Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 January 2017
This article uses life history interview data collected during a project on languages and peace support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina to consider, as an occupational group, people from former Yugoslavia who were employed as interpreters by foreign military forces. In exploring their opportunities for temporary prosperity and the sources of precarity that were associated with this distinctive form of work, Catherine Baker discusses the socioeconomic transformation of Bosnia-Herzegovina both in light of literature on postsocialist labor and in light of a global “development-security nexus” that may be observed during and after contemporary conflicts. Neither lens is sufficient for understanding the full extent of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Baker concludes by making the case for researchers of all postsocialist societies in central and eastern Europe, not just the societies that have direcdy experienced armed conflict, to take account of the global context of security, development, humanitarianism, and intervention.
Early versions of this paper were presented at the Second Languages at War Annual Workshop, Imperial War Museum, London, 28 May 2010, and at the American Association for Applied Linguistics (AAAL) annual convention, Chicago, 26-29 March 2011. The research was carried out as part of the project Languages at War: Policies and Practices of Language Contacts in Conflict, funded by the United Kingdom's Arts and Humanities Research Council, while I was employed at the University of Southampton. A British Academy Overseas Conference Award supported the presentation of this research at AAAL. Thanks are due to Louise Askew, Mona Baker, Hilary Footitt, Eric Gordy, Michael Kelly, and Simona Tobia, to discussants and attendees at the panels in London and Chicago, and to the editor of Slavic Review and the anonymous reviewers of this paper for comments that have improved it greatly.
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29. A year or two after this last interviewee had started working, the divisional headquarters began enforcing a minimum working age of eighteen and reportedly terminated several young interpreters’ contracts.
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43. As SFOR shifted its role from security to liaison, many SFOR bases closed and fewer night patrols were used. By 2010, this had converted many EUFOR field interpreter posts to office-hours positions.
44. Dubravka, interview, Banja Luka, 9 May 2010.
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55. At that time, a major Bosnian jobs portal was http://www.posao.ba/job.php?jobID=54919 (accessed 9 May 2011; no longer available).
56. While much more deserves to be said about gender and interpreting, a full analysis of how this work was gendered is beyond the scope of this paper.
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