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The Democratic University: The Role of Justice in the Production of Knowledge*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 June 2009

Elizabeth S. Anderson
Elizabeth S. Anderson
Affiliation:
Philosophy and Women's Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
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Extract

What is the proper role of politics in higher education? Many policies and reforms in the academy, from affirmative action and a multicultural curriculum to racial and sexual harassment codes and movements to change pedagogical styles, seek justice for oppressed groups in society. They understand justice to require a comprehensive equality of membership: individuals belonging to different groups should have equal access to educational opportunities; their interests and cultures should be taken equally seriously as worthy subjects of study, their persons treated with equal respect and concern in communicative interaction. Conservative critics of these egalitarian movements represent them as dangerous political meddling into the disinterested pursuit of knowledge. They cast the pursuit of equality as a threat to freedom of speech and academic standards. In response, some radical advocates of such programs agree that the quest for equality clashes with free speech, but view this as an argument for sacrificing freedom of speech.

Type
Research Article
Information
Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 12 , Issue 2 , Summer 1995 , pp. 186 - 219
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1995

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References

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