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Concrete Kantian Respect

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2009

Nancy Sherman
Nancy Sherman
Affiliation:
Philosophy, Georgetown University
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When we think about Kantian virtue, what often comes to mind is the notion of respect. Respect is due to all persons merely in virtue of their status as rational agents. Indeed, on the Kantian view, specific virtues, such as duties of beneficence, gratitude, or self-perfection, are so many ways of respecting persons as free rational agents. To preserve and promote rational agency, to protect individuals from threats against rational agency, i.e., to respect persons, is at the core of virtue. No doubt, part of the appeal of the Kantian notion of respect is that it offers an intuitive way of talking about the wrongness of manipulation and coercion, and in general, the wrongness of unfairly taking advantage of another. For to respect persons is to take seriously their status as persons, and to forswear, at some level, actions and attitudes that would compromise their dignity. Talking about respect has become shorthand for signaling deontological concerns. More formally, within recent Kantian exegesis, respect is viewed as yielding a more accessible and less contrived account of the Categorical Imperative than the more traditional criterion of universalizability and the contradictions tests applied to it. Within the Kantianinspired political theory of John Rawls, respect is also a core notion, representing a pervasive good, the bases of which, just states have an obligation to distribute to their members. Yet, for all its appeal, respect is an odd feature of Kantian ethics. For it is an emotion in a theory that prides itself in grounding morality in principles of reason alone. In this essay, I draw attention to the importance of respect in Kant's account in order to show just how he makes room for the emotions. Indeed, I shall argue that on Kant's account of full moral agency, we are emotional as well as rational creatures. Although Kant often portrays respect as an abstract emotional attitude mysteriously connected to our rationality, I argue that on a suitable revision, respect can be transformed into a more concrete attitude, cultivated and expressed alongside other emotions requisite for full virtue.

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Research Article
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Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 15 , Issue 1 , Winter 1998 , pp. 119 - 148
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Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1998

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References

1 The Categorical Imperative is, according to Immanuel Kant, the most general principle of morality for human beings. It is the moral law applied to finitely rational creatures. It is “categorical” in the sense that moral prescriptions and proscriptions cannot be traded for nonmoral interests; it is “imperative” in the sense that as human beings subject to temptations, we must give ourselves morality in the form of an imperative, or “ought.” In contrast, holy beings “will” morality without any sense of struggle or opposition. The Categorical Imperative is expressed by various formulae, among which is the Formula of Humanity (also called the Formula of End-in-Itself) which requires that we respect persons as ends-in-themselves, and not merely as means. A further formulation of the Categorical Imperative is expressed by the Formula of Universal Law, which proposes universalizability as a moral criterion. The Hypothetical Imperative is a principle of practical reasoning best captured by the idea of means/end or prudential reasoning. According to this principle of practical reason, actions are taken as efficient means for bringing about desired ends. In this sense, actions that fall under the principle of the Hypothetical Imperative are not categorical.

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6 Plato, , TheaetetusGoogle Scholar, 209b; see The Anonymous commentary on the Theaetetus, 5.18–6.31 (Long, A. A. and Sedley, D. N., The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987], 57 H).Google Scholar The phrase “furthest Mysian” connotes remoteness and, as Annas has argued, impartiality in moral theory. See Annas, Julia, The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 250, n. 7.Google Scholar

7 These notions are important, notably, to the theories of David Hume and Adam Smith, but also to more contemporary versions of ideal-observer theories, such as the one defended by Firth, Roderick, “Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 12 (1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and the one expounded by Harman, Gilbert, The Nature of Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977).Google Scholar I should note that the actual term “empathy,” translated from the German Einfühlung (literally, “to feel one's way into another”), is of early twentieth-century coinage. (See Lipps, W., “Einfühlung, inner Nachamung, und Organ-empfindungen,” Archiv für die Gesamte Psychologic, 2 [1903], pp. 185–204Google Scholar; and Titchener, E., Experimental Psychology of the Thought Processes [New York: Macmillan, 1909CrossRefGoogle Scholar; reprinted, Arno Press, 1973].) The term found in Smith and Hume is “sympathy,” though Smith, most notably, means by the term what we mean by empathy—namely an affective form of imaginative identification. As he often puts it, to sympathize is “to change places in fancy.” Hume espouses a more mechanical and less cognitive model of being affectively aroused. Both connect sympathy to a general altruistic attitude, though for neither is that the primary focus. For further discussion, see Sherman, Nancy, “Empathy and Imagination,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 22, ed. French, Peter A., Uehling, Theodore E. Jr., and Wettstein, Howard K. (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1998).Google Scholar

8 Taxonomically, passion (Leidenschaft) falls under the general heading of inclination (Neigung), and inclination under the more general notion of appetite (Begierde). Emotional agitation (Affekt) is not an appetite but a reactive feeling of pleasure and pain (Gefühl). (Kant, , Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. Gregor, Mary J. [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974], p. 251CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Kant, , The Doctrine of VirtueGoogle Scholar, Part II of The Metaphysic of Morals, trans. Gregor, Mary J. [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964], p. 211.)Google Scholar

9 Kant, , Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, pp. 251, 253.Google Scholar Similarly, pathos becomes morbus in Latin writers.

10 Ibid., p. 144; on passivity in our thought process, see Kant's remarks about novel reading and the transports to fantasy that it introduces, in ibid., p. 208.

11 Kant, , The Doctrine of Virtue, pp. 398–402; 456–58.Google Scholar

12 Ibid., p. 392.

13 Ibid., p. 485. I develop this argument at greater length in Sherman, , Making a Necessity of VirtueGoogle Scholar, ch. 4, section 4. See also Baron, Marcia, Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), ch. 3.Google Scholar

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15 Aristotle, , Nicomachean Ethics, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Barnes, Jonathan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984)Google Scholar, 1106b20–31. For further discussion of the rigorism and latitude of Kantian virtue, see Sherman, , Making a Necessity of VirtueGoogle Scholar, ch. 8.

16 Aristotle sometimes says that pleasure and pain are “with” (meta) the emotion, as at Rhetoric, 1378a30, in Barnes, ed., The Complete Works, or “accompanied by it,” as at Rhetoric, 1378b1; but he also says that those feelings are epi (directed toward) the evaluations, as in the definition of pity at Rhetoric, 1385b12. See Sherman, , Making a Necessity of VirtueGoogle Scholar, ch. 2.

17 See Striker's helpful section on the emotions: Striker, Gisela, “Following Nature: A Study in Stoic Ethics,” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 9, ed. Annas, Julia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 1–73.Google Scholar

18 Andronicus, , On Passions 1Google Scholar, in Friedrich, Hansvon Arnim, August, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, 4 vols. (New York: Irvington, 1986)Google Scholar, 3.391 (Long, and Sedley, , The Hellenistic PhilosophersGoogle Scholar, 65B).

19 Cicero, , Tusculan Disputations, trans. King, J. E. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964), 4.15.Google Scholar

20 Stobaeus, 2.88,22–89,3, in von Arnim, , Stoicorum Veterum FragmentaGoogle Scholar, 3.378, 389, part (Long, and Sedley, , The Hellenistic Philosophers, 65A).Google Scholar

21 Of course, the same anxiety that surrounds the external goods could affect an attitude toward reason and its grounding of virtue. To care about reason—its strength, competitive advantages, control over self and others, and so on—is, Buddhist doctrine would say, to cling to the self in much the same way the Stoics would hold we cling to external goods. Reason, on that Buddhist view, is no more permanent nor within our ultimate control than external goods. Thus, Buddhists prescribe a far more radical form of detachment in their doctrine of selflessness. Posidonius shows some awareness of this sort of point in his question as to why emotional attachments cannot extend to reason. See Fragment 164, in Posidonius, ed. Edelstein, L. and Kidd, I. G. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 266D.Google Scholar

22 See Cassirer, Ernst, Kant's Life and Thought (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981)Google Scholar, on Kant and his rich education steeped in Latin and in close study of the Latin authors. Kant's own works show references to Epicurus, Horace, Cicero, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius. Though Marcus wrote in Greek, his work was translated into Latin in the mid-sixteenth century, and it is likely that Kant would have been exposed to it firsthand in this way. Kant's knowledge of Stoicism in presumably through the Latin authors—Cicero and Seneca, and as I suggest, Marcus. I am not aware of specific translations of Epictetus into Latin that would have circulated in Kant's time. For a helpful study of Kant's indebtedness to Cicero's De Officiis, which was translated into German by Garver during Kant's time, see Reich, Klaus, “Kant and Greek Ethics,” Parts I and II, Mind, vol. 48 (1939), pp. 338–54, 446–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For more general discussion of Kant's stoicism, see Seidler, Michael, “Kant and the Stoics on the Emotional Life,” Philosophy Research Archives, 1981Google Scholar; Seidler, Michael, The Role of Stoicism in Kant's Moral Philosophy, dissertation, St. Louis University, 1981Google Scholar; and Seidler, Michael, “Kant on the Stoics on Suicide,” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 44 (1983), pp. 429–53.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed See also Nussbaum, Martha, “Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism,” Journal of Political PhilosophyGoogle Scholar, forthcoming, presented at the Chicago Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, March 1996.

23 This is, of course, the force of emotions as “pathological,” but see especially Kant's remarks on sentimentality in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, pp. 235–36.Google Scholar See The Doctrine of Virtue, p. 399Google Scholar, for the definition of pathological feeling as preceding the thought of the moral law.

24 Affects are storms that exceed proper proportions—“they work like water breaking through a dam” (Kant, , Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, p. 252).Google Scholar Passions so overwhelm us that we cannot see the forest for the trees—“we lack the reflection that would compare this feeling with the totality of all feelings” (ibid., p. 254).

25 As Kant puts it in Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. Paton, H. J. (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 399Google Scholar, emotions are only contingently related to right principles: “[Sympathy] stands on the same footing as other inclinations—for example, the inclination for honour, which if fortunate enough to hit on something beneficial and right and consequently honourable, deserves praise and encouragement, but not esteem; for its maxim lacks moral content.”

26 Kant, , The Doctrine of Virtue, pp. 405, 393.Google Scholar

27 Kant, , Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, p. 394.Google Scholar

28 Kant, , Critique of Practical Reason, p. 31.Google Scholar

29 Kant, , Lectures on Ethics, trans. Infield, Louis (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980), p. 200.Google Scholar

30 Kant, , The Doctrine of Virtue, p. 457.Google Scholar For further discussion of this passage, see Baron, Marcia, Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995)Google Scholar, and Sherman, , “Kant on Sentimentalism and Stoic Apathy.”Google Scholar

31 Kant, , The Doctrine of Virtue, pp. 456, 457.Google Scholar

32 Kant, , Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, pp. 255–56.Google Scholar

33 Boswell, James, Boswell's Life of Johnson, vol. 3, ed. Hill, G. G., revised by Powell, L. F. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 149 and note.Google Scholar

34 On the distinction between sensitivity and sentimentality, see Kant, , Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, pp. 235–36.Google Scholar

35 Kant, , The Doctrine of Virtue, pp. 456, 455.Google Scholar

36 Ibid., pp. 464, 458; see also p. 485.

37 See Kant's own remarks in ibid., p. 408, about how he wishes to limit the term.

38 See Stobaeus, , Eclogae Physicae et Ethicae, ed. Wachsmuth, C. (Berlin: Wiedmannos, 1884)Google Scholar, 2.90,19–91,9 (Long, and Sedley, , The Hellenistic PhilosophersGoogle Scholar, 65 F). Note that there is no counterpart in the eupatheia classification to distress (lupē) and its derivatives. This is presumably because there is no disturbance-free way of suffering distress.

39 For the original emotions, see, for example, Stobaeus, , Eclogae Physicae et EthicaeGoogle Scholar, 2.88,8–90,6 (von Arnim, , Stoicorum Veterum FragmentaGoogle Scholar, 3.378, 389, part; Long, and Sedley, , The Hellenistic Philosophers, 65 A).Google Scholar

40 Kant, , Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 23–24.Google Scholar

41 “We call the capacity for pleasure or pain at a representation “feeling” because both of these comprise what is merely subjective in the relation to our representation and contain no reference to an object which could give us knowledge of the object (or even knowledge of our own state).… Pleasure or pain… expresses nothing at all in the object, but simply a relation to the subject” (Kant, , The Doctrine of Virtue, pp. 211–12Google Scholar; see also the attendant note).

42 For an important piece on this, see Gordon, Robert, “Sympathy, Simulation, and the Impartial Spectator,” in Mind and Morals, ed. May, Larry, Friedman, Marilyn, and Clark, Andy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 165–80Google Scholar, originally published in Ethics, vol. 105 (1995), pp. 727–42.Google Scholar

43 Kant's remarks in the Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 23–24Google Scholar, sound remarkably like the view Freud would later espouse throughout his writings—namely, what he calls the “economic” model, in which emotions are quanta of energy that we displace in different ways, but that we seek to keep constant.

44 See Freud's remark in the early Studies on Hysteria (1893–1895)Google Scholar, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. Strachey, James, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974).Google Scholar

45 Kant, , Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, p. 50/50.Google Scholar

46 For an instructive discussion of respect, see Reath, Andrews, “Kant's Theory of Moral Sensibility: Respect for the Moral Law and the Influence of Inclination,” Kant-Studien, vol. 80 (1989), pp. 284–302.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

47 Kant, , Critique of Practical Reason, p. 77.Google Scholar

48 Ibid., p. 86.

49 See ibid., pp. 74, 77, 79, 80.

50 “Sensuous feeling, which is the basis for all our inclinations, is the condition of the particular feeling we call respect, but the cause that determines this feeling lies in the pure practical reason” (ibid., p. 76). See Kant, , Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, p. 401n.Google Scholar, for similar views. Here Kant seems to worry that this feeling might be confused with moral-sense theorists' notions, no doubt in part because of his own strong attraction to those views in his years of writing the prize essay, Über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsütze der Natürlichen Theologie und der Moral (1762–1764).Google Scholar (See Reich, , “Kant and the Greek Ethics.”)Google Scholar On such a view, respect would be a separate, noncognitive sensibility for the good.

51 Even so, Kant seems to make heavy weather of a common ancient notion that reason can generate its own motions or incentives. Plato had such a view in his notion that the logistikon part of the soul generates its own desires in the form of love of philosophy and love of wisdom; and Aristotle's notion of boulēsis, adapted by the Stoics, is that of a rational wish or desire that is the product of deliberation. If respect is just an emotion generated by rational processes and capacities, then it is nothing particularly new. (See Cooper, John, “Plato's Theory of Human Motivation,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 1 [1984], pp. 3–21Google Scholar; Cooper, John, “Some Remarks on Aristotle's Moral Psychology,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 27, suppl. [1988], pp. 25–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Frede, Michael, “The Stoic Doctrine of the Affections of the Soul,” in The Norms of Nature, ed. Schofield, Malcolm and Striker, Gisela [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986]Google Scholar, for good discussions here.) If, on the other hand, respect arises from dwelling on the specific nature of our autonomous legislative capacity, then in content, at least, Kant is pointing to something innovative.

52 See Kant, , Critique of Practical Reason, p. 75.Google Scholar

53 Again, we might wonder if we are helped by thinking of respect along Freudian lines as a signal affect—an emotion, that is, which is theoretically posited as part of our response to certain conditions, but which we may experience at times only unconsciously. In his later writings, Freud thought of anxiety as a signal affect.

54 Kant, , The Doctrine of Virtue, p. 399.Google Scholar

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid., p. 400.

57 The model Kant is intent on avoiding is a version of a moral-sense theory in which morality exists independent of us and is naturally grasped by an intuitive sense. On his view, in contrast, morality is an autonomous construction of our own reason and will, which arouses our feelings as a response to our own mastery. See Kant, , The Doctrine of Virtue, p. 400.Google Scholar

58 It is rather in virtue of them that we can be obligated: as Kant puts it, “conscience speaks out involuntarily and inevitably. Therefore, to act with the approval of one's conscience cannot itself be a duty” (The Doctrine of Virtue, p. 401).Google Scholar See also ibid., pp. 400 and 403: “[T]he law in man irresistibly forces from him reverence for his own being.”

59 Kant, , The Doctrine of Virtue, pp. 399–400.Google Scholar

60 Ibid., p. 401.

61 Ibid., p. 402.

62 Ibid., p. 403.

63 Ibid., p. 463.

64 Ibid., pp. 465–67; see also pp. 458–64.

65 I develop this point in Sherman, Making a Necessity of Virtue, ch. 4; and in Sherman, , “Kantian Virtue: Priggish or Passional?”Google Scholar

66 On the more specific theme of integrating a caring attitude with an attitude of respect, see Dillon's important article: Dillon, Robin, “Respect and Care: Toward Moral Integration,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 22 (1992), pp. 105–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

67 See here Piper's stimulating discussion on correcting for one's habits of mind that stand in the way of what she calls “modal imagination”: Piper, Adrian, “Impartiality, Compassion, and Modal Imagination,” Ethics, vol. 101 (1991), pp. 726–57.Google Scholar

68 See Deigh's helpful remarks on this point, in Deigh, John, “Empathy and Universalizability,”Google Scholar in May, , Friedman, , and Clark, , eds., Minds and Morals, pp. 199–220.Google Scholar

69 Thus, when asked where he came from, Diogenes the Cynic replied: “I am a kosmopolitēs” (Laertius, Diogenes, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 2 vols., trans. Hicks, R. D. [Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1972], 6.63).Google Scholar See Epictetus, , Discourses, 2 vols, trans. Oldfather, W. A. (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1925)Google Scholar, 2.10.3, 1.9.2.

70 Kant, , Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, p. 130Google Scholar: “That is to say, if the question is merely whether I, as a thinking being, have reason to admit the existence of a whole of other beings beyond my existence, forming a community with me, (called the world) [mit mir in Gemeinschaft stehender,… (Weltgennant)], this question is not anthropological but merely metaphysical.” For further discussion of this passage, see Reich, “Kant and Greek Ethics.” Also, for a very good account of Kant's cosmopolitanism in his Perpetual Peace, see Nussbaum, “Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism”; and Julia Annas, “Comments on M. Nussbaum's ‘Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism’,” unpublished, both presented at the Chicago Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, March 1996.

71 Significantly, a Greek text of Marcus Aurelius's Meditations was edited and published in Zurich (by Gessner) in 1558 at the same time that the text was translated into Latin by Wilhelm Holzman d'Ausberg (who later Hellenized his name to Xylander) and published by the same editor. The recirculation of Marcus and his translation into Latin suggests that Kant may have read him directly. The information here was collected from Bronze et Or: Visages de Marc Aurèle, an extensive exhibit on Marcus at the Musee d'Art et d'Histoire, Geneva, Summer 1996.

72 Striker, , “Following Nature” (supra note 17), pp. 10–13.Google Scholar

73 Aurelius, Marcus, The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, trans. Farquharson, A. S. L. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1989)Google Scholar, 8.34; see also 11.8 and 9.23.

74 Ibid., 12.26.

75 Ibid.; on psuchē logikē kai politikē, see 6.44; 7.68; 7.72; 8.2 (zōiou noerou kai koinōnikou); cf. 6.4; also 4.24, 4.29; 12.20.

76 Ibid., 4.4.

77 Ibid., 4.29.

78 Ibid., 4.4.

79 On extending our altruism outward in an impartial way, see Hierocles (Stobaeus, , Eclogae Physicae et Ethicae, 4.671, 7–673, 11Google Scholar; Long, and Sedley, , The Hellenistic Philosophers, 57 G)Google Scholar; on our social instincts, see Cicero, , De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, trans. Rackham, H. (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1921), 3.62–68.Google Scholar

80 See Stanton, G. R., “The Cosmopolitan Idea of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius,” Phronesis, vol. 13 (1968), pp. 183–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Annas, Julia, “Comments on M. Nussbaum's ‘Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism’,”Google Scholar for these criticisms. Note, however, Marcus's interesting remarks about establishing community with others through empathetic identification, in Meditations, 8.61: You must “enter into the governing mind of every man and allow every other to enter into your own.”

81 Significantly, on this very site of the Danube a bust of Marcus was unearthed in 1974. The bust, apparently fabricated in a nearby city and wheeled into the campsite to honor the emperor, portrayed a contemplative Marcus, with characteristic signs of the philosopher: hair curled around the head, eyes pensive, gazing far into the distance. From Bronze et Or: Visages de Marc Aurèle (supra note 71).

82 Laertius, Diogenes, Lives of Eminent PhilosophersGoogle Scholar, 7.33ff. See Schofield, Malcolm, The Stoic Idea of the City (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)Google Scholar, for helpful discussion of Zeno's city of lovers and for an excellent general discussion of Stoic cosmopolitanism.

83 For example, Epicterus, , Discourses, 2.8.12, 1.9.23, 2.10.3–4.Google Scholar

84 Note that Epictetus himself was an ex-slave.

85 Epictetus, , Discourses, 1.9.6.Google Scholar

86 Ibid., 2.10.3–4.

87 Laertius, Diogenes, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 7.85.Google Scholar

88 Cicero, , De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, 3.16–26.Google Scholar

89 Laertius, Diogenes, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 7.88.Google Scholar

90 There are four personae—the first persona has to do with our shared rational nature, the second with what is specific to us as individuals, the third with our social position, and the fourth with our own choices of career or metier. For an excellent elaboration of Cicero's account, see Gill, Christopher, “Personhood and Personality: The Four-Personae Theory in Cicero, De Officiis,” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 6, ed. Julia Annas (1988), pp. 169–99.Google Scholar

91 I am indebted to Gill, who puts it this way; see Gill, “Personhood and Personality.”

92 Cicero, , On Duties, ed. Griffin, M. T. and Atkins, E. M. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)Google Scholar, 1.107–111.

93 See Reich, , “Kant and Greek Ethics.”Google Scholar

94 Most explicitly at The Doctrine of Virtue, pp. 468–69.Google Scholar

95 I believe this point is preserved also in the interpretation of the Formula of Universal Law as requiring that we be able to universalize our maxims, not that we all actually act on those maxims. That would be a requirement not of universalizability of our maxims, but of uniformity of them.

96 Cicero, , De OfficiisGoogle Scholar, 1.99. For a further early reference to the respect aroused by our divine-like capacity of reason, see Seneca, , Epistulae Morales, 3 vols., trans. Gummere, Richard (Cambridge, MA: Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1917–1922), p. 51.Google Scholar

97 Cicero, , De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, 3.62–64.Google Scholar

98 Hierocles (Stobaeus, , Eclogue Physicae et EthicaeGoogle Scholar, 4.671, 7–673,11; Long, and Sedley, , The Hellenistic Philosophers, 57 G).Google Scholar

99 Hierocles adopts Plato's recommendations in the Republic for widening one's affiliations by using terms such as “mother,” “father” “cousin,” “brother,” and so on, to apply to all members of appropriate age/gender groups. For an important criticism of this Platonic method of unifying the city, see Aristotle, , PoliticsGoogle Scholar, Book II, ch. 4, in Barnes, , The Complete Works of Aristotle.Google Scholar

100 Kant, , “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” in Kant's Political Writings, ed. Reiss, H. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 44.Google Scholar For Kant's account of our instincts, or original predispositions (anlage), see Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, pp. 26–28/21–23.Google Scholar There, too, he views our sociality as characterized by competitiveness and rivalry.

101 Kant, , Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, pp. 429–30.Google Scholar

102 See Sherman, , Making a Necessity of VirtueGoogle Scholar, ch. 7. See also Herman, , The Practice of Moral Judgment, ch. 7.Google Scholar

103 Though about this, it is rightly objected that the Stoics seem to have been more in the armchair than close up, observing their subjects.