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A Struggle for the Soviet Future: The Birth of Scientific Forecasting in the Soviet Union

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Eglė Rindzevičiūtė
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Abstract

This article analyzes the development of Soviet scientific future studies after World War II, arguing that the field's theory and methods undermined the certainty of the communist future and laid the foundations for a new Soviet governmentality that acknowledged the intrinsic uncertainty of future development. The emphasis on uncertainty—but also the need for more data that could freely circulate between different branches of government and hence more transparency (glasnost')—called for radical revisions to Soviet notions of effective governance. Whereas some used future studies to criticize the actual practices of Soviet economic planning, others used this new type of expertise to extend personal influence and accumulate organizational power. Both cases, however, made it clear that Soviet governance had to accommodate the shift toward new constellations of power/knowledge in which scientific experts would play an ever-increasing role in shaping policy with regard to a fundamentally uncertain future.

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Articles
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Slavic Review , Volume 75 , Issue 1 , Spring 2016 , pp. 52 - 76
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. 2016

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References

This study was part of the research project “A Political History of the Future : Knowledge Production and Future Governance 1945-2010” (FUTUREPOL), funded by the European Research Council, at Sciences Po, Paris. I thank the FUTUREPOL team, particularly Jenny Andersson, as well as Barbara Czarniawska, Irina Sandomirskaja, and the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments.

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32. The term Delphi method was originally created by Abraham Kaplan in 1950, and the method was developed by Olaf Helmer, Norman Dalkey, and T. J. Gordon at RAND. On Soviet adaptation of the Delphi method, see Pospelov, G. S. and V. I., Maksimenko, “Predislovie,” in I. V., Bestuzhev-Lada and R. A., Fesenko, Gorizonty nauki i tekhniki (Moscow, 1969), 8-9 Google Scholar; and Jenny Andersson, “Forging the American Future: RAND, the Commission for the Year 2000 and the Rise of Futurology” (forthcoming).

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35. “Otchet” (November 1958), RGAE, f. 99, op. 1, d. 858,11.5-6.

36. A1957 scheme for continuous planning included general perspective plans (for fifteen to twenty years), five-year plans, and annual plans. RGAE, f. 99, op. 1, d. 862,11.21-22. A French planner noted that Gosplan's perspective planning was based on calculations of optimal development of existing trends. French prospective planning indicated several quite different futures and was “not thinkable” for Soviet economists. Robert Fraisse, “Notes sur planification a long terme en Union Sovietique” (December 1966), BR 4/513/8, Sciences Po, 11.

37. Grigorii Sapov, “Tri interv'iu s E. B. Ershovym. Pervoe interv'iu” (February-March 1999), at http://www.sapov.ru/staroe/si06.html (last accessed December 5,2015).

38. “Stenograma” (Moscow, December 14,1966), RGAE, f. 99, op. 1, d. 869; Rosier, Bernard, ed., Wassily Leontief: Textes et itineraire (Paris, 1986).Google Scholar

39. I base this statement on the memoir by N. N. Moiseev, Kak daleko do zavtreshnego dnia…: Svobodnye razmyshleniia, 1917-1993 (Moscow, 1997).

40. Ershov, Iu. V. and Popovich, A. S., “Propushchennaia vozmozhnost’ obognat’ Ameriku, ili k chemu provodit ignorirovanie prognoz,” Top Club Journal 3, no. 21 (2012): 8-17 Google Scholar; Dobrov, Genadii, “0 predvidenii razvitiia nauki,” Voprosy filosofii, no. 10 (1964): 71-82.Google Scholar

41. See N. N. Moiseev, Kak daleko; Kaplan, Fred, The Wizards of Armagedon (Stanford, 1991)Google Scholar; and Joy Rohde, Armed with Expertise: The Militarization of American Social Research during the Cold War (Ithaca, 2013).

42. Travin, Dmitry and Marganiya, Otar, “Resource Curse: Rethinking the Soviet Experience,” in Gel'man, Vladimir and Marganiya, Otar, eds., Resource Curse and Post-Soviet Eurasia: Oil, Gas and Modernization (Lanham, 2010), 31-32 Google Scholar; Efremenko, D. V., Vvedenie v otsenku tekhniki (Moscow, 2002), 59.Google Scholar

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44. On Kosygin, see Kahonen, Aappo, “Optimal Planning, Optimal Economy, Optimal Life? The Kosygin Reforms, 1965-72,” in Miklossy, Katalin and Ilic, Melanie, eds., Competition in Socialist Society (London, 2014), 23-40.Google Scholar

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46. Ibid., 4-5.

47. RGAE, f. 4372, op. 65,1.3; RGAE, f. 99, op. 1, d. 869,1. 3.

48. “Stenograma,” 1.115.

49. RGAE, f. 99, op. 1, d. 869,1.15.

50. Ibid., 11. 97-105.

51. Ibid., 11.43-46, 52.

52. Ibid., 1. 27.

53. Ibid., 1.13.

54. Kosygin, “Povyshenie,” 4.

55. RGAE, f. 99, op. 2, op. 1.

56. “Stenograma,” 1.17.

57. Ibid., 11.32-33.

58. This was a modest pluralism referring to different routes leading to different levels of achievement, such as maximum, minimum, and average. RGAE, f. 99, op. 1, d. 869,11.7-9.

59. Ibid., 11. 64-68.

60. Sapov, “Tri interv'iu.“

61. “Stenograma,” (Moscow, December 14,1966), RGAE, f.99, op.l, d.869,11.16-23.

62. Ibid., 1.26.

63. Ibid, 1.2.

64. ARAN, f. 2, op. 1, d. 858,1.176.

65. On clientelism in Soviet policymaking, see Fortescue, Stephen, ed., Russian Politics: From Lenin to Putin (Basingstoke, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; ARAN, f.2, op.l, d.858,11.172-173.

66. In the summer of 1968, IKSI was established as a separate institute, based on the Department of Social Research (est. February 1966) at the Institute of Philosophy. ARAN, f. 1977, op. 1, d. 2,11.1-2. See Weinberg, Elizabeth A., Sociology in the Soviet Union and Beyond: Social Enquiry and Social Change (Aldershot, 2004).Google Scholar

67. “Sotsial'nyi progress v SSSR” (1973), ARAN, f. 1977, op. 2, d. 66,1. 52.

68. IKSI's research plan (1969), ARAN, f. 1977, op. 1, d. 7,1.3.

69. RGAE, f. 99, op. 1, d. 869,1. 47.

70. Ibid., 1.77. The reports were sent to Gosplan, the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT), and the Foreign Ministry. ARAN, f. 1977, op. 1, d. 40,1. 4.

71. Osier, Rethinking the Scientific Revolution.

72. IKSI staff grew from about 100 in 1968 to almost 300 in the mid-1970s, and Bestuzhev-Lada's unit grew to 15 staff members. A year after its establishment, IKSI lacked basic equipment, such as desks and typewriters. Scholars complained about having to work in insufficiently lit basement offices. IKSI's first computer, a Minsk-32, arrived only in 1971. ARAN, f. 1977, op. 1, d. 42,11.1-2; ARAN, f. 1977, op. 1, d. 7,1.114; and ARAN, f. 1977, op. 1, d. 38,1.16.

73. At the end of the 1960s, two publications attracted harsh ideological criticism: a humble print run of lecture notes on western sociological theories, by Iurii Levada, and the collection The Mathematical Modeling of Social Processes, edited by Iurii Osipov, Aganbegian, and Moiseev. See B. M., Firsov, Istoriia sovetskoi sotsiologii 1950-1980 gg.: Kurs lektsii (St. Petersburg, 2001).Google Scholar

74. Bestuzhev-Lada succeeded in establishing his position as “the leading Soviet forecaster” in western historiography. One of the reasons why is that almost all historical writings about Soviet forecasting either are produced by Bestuzhev-Lada himself or draw heavily on his narrative. See, for example, Rocca, Gordon, ‘“A Second Party in Our Midst': The History of the Soviet Scientific Forecasting Association,” Social Studies of Science 11, no. 2 (1981): 199-247 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Bestuzhev-Lada, Igor’, ed., Malaia rossiiskaia entsiklopedia prognostiki (Moscow, 2007)Google Scholar. His early involvement in the emerging futurist networks is also acknowledged by western authors. Wendell, Bell, Foundations of Futures Studies: History, Purposes, and Knowledge, vol. 1, Human Science for a New Era (New Brunswick, 2003), 36.Google Scholar

75. Bestuzhev-Lada, I. V., “Prognozirovanie bylo iznachal'no oberecheno na pogrom,” in Batygin, G. S. and S. M., larmoliuk, eds., Rossiiskaia sotsiologiia shestidesiatykh godov v vospominaniiakh i dokumentakh (St. Petersburg, 1999), 417-18.Google Scholar

76. Ibid., 405.

77. The 1967 paper was intended for the first World Futures Conference, organized by Johan Galtung in Oslo. Both Bestuzhev-Lada and Dobrov were invited but, due to bureaucratic delays, could not attend. Their papers were published in the conference proceedings, Mankind 2000. ARAN, f. 1977, op. 2, d. 60,1.4. Bestuzhev's first publications in the field of scientific forecasting include a contribution to a joint report edited by Rumiantsev, Problemy obschei i sotsial'noiprognostiki (Moscow, 1968), and lecture notes on social forecasting, published in 1969.

78. Bestuzhev-Lada, “Prognozirovanie,” 406-7; ARAN, f. 1957, op. 1, d. 29,1.16; Report of the work at IKSI (1968), ARAN, f. 1977, op. 1, d. 2,11. 20-37.

79. See, for example, a nostalgic tale about the intellectual circles at IMRD in the documentary Otdel (dir. Aleksandr Arkhangel'skii, 2010). Bestuzhev-Lada did not feature in this film. Arab-Ogly actively networked with western thinkers: in 1959, he met Daniel Bell, as well as Raymond Aron and Robert Merton, in the ISA Congress in Italy. From the late 1950s, he was in contact with French Christian Marxist Roger Garaudy, who would be the first to publish Bestuzhev-Lada's writings in the west in 1968. Arab-Ogly, E. A., Demograficheskie i ekologicheskie prognozy: Kritika sovremennykh burzhuaznykh kontseptsii (Moscow, 1978)Google Scholar; Arab-Ogly, E. A., “Togda kazalos', chto koe-to udavalos’ …, “ in Batygin, and Iarmoliuk, , eds., Rossiiskaia sotsiologiia, 364-65, 369.Google Scholar

80. Bestuzhev-Lada, “Prognozirovanie,” 407.

81. Interview with Russian scientist, Moscow, April 12,2013.

82. Bestuzhev-Lada, “Prognozirovanie,” 405-6.

83. Ibid., 415-16.

84. ARAN, f. 1977, op. 1, d. 42,11.1-5. In his memoir, Bestuzhev-Lada writes that he hated mathematics almost as much as homosexuality. Igor’, Bestuzhev-Lada, Svozhu schety s zhizn'iu: Zapiski futurologa o proshedshem i prikhodiashchem (Moscow, 2004), 289-90.Google Scholar

85. This is suggested by the speed with which Zvorykin completed his research projects at IKSI. Although Bestuzhev-Lada began his work in winter 1969, his first research project about forecasting youths’ future values was not launched until 1972. During this time, Zvorykin delivered several reports on his research findings to the academy and the Central Committee. I base this observation on the IKSI documents kept at ARAN, f. 1977.

86. In 1969, Bestuzhev-Lada spoke at a number of the academy institutes and delivered a course on the history of forecasting at the philosophy department of Moscow State University. ARAN, f. 1977, op. 1, d. 7,1.86.

87. Due to the lack of space, the connections between scientific forecasting and science- fiction writing cannot be addressed in this article; the subject, indeed, merits a study of its own. I will only note that Efremov's biographers appear to have overlooked his international connections with western futurologists, something that might have explained the KGB's suspicion of Efremov after his death. 01 ‘ga Eremina and Nikolai Smirnov, Ivan Efremov (Moscow, 2013).

88. The Soviet Sociological Association was established in June 1958. Dmitri N., Shalin, “The Development of Soviet Sociology, 1956-1976,” Annual Review of Sociology 4 (1978): 171-91Google Scholar; Bestuzhev-Lada, , “Prognozirovanie,” 406, 414-15.Google Scholar

89. ARAN, f. 1977, op. 2, d. 60.

90. Bestuzhev-Lada was instructed to strictly focus on the perspectives of the socioeconomic aspects of disarmament in his Oslo talk. IKSI (September 1970) ARAN, f. 1977, op. 1, d. 52,11. 70-72; “Direktivnye ukazaniia” (IMRD, October 30,1968), ARAN, f. 1957, op. 1, d. 39,1.38.1 could not locate his report on this visit; Rocca indicated that Bestuzhev- Lada indeed went in person to Oslo.

91. Bestuzhev-Lada, “Prognozirovanie,” 420.

92. In the 1980s, Rocca painstakingly tried to map the development of the SSF but with little success. Some information about it can be found in Firsov, Istoriia sovetskoi sotsiologii. The current state of knowledge leaves one with a lot of unanswered questions about this initiative.

93. In his autobiography, Bestuzhev-Lada claims that the basis for the spontaneous prognosis conferences and, eventually, the association was his seminar at IMRD in 1967. In May 1968, this committee organized the Public Institute for Social Prognosis, with Bestuzhev-Lada named as director, although he denied that he was appointed to this position. Bestuzhev-Lada was in charge of the organizing of the second congress in scientific prognosis, and Tardov took over when organizing the third congress. Bestuzhev-Lada, “Prognozirovanie,” 421-22; Bestuzhev-Lada, Svozhu schety.

94. See, for example, Rindzeviciute, Egle, “When Formal Organisations Meet Informal Relations in Soviet Lithuania: Action Nets, Networks and Boundary Objects in the Construction of the Lithuanian Sea Museum,” Lithuanian Historical Studies 15 (2011): 107-34.Google Scholar

95. Vasilii Parin, “Nauchnye trudy za 1935-71,” ARAN, f. 1640, op. 1.

96. One document noted that Dobrov and Bestuzhev-Lada refused to join this initiative to reform the committee into an association. “Zapiska otdela nauki i otdela propagandy TsK KPSS o grubykh narusheniiakh ustanovlennogo poriadka pri sozdanii vsesoiuznogo obshchestva nauchnogo prognozirovaniia (October 21,1970),” in Batygin and Iarmoliuk, eds., Rossiiskaia sotsiologiia, 528-30.

97. “Dopol'nenie k zapiske o grubykh narusheniiakh ustanovlennogo poriadka pri sozdanii vsesoiuznogo obshchestva nauchnogo prognozirovaniia (March 5, 1971),” in Batygin and Iarmoliuk, eds., Rossiiskaia sotsiologiia, 536-40; Firsov, , Istoriia sovetskoi sotsiologii, 31.Google Scholar

98. Bestuzhev-Lada, “Prognozirovanie,” 422-23; “Prikaz no. 14-104” (Moscow, June 23,1972), ARAN, f. 1977, op. 1, d. 59,11.17-18. In July, Bestuzhev-Lada was appointed as the head of the unit for methodological problems of forecasting social needs.

99. ARAN, f. 1977, op. 2, d. 60.

100. This was a great achievement, because the influential philosopher and academician Bonifatii M. Kedrov spoke vehemently against participating in such conferences. ARAN, f. 1731, op. 1, d. 160,11.127-36. Another issue was that at the Bucharest conference, the famous western futurologist Robert Jungk pressured the Soviet Union to permit Jewish scientists to emigrate.

101. The common denominator for these purges is probably the attack on Rumiantsev. For instance, a letter to the Central Committee which listed the ideological errors committed at IKSI did not mention either Bestuzhev-Lada or forecasting. “Zapiska TsK KPSS o rabote IKSI AN SSSR,” TsKhSD, f. 4, op. 20, d. 770,11. 41-42, in Batygin, and larmoliuk, , eds., Rossiiskaia sotsiologiia, 551-53.Google Scholar

102. Krementsov, Nikolai, Stalinist Science (Princeton, 1996).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

103. ARAN, f. 2, op. 6m, d. 500,11.180-81.

104. From 1975, the commission organized annual conferences and summer schools in forecasting. Rabochaia kniga po prognozirovaniiu (Moscow, 1982), 69.

105. In his interview, Bestuzhev-Lada mentions regular meetings with Politburo members’ assistants in 1967-69; he wrote, “In my thoughts, I was far away from IKSI and close to the Politburo.” Bestuzhev-Lada, “Prognozirovanie,” 420.

106. On the high modernist plans for large-scale industrialization, which had catastrophic effects on the natural environment, see Josephson, Paul R., Industrialized Nature: Brute Force Technology and the Transformation of the Natural World (Washington, D.C., 2002).Google Scholar

107. Lada, Igor’ V., Esli mir razoruzhitsia… (Moscow, 1961), 6,18, 43-44.Google Scholar

108. Lada, , Esli mir, 63.Google Scholar Bestuzhev-Lada co-authored with Oleg Pisarzhevskii a revised version of this book, titled Kontury griadushchego (The Contours of the Future, 1965).

109. This and other books authored by Bestuzhev-Lada were outcomes of the work of his whole research group at IKSI, with sometimes dozens of contributions.

110. IKSI (March 3,1972), ARAN, f. 1977, op. 1, d. 61,1.11.

111. IKSI protocols (February 6, 1973, March 6-15, 1973), ARAN, f. 1977, op. 1, d. 91,11. 6-9.

112. See Bestuzhev-Lada, I. V. and Frolov, S. F., Poiskovoe sotsial'noeprognozirovanie: Perspektivnye problem obshchestva. Opyt sistematizatsii (Moscow, 1984), 81-84.Google Scholar

113. Rindzeviciute, Egle, “Toward a Joint Future beyond the Iron Curtain: East-West Politics of Global Modelling,” in Andersson, and Rindzeviciute, , eds., The Struggle for Long- Term, 115-43.Google Scholar

114. “Academician S. Shatalin,” Options (September 1989): 10-11.

115. Soviet forecasters could be described as “policy intellectuals“: although sometimes critical of the existing Soviet governance, they did not dissent. As Arab-Ogly has put it, “Of course, I deeply respected dissidents, both back then and today. However, we did our own thing.” Arab-Ogly, “Togda kazalos', chto koe-to udavalos',” 366.

116. Jameson, Fredric, Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions (London, 2005).Google Scholar

117. Power, Michael, Organized Uncertainty: Designing a World of Risk Management (Oxford, 2007).Google Scholar

118. Gregory, The Political Economy of Stalinism.

119. For example, in 1969 Rumiantsev complained to M. A. Suslov that the kind of social research done in nonmilitary research centers in the United States was classified and done in secret institutes in the Soviet Union. This, argued Rumiantsev, was an obstacle to both Soviet science and governance. “Zapiska A. M. Rumiantseva M. A. Suslovu o poezdke v SShA” (January 22,1969), cited in Batygin, and Iarmoliuk, , eds., Rossiiskaia sotsiologiia, 604.Google Scholar

120. “Otchet” (Geneva, October 2-7,1967), RGAE, f. 99, op. 1, d. 890,1.54.

121. “Stenograma” (April 28,1983), ARAN, f. 2, op. 1, d. 858,1.169.

122. In May 1972, GKNT warned the Central Committee that coal, oil, and gas resources would be exhausted within the next 150 years. RGAE, f. 9480, op. 9, d. 1566 (1), 1.69.

123. Bestuzhev-Lada's hope to advance his career through policy science was never fulfilled, and he regretted not having left an academic school behind. Bestuzhev-Lada, “Prognozirovanie,ÉD; 426-27.