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Toward a National Hungarian Army: The Military Compromise of 1868 and Its Consequences
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2017
Extract
In discussing the Ausgleich of 1867 historians generally focus on the complex political and economic arrangements and pay little attention to the military controversy over the problem of restructuring the Habsburg army. Yet this problem almost prevented conclusion of the political agreement and greatly endangered its implementation. Count Julius Andrassy, one of the leading Hungarian negotiators, called it the “sword of Damocles suspended over our heads,” and the common war minister, Franz Baron Kuhn, believed that “the future existence of the monarchy” depended on “a successful solution of the army question”.
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References
1. Andrassy to Francis Joseph, July 17, 1868, Kriegsarchiv (henceforth KA), Militarkanzlei seiner Majestat (MKSM), Sonderreihe F 29 (a) 3.
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29. The view of an old Habsburg loyalist of liberal views, Joseph Redlich, Emperoi Francis Joseph of Austria (New York, 1929), pp. 352-53.
30. The order was most carefully phrased; there exist no less than five different drafts. KA MKSM 82-3/14.
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35. KA MKSM 1870 1/4S. The Gatling batteries were dissolved only in 1875 when they had proved not practical. Cf. Wrede, Alphons, Geschichte der k.u.k. Wehrmacht, 5 vols. (Vienna, 1898–1905), 5: 557 Google Scholar. See also Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Politisches Archiv, Militaria, Box 560-12, “Einführung der Gatling-Kanonen für die ungarische Armee.”
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45. Jenks, William A., Austria Under the Iron Ring, 1879-1893 (Charlottesville, 1965), pp. 245–46Google Scholar. On the intentions of the Magyars to use the language of command question to pave the way for a national army see the documents in Kemény, Gábor G., Iratok a nemsetiségi kérdés történeténes Magyaroszágon a dualizmus korában, 4 vols. (Budapest, 1952–66), 4: 395, 301, 305–6.Google Scholar
45. Jenks, William A., Austria Under the Iron Ring, 1879-1893 (Charlottesville, 1965), pp. 245–46Google Scholar. On the intentions of the Magyars to use the language of command question to pave the way for a national army see the documents in Kemény, Gábor G., Iratok a nemsetiségi kérdés történeténes Magyaroszágon a dualizmus korában, 4 vols. (Budapest, 1952–66), 4: 395, 301, 305-6.Google Scholar
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48. A detailed analysis together with pertinent documents is given by Peball, Kurt and Rothenberg, Gunther E., “Der Fall ‘U’: Die geplante Besetzung Ungarns durch die k.u.k. Armee im Herbst 1905,” Schriften des Heeresgeschichtlichen Museums in Wien, 4 (1969): 85–126.Google Scholar
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50. Spitzmiiller-Harmersbach, Alexander, Der letste österreichisch-ungarische Ausgleich und der Zusammenbruch der Monarchie (Berlin, 1929), pp. 79–83 Google Scholar. Cf. Regele, Feldmarschall Conrad, pp. 439-41. Documents include the protocol of the crown council, Dec. 4, 1917, KA MKSM 1918 38-2/1, 2, and projects for the implementation of this proposal dated as late as Sept 12, 1918, ibid.
51. See, for instance, the judgment by an English scholar: "The weakness of the Habsburg army in 1914 stemmed not from the disaffection of its soldiers but from the intransigence of politicians in Hungary." Norman Stone, "Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1900-1914," Past and Present, no. 33 (1966): 103.
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