter, Urinboyev explains who Uzbek migrants in Russia are, why they keep coming to the country and how employers, middlemen, landlords, and ordinary Russians deal with them. Sometimes they have happy endings and acquire Russian citizenship (Zaur's story), others feature love, hope, and survival (story of Baha), while others are stories of lost hopes and unrelinquished dreams (Nodir's story). This book constitutes a unique resource of migrants’ everyday life and law enforcement migration practices within Russia.

Our next author, Amy Liu, examines a link between international relations, domestic policies, and Chinese migrant communities in central and eastern Europe. It is a seldom studied research area. Liu's book is about the phenomena of Chinese migrants working and living in Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Croatia, and their incorporation into the host societies. Migrant incorporation is a special research area that deals with “diversification of diversity.”¹³ On the one hand, it describes the various ways in which newcomers may be integrated, often described as “incorporated” into the host society in order to adopt to its legal, political, linguistic, and cultural norms and traditions. On the other hand, the home countries’ environment is also important and influential on migrant life in the host country. Steven Vertovec perfectly summarizes it as follows: [migration incorporation] denotes diversity not only between immigrant and ethnic groups, but also within them.¹⁴

Liu explains the difference between bonding migrant networks based on ethnolinguistic homogeneity and bridging migrant networks characterized by interethnic engagement (Chapter 2). With conclusions based on the example of Budapest (Hungary), Bucharest (Romania), Belgrade (Serbia), Sofia (Bulgaria), and Zagreb (Croatia), Liu justifies how the type of existing migrant networks can influence migrant incorporation in host countries (Chapter 3). She finds some similarities and differences in Chinese communities in central and eastern Europe. First, the Chinese became visible in the region after the collapse of the USSR, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991. Second, Chinese migration to Europe has a male face. The majority of Chinese are first-generation migrants with an average age of thirty-seven. Third, the Chinese representative ratio, their engagement and geographical placement, as well as the relation between the host (European) countries and China (a sending country) differs by country and city. Budapest hosts Chinese communities with a vibrant linguistic and geographical diversity. Chinese communities in Bucharest and Belgrade are primarily the result of a Chinese exodus from Budapest. Finally, there is no significant diversity in labor activities among Chinese migrants within the region. Chinese in Bucharest, Budapest, and Belgrade are merchants and concentrate on doing all form of business in the city's respective Chinatowns. The Chinese in Sofia work as personnel in Asian restaurants or traditional medicine practitioners or as “small scale farmers who lease land from the locals” (Liu, 57). It is important to mention that in doing this research, Liu operated with data and information drawn from both original and secondary resources.

Liu's analysis of China's exceptional case amid right-wing nationalism in Hungary (Chapter 5) should be of special interest to many readers. Many scholars write about right-wing radicalism, based on anti-immigrant rhetoric, and how deep it is rooted in the Hungarian political environment. They describe Hungarian immigration law and enforcement practices as tough and discriminatory.¹⁵ Umut Korkut argues that Hungarian officials at national and regional levels cultivate a conservative values-agenda, anti-western discourse, and migrant-phobia through diverse inroads.¹⁶ But Liu tells another story, showing how Hungarian officials adopted a special residency program in exchange for €300,000 for wealthy migrants, predominantly of Chinese origin, and remain silent on this matter (Liu, 94–95). Another fascinating case study is the comparison of Muslim and Chinese migrants in central and eastern Europe (Chapter 7).

Chapter by chapter, Liu creates policy recommendations depending on the type of existing and dominated migrant networks that could strengthen levels of political incorporation of Chinese migrants into European countries (Chapter 10). These recommendations, in particular the promotion of regional dialects and lingua franca [here: Mandarin] used by migrant communities, diversification of legal channels to emigrate, and maintenance of diverse channels to communicate at different levels could apply to various migrant communities in a broader context.

The book The History and Politics of Free Movement Within the European Union analyzes the idea and the right to free movement across borders in different historical periods. According to Saila Heinikoski and her respondents from the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Romania, free movement is a fundamental right of all EU citizens. It is a “core element” (German Minister Thomas de Maiziere), “an instrument of European unification” (French President Jacques Chirac), “the backbone of the European Union” (EU Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos); “wish of us all” (Romanian President Trajan Băsescu); and “a choice [France] wanted several decades ago when making Europe (French President François Hollande).

Heinikoski searches for answers to questions of what the nature and evolution of the right to free movement has been (chapters 2, 8, 9), who is allowed to move freely in the EU and who is not (chapters 4,7), and to what extend the free movement idea can promote good in Europe (Chapter 10) and the whole world. The last question is a tricky one. The free movement of goods, capital, services, and people, known collectively as the four freedoms, is the cornerstone upon which the European Union is created, and upon which European integration is based. Floris de Witte highlights that while “free movement must be celebrated… as a right that is available for all 500 million EU citizens, and as an idea that benefits all those citizens—whether they make use of it or not,” Sarah Fine argues that the right to free movement should be also a reason for creating “hard” external border controls.¹⁷

The discussion of the values of free movement guarantees and border control measures is a never ending story on the European continent.¹⁸ Chapter 4 of Heinikoski's book also deals with security issues and the duties of better implementation of the right to free movement within EU. One moment is wholly absorbing: before the Brexit referendum, two key figures of the British political scene, David Cameron and Theresa May, stipulated that “free movement is a qualified right,” and therefore, [the UK] is going to prevent “the frequent use of the free movement right in order to circumvent national immigration control” (55).

Interestingly, ordinary European inhabitants attach high importance to freedom of movement, although most of them do not support increased immigration. A survey from the Bertelsmann Foundation finds that 90% of Polish, 86% of Spanish, 84% of German, and 71% of French citizens consider freedom of movement to “be of exceptional significance,” albeit 50% of Europeans have a fear of being “alienated” and “to be a stranger in my own country.”¹⁹ From this perspective, one may draw two conclusions. First, the attractiveness of freedom of movement clearly has more value than a fear of unwanted migration. Second, some scholars are mistaken by saying that free movement served to alienate third country nationals and created a dilemma of “Insider” and “Outsider” within the EU.²⁰ Heinikoski explains the theoretical value of guaranteed free movement from value-based and instrumental perspectives, concluding that “free movement connected to deeper Europeanness, burden-sharing in immigration and negative transnationalism” (100). She argues that free movement is “a symbol of European solidarity” and “a symbol of promoting European unification” (Heinikoski, 110) aimed at giving Europeans “a feeling of sameness” (99).

EU immigration and asylum policies do not apply equally to all EU members states. Michael Cooper explained why some EU countries, namely Denmark (three opt-outs), Ireland (two opt-outs) and Poland (one opt-out), enjoy certain “opt-out” privileges, while some non-EU members, namely Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland, have “opt-in” benefits to some agreements within the Schengen Agreement.²¹ Today's EU migration policy is part of a wider policy area called the AFSJ-Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice. It regulates free movement of people, goods, services, asylum and visa issues, judicial and external border control cooperation, police collaboration, and others. The EU is not granted exclusive power to regulate AFSJ policies but shares its competence with its member states.²² For example, migrants’ access to social benefits and services is fundamentally shaped by the immigration policy of member states and the capacities of their welfare systems, but such provisions must be compatible with EU law and, in particular, with the basic principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination of EU migrant citizens.²³

Heinikoski finds that EU politicians pay no attention “to the gender pattern of free movement,” albeit many scholars’ work has shown the “gendered effects of free movement” (143–44). She speaks about some “most wanted” migrant groups, such as high skilled workers, young EU nationals, and “unwanted” individuals, in particular criminals, welfare tourists, and irregular migrants, and “the hierarchy and asymmetries” applied to them by diverse discourses of state representatives within the EU (Chapter 10).

Modern European migration policy based on free movement of goods, services, capitals, and people is multidimensional, requires competences in both the internal and external aspects of migration, and is characterized by multi-level governance. While member states have made some progress in unification and harmonization of migration and asylum law across the continent, this issue remains the most “complex” and “controversial” area of EU cooperation.²⁴ Despite Brexit and various humanitarian crises at EU borders, it is still worth providing a legal, political, and philosophical argument for why European officials and ordinary people should value freedom of movement. It could also contribute to diminishing the “democratic deficit” (Heinikoski, 8) of the [whole] union.²⁵

Heinikoski's book's novelty consists of its methodology aimed at operating a discourse-historical approach and using political statements as the empirical material for the author's analysis. It is an interesting and innovative research approach, albeit political statements are always more abstract in some sense than law, with its focus on personal experience, ethics, and intuition. Such statements always differ from a legal norm that is grounded in, and constrained by, national legal order, precedent, and practice. However, the valuable component of Heinikoski's contribution is the appendix with collected empirical documents from the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Romania along with her justification and analysis of a broader and diverse context of free movement within Europe.

This book is highly valuable, if not crucial reading for anyone who wants to understand how the right to free movement in Europe has been established and promoted. For those not involved with migration studies, the book may also offer interesting reading, as it offers an understanding of attitudes toward the idea and right to free movement among high-ranking politicians in six European countries: the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Romania.

In sum, the legal, political, and humanitarian context in which migrants negotiate their status and rights has not changed significantly in the twenty-first century Lives of ordinary people and some politicians are still dominated by a fear of being occupied, absorbed, or overrun by invaders, aliens, and migrants. Therefore, more research on policies affecting migration in both sending and receiving countries and the relation between migration and politics are needed. These three books reflecting the most current scholarship and theories in migration, foreign and domestic policies, and international relations have already made an outstanding contribution to migration studies.