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The Politotdel: A Lesson from the Past
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2017
Extract
At the end of 1932 Soviet agriculture was in an extremely perilous condition. After three years of forced collectivization, “dekulakization,” and confiscatory procurement policies, labor discipline and operational effectiveness were collapsing in the socialist enterprises in the village—the machinetractor stations (mashinno-traktornye stantsii—MTS), the kolkhozes, and the sovkhozes. Through neglect or outright sabotage the peasants had decimated the herds of cattle and essential draft animals. Finally, a growing famine, partially artificial in origin, was striking certain major regions of the country.
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References
1 For an interesting treatment of the famine see Dana G. Dalrymple, “The Soviet Famine of 1932-1934,” Soviet Studies, XV, No. 3 (Jan. 1964), 250-84.
2 Most of the following discussion will be limited to the MTS politotdely. The sovkhoz politotdely, confined in their jurisdiction primarily to the territory of the sovkhozes themselves, were relatively less important in the total picture of Party control in agriculture.
3 These two principles should not be confused with the “functional” and “branch-of-production“ principles of organization of the Central Committee Secretariat. The production and territorial-production principles referred to in the present article, although related to these, concern primarily the organization of Party administration at the middle and lower levels. In agriculture this has meant particularly the raion level. For a discussion of the alternations in the Central Committee Secretariat see Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled (rev. ed.; Cambridge, Mass., 1963), Chap. 6.
4 K. E. Voroshilov, Stat'i i rechi (Moscow, 1937), p. 505.
5 J. Stalin, Works (Moscow, 1952-55), XIII, 229.
6 Ibid., pp. 232-33.
7 L. M. Kaganovich, “Tseli i zadachi politicheskikh otdelov MTS i sovkhozov,” Bol'shevik, No. 1-2 (Jan.), 1933, p. 18.
8 KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh s“ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK (Moscow, 1954-60), Part III, p. 190.
9 Ibid., pp. 191-92. On links between the politotdely and the Procuracy see, for example, “V kollegii NKIu,” Sovetskaia iustitsiia, No. 7, 1933, p. 24; and S. Galitskii, “Sovmestnaia rabota organov iustitsii s politotdelami Leningradskoi oblasti,” ibid., No. 16, 1934, passim, esp. p. 4.
10 KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Part III, p. 197.
11 Ibid., p. 196.
12 “Novyi otriad poslantsev partii v derevniu,” Pravda, Aug. 15, 1933.
13 Smolensk under Soviet Rule (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), p. 286. See also S. Trapeznikov, Istoricheskii opyt KPSS v sotsialisticheskom preobrazovanii sel'skogo khoziaistva (Moscow, 1959), p. 277. Trapeznikov refers to the OGPU deputy as the “deputy director [of the MTS] for special work [spetsrabota],” indicating perhaps a formal status equal to that of the politotdel chief himself. I have not seen this formulation used elsewhere, however.
14 I. E. Zelenin, “Politotdely MTS (1933-1934 gg-)»” in Istoricheskie zapiski (Moscow: Institut istorii, AN SSSR), No. 76,1965, p. 54.
15 Jerry F. Hough, in a recent article, has quite convincingly argued that this separation does not in fact exist even in Soviet administrative theory itself. Hough demonstrates that there is a rational division of labor between Party and state officials in the operation of the economy at the middle and lower levels, as well as at the apex of the system. See “The Soviet Concept of the Relationship between the Lower Party Organs and the State Administration,” Slavic Review, XXIV, No. 2 (June 1965), 215-40.
16 Zelenin, pp. 44-45.
17 It should be noted that Khrushchev did not adopt this hybrid form in his two experiments with the politotdel model, a fact which might seem to call in question the applicability of the framework presented in this article. The author would submit, however, that this difference in structure, while important, is not crucial. Khrushchev was perhaps less deeply concerned with the formal niceties of the Party-state separation than were Kaganovich and his colleagues, operating in an earlier period, when the separation may have had more symbolic importance.
18 KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Part III, p. 195.
19 Itogi raboty mashinno-traktomykh stantsii za 1933 goda (Moscow, 1936), p. vi.
20 P. D. Indychenko, “Pervyi opyt raboty politotdelov MTS i sovkhozov,” Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, No. 9 (Sept.), 1933, p. 19.
21 “Derevenskaia partorganizatsiia pered litsom novykh zadach,” Partiinoe stroitel'stvo, No. 13-14 (July), 1933, p. 26.
22 For example, “Vsemernuiu pomoshch’ politotdelam MTS i sovkhozov,” Pravda, June 12. 1933.
23 Decree of June 15, 1933, “O rabote politodelov MTS, o kolkhoznoi iacheike i o vzaimootnosheniiakh politotdelov i raikomov,” in P. N. Sharova et al., eds., Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva: Vazhneishie postanovleniia Kommunisticheskoi partii i Sovetskogo pravitel'stva, 1927-1935 gg. (Moscow, 1957), p. 461.
24 Zelenin, p. 45.
25 Ibid., n. 14.
26 la. A. Iakovlev, “Zadachi komandnogo sostava novostroiashchikhsia MTS,” in Voprosy organizatsii sotsialisticheskogo sel'skogo khoziaistva (Moscow, 1935), p. 144.
27 V. Markovich, “Derevnia poluchila moguchii otriad Bol'shevikov,” Partiinoe stroitel'stvo, No. 13-14 (July), 1933, pp. 62-63.
28 Zelenin, p. 46.
29 These figures are drawn from data given in Markovich, pp. 62-63. Note the large number of former okrug and guberniia officials. These two administrative units had been liquidated in 1930 and 1929, respectively. Hence there were large numbers of relatively highranking personnel available for assignment at the time of the creation of the politotdely. This coincidental reservoir of cadres would not be available to the Party in subsequent ventures with the politotdel model.
30 Ibid. Compare these percentages with Fainsod's statistics on the general level of education of Party members in How Russia Is Ruled, p. 268.
31 Markovich, p. 64.
32 Trapeznikov, p. 276.
33 Krinitskii, in XVII s“ezd Vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoe partii (b): Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow, 1934), p. 139.
34 Larin, speech at kraiispolkom conference, in Molot (Rostov-on-Don), January 30, 1934. The middle and lower levels of MTS personnel were also hard hit in the North Caucasus. In 191 MTS covered by a contemporary survey almost 25 percent of these categories were purged for various political reasons, ranging from “alien” social origin to sabotage of tractors, as part of a rather transparent campaign to attribute the failures of the past to “class enemies” who had infiltrated the local socialized enterprises. See A. Shteingart, “Politotdely Severnogo Kavkaza za rabotoi,” Pravda, July 3, 1933.
35 The title of a lead editorial in Pravda on such resistance is perhaps suggestive: “Za klevetu na politotdel—surovaia partiinaia kara,” Pravda, July 3, 1933.
36 Iu. V. Arutiunian and M. A. Vyltsan, Istoricheskaia rol’ MTS i ikh reorganizatsiia (Moscow, 1958), p. 45.
37 Larin, in Molot, Jan. 30,1934.
38 Zelenin, p. 53. Zelenin's attribution of the excesses of the 1933 purges entirely to the OGPU deputies is probably unjustified; it obviously reflects the de-Stalinization line of the Khrushchev era. However, the evidence does indicate that the 1933 purges, like the subsequent Great Purges, tended to develop a momentum of their own and to occupy an inordinate share of the work of the politotdely.
39 Ibid., p. 49.
40 For example, see Fainsod's description of the El'nia MTS in Smolensk, p. 289.
41 For a tabulated breakdown of types of cells during the early stages of the collectivization drive see “Perestroika partiinoi raboty,” Partiinoe stroitel'stvo, No. 11-12 (June), 1930, p. 46.
42 See note 23 above. The activities of the politotdel of the Ostrogozhsk MTS (Central Chernozem Oblast) in this area were typical. Before the reorganization there had been ten territorial cells and three candidates’ groups among the 30 kolkhozy of the MTS zone. After the reorganization there were 16 kolkhoz production cells, two candidates’ groups, and four so-called “Party-Komsomol nuclei“—all presumably intimately involved in kolkhoz production. The politotdel also directed 72 individual Party organizers into the 126 kolkhoz field brigades in the zone. Of 153 Communists in the Party cells of the zone, 48 percent were reported to be working directly in production after the reorganization, twice the previous percentage. B. Ruban, “God bor'by za bol'shevistskie kolkhozy,” Na agrarnom fronte, No. I (Jan.), 1934, p. 121.
43 Zelenin, p. 49.
44 Institut Krasnoi Professury, MTS i ee politotdel: Opyt raboty Veselokutskoi MTS, Odesskoi oblasti, SSSR (Moscow, 1934), pp. 33-34. This arrangement was not necessarily typical.
45 Ibid., pp. 39-40.
46 Ibid., pp. 49-50.
47 Quoted in Shteingart.
48 See, for example, the case of the chief of the politotdel of the El'nia MTS, in Fainsod, Smolensk, p. 282.
49 XVII s“ezd, passim, esp. p. 22.
50 Ibid., pp. 138-39.
51 Zelenin (p. 53) suggests that there had been a continuing struggle between those who supported the “political” approach, headed by Stalin, Kaganovich, and Molotov, and those who consistently opposed it—he names Postyshev specifically. The debates at the Congress do seem to point to the existence of a struggle between forces trying to retain the politotdely as an independent chain of command, bypassing the regular provincial Party channels, and the provincial Party leaders attempting to regain control over all Party personnel in the countryside. Whether this was a conflict of personalities or of policies is difficult to determine. Either way the Great Purges represented a definite settling of scores with the provincial leaders.
52 XVII s“ezd, pp. 540, 542. Kaganovich, the main patron of the politotdely, now appeared to be taking a middle ground, probably reluctantly, between Krinitskii and the critics of the politotdely. The opposition had evidently been so great, on practical grounds, that Kaganovich had been forced to yield, but he was attempting to stall for time. The decision to transfer authority to the agricultural bureaucracy may thus conceivably have been a maneuver to maintain an alternative channel of control outside the direct purview of the provincial Party secretaries. More likely, however, the reorganization was simply part of the general move toward more normal patterns of administration throughout the economy.
53 Ibid., p. 150. He had been urging these changes in his home territory before the Congress. See Molot, Jan. 23,1934.
54 XVIIs“ezd, pp. 560-61.
55 KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Part III, pp. 227-28. The author has found no evidence that any were actually converted piecemeal. When the liquidation did finally take place, it occurred under the terms of a new resolution, which ordered the wholesale conversion or abolition of all MTS politotdely.
56 Ibid.
57 Proletarii (Kharkov), Feb. 22, 1934.
58 “Vse usloviia dlia rosta pogolov'ia est',” Molot, Sept. 3, 1934. A resolution of the June (1934) plenum of the Central Committee explicitly charged the politotdely with responsibility for kolkhoz livestock.
59 “Vstretit’ uborku khoroshimi taborami,” ibid., June 15,1934.
60 “Lesonasazhdenie—zashchita urozhaia,” Pravda, May 21, 1934.
61 See, for example, the decree of the Azov-Black Sea Kraikom “O vypolnenii plana khlebosdachi po otstaiushchim raionam i MTS kraia,” Molot, Oct. 12, 1934.
62 A. Charkin, “Iz praktiki partiinogo instruktazha v politsektore MTS,” Partiinoe stroitel'stvo, No. 12 (June), 1934, p. 33.
63 See, for example, “Inzhenery sotsialisticheskikh polei,” Pravda, May 18, 1934.
64 Zelenin, pp. 56-57.
65 Kaganovich, “O vnutripartiinoi rabote i otdelakh rukovodiashchikh partiinykh organov,” Pravda, Nov. 24, 1934. Note the extraordinary length of time between the delivery of the speech and its publication.
66 KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Part III, p. 263.
67 Ibid., pp. 263-64.
68 Kaganovich, “Itogi noiabr'skogo Plenuma TsK VKP(b),” Partiinoe stroitel'stvo, No. 1-2 (Jan.), 1935, p. 15.
69 The sovkhoz politotdely continued in operation until 1939.
70 KPSS v rezoliutsiiahh, Part III, p. 238. This resolution may, of course, be viewed as a victory for Kaganovich over his opponents. The Central Committee soon took advantage of this self-conferred right by establishing politotdely in the transport system. It is interesting to note that Kaganovich became People's Commissar of Transport at precisely this time.
71 The question arises why some Soviet leaders faced with the perennial problem of crisis in agriculture have not perceived the necessity of resorting to the production principle. Surely “it is no accident” that Khrushchev, who did perceive the need for the shift in principles, was for a long time a protégé of Kaganovich. The personal style and background of the “perceiver” makes any theorizing on Soviet administrative behavior hazardous.