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Tocqueville On War

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2009

Eliot A. Cohen
Eliot A. Cohen
Affiliation:
Political Science, Harvard University
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Extract

The title of this article has been chosen deliberately, for we find interesting parallels in the careers and outlooks of Alexis de Tocqueville and the great Prussian theorist of war, Carl von Clausewitz whose master work, On War, remains sui generis. They overlapped in time (Tocqueville lived from 1805 to 1859, Clausewitz from 1780 to 1831), but, more importantly, their major theoretical works dealt in large measure with the same problem – the democratic revolution and its impact on politics. As Clausewitz argued, the warfare of the new era was

caused by the new political conditions which die French Revolution created both in France and in Europe as a whole, conditions that set in motion new means and new forces, and have thus made possible a degree of energy in war diat odierwise would have been inconceivable.

It follows that the transformation of the art of war resulted from the transformation of politics.

Type
Research Article
Information
Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 3 , Issue 1 , Autumn 1985 , pp. 204 - 222
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1985

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References

1 Clausewitz, Carl Von, On War, trans. Michael, Howard and Peter, Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p.610Google Scholar. I have benefited as well from Huntington, Samuel P., “Tocqueville's Annies and Ours,” text of remarks delivered at the University of Chicago, 15 February 1985.Google Scholar

2 See Aron, Raymond, Pensee la Guerre, Clausewitz, 2 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1976), vol. 1, p.39Google Scholar for a particularly acute comparison; also, see p.65. In addition, see Paret, Peter, Clausewitz and the State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp.351–3.Google Scholar

3 See Book I, ch. 1, sec. 28. Clausewitz, On War, p.89.

4 For a brief summary of Tocqueville's activities in Algeria see Jardin, Andre, Alexis de Tocqueville (Paris: Hachette, 1984), pp.302–327.Google Scholar His report on Algeria can be found in De Tocqueville, Alexis, Oetwres, 9 vols., ed. Mary, De Tocqueville (Paris: Michel Levy 1866), vol. 9, pp.423–438, 469–480.Google Scholar (Note: the more recent and complete edition of Tocqueville's works was not available to me in writing this article.) See also Richter, Melvin, “Tocqueville on Algeria,” Review of Politics vol. 25 (July 1963), pp.362–398.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Finally, for a miscellany of Tocqueville's observations on these matters see M.C.M., Simpson, ed., Correspondence and Conversation of Alexis de Tocqueville with Nassau William Senior, 2 vols. (London: Henry S. King, 1872), vol. 1, pp.118, 225–243Google Scholar; vol. 2, pp.8–9, 93–103, 126, 179–183.

5 Tocqueville, Alexis De, Democracy in America, trans. George, Lawrence (New York: Anchor Books, 1966), vol. 2, pt. 3, chs. 22–23, pp.645–654.Google Scholar

6 Clausewitz, On War, bk. 1, ch. 1, p.87.

7 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 2, pt. 3, ch. 22, p.646.

8 ibid., ch. 24, p.657.

9 For Clausewitz's analysis of escalation, see On War, bk. 1, ch. 1, p.77.

10 See the exchange of speeches between Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State George Shultz, New York Times, 29 November 1984 and 10 December 1984.

11 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 2, pt. 3, ch. 22, p.648.

12 ibid.

13 See Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), ch. 6, pp. 143–162.Google Scholar

14 See Franklin, D. Margiotta, ed., The Changing World of the American Military (Boulder: Westview, 1978), pp.37–70.Google Scholar

15 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 2, pt. 3, ch. 24, p.656.

16 For a recent (and heated) example of this debate, see Armed Forces Journal International (September 1984), and the spate of letters and articles which followed this issue, which contained a discussion of the Army's personnel management system.

17 Foot, M.R.D., Men in Uniform (New York: Praeger, 1961), p.30.Google Scholar

18 Gaulle, Charles De, The Edge of the Sword, trans. Gerard, Hopkins (London: Faber and Faber, 1960), p.67.Google Scholar

19 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 2, pt. 3, ch. 24.

20 Rommel, Erwin, The Rommel Papers, trans. Paul, Findlay (New York: Harcourt Brace, and Co., 1953), p.521.Google Scholar

21 See Stouffer, Samuel A., el al, The American Soldier, vol. 1, Adjustment During Army Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), pp.362–429.Google Scholar

22 As the author discovered by personal experience (1980–1983). Most armies, including the American, rely heavily on peer evaluations during officer training courses, and even (in some cases) for picking out promising enlisted men (communications with senior American and Israeli military officials, including commanders of basic training brigades). On the use of peer evaluations, see Janowitz, Morris, Sociology and the Military Establishment, 3rd ed. (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1974), pp.76–77.Google Scholar In the Swiss and Israeli armies officers are selected from the ranks, in part by use of peer evaluations. See Haltiner, Karl and Meyer, Ruth, “Aspects of the Relationship between Military and Society in Switzerland,” Armed Forces and Society, vol. 6 (Fall 1979), pp.57–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

23 Quoted in Marshall, S.L.A., Men Against Fire (New York: William Morrow, 1947), p.106.Google Scholar

24 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 2, pt. 3, ch. 25.

25 For personal recollections, see Roskill, Stephen, The Art of Leadership (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1965), pp. 69–70Google Scholar and Moran, Lord, The Anatomy of Courage (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p. 166.Google Scholar

26 See department of the Army, Military Leadership, Field Manual 22–100 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1973), ch. 7, pp.7–1–7–5.

27 Polybius, , The Rise of the Roman Empire, trans. Ian, Scott-Kilvert (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), pp.318–338.Google Scholar

28 Keegan, John, The Face of Battle (New York: Viking, 1976), p.324.Google Scholar

29 The transformation of the Civil War army is one case in point; the purge of the officer corps of the National Guard in 1940 is another. See Weigley, Russell, History of the United Slates Army (New York: Macmillan, 1967), pp.229–230, 427–428.Google Scholar Informal election, however, continues on the battlefield. “In a battle crisis, a majority of Americans present will respond to any man who has the will and the brains to give them a clear, intelligent order. They will follow the lowest ranking man present if he obviously knows what he is doing and is morally the master of die situation, but they will not obey a chuckle-head if he has nothing in his favor but his rank.”; Marshall, S.L.A., The Armed Forces Officer (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1975), p. 192.Google Scholar

30 Keegan, The Face of Battle, pp.189–192. For a detailed comparison of officers and enlisted men, see Moskos, Charles C., The American Enlisted Man (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), pp.38–62.Google Scholar

31 This is discussed (if not indeed hammered home) in Department of the Army, Military Leadership, ch. 2.

32 Hauser, William L., “The Will To Fight,” Sam, C. Sarkesian, ed., Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980), p.193.Google Scholar

33 ibid.

34 In neither army did massive social reform (change in the composition of the officer corps) accompany tactical and organizational reform. See Cohen, Eliot A., Citizens and Soldiers (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), pp.50–55.Google Scholar

35 Allon, Yigal, The Making of Israel's Army (New York: Universe Books, 1970), pp.249–269.Google Scholar

36 Keegan, The Face of Battle.

37 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 2, pt. 3, ch. 18, p.616.

38 ibid., p.626.

39 Marshall, Armed Forces Officer, p.1.

40 I differ from Huntington in describing the military ethos as aristocratic, where he calls it conservative. The implied tensions between officer and society are, if anything, stronger in the former view. See Moskos, American Enlisted Man, pp.8–9, for a discussion of the Doolittle Board reforms, which addressed the caste issue directly.

41 See Margiotta, Changing World.

42 I make this point in a minor way with reference to the Israeli campaign in Lebanon in 1982: Cohen, Eliot A., “Peace for Galilee: Success or Failure?” Commentary, vol. 78 (November 1984), pp.24–30.Google Scholar

43 The best book on the Dardanelles is still Rhodes James, Robert, Gallipoli (London: Batsford, 1965).Google Scholar

44 For a recent inside account of the difficulties of strategy-making in Vietnam, see General Palmer, Bruce Jr., The 25—Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984).Google Scholar

45 For a good introduction to the military reform debate, see Clark, Asa, et al., The Defense Reform Debate (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1984).Google Scholar