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Cosmopolitan Altruism*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 June 2009

William A. Galston
William A. Galston
Affiliation:
Philosophy, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland at College Park
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Extract

This essay focuses on what I shall call “cosmopolitan altruism”—the motivationally effective desire to assist needy or endangered strangers. Section I describes recent research that confirms the existence of this phenomenon. Section II places it within interlocking sets of moral typologies that distinguish among forms of altruism along dimensions of scope, interests risked, motivational source, and baseline of moral judgment. Section III explores some of the relationships between altruism—a concept rooted in modern moral philosophy and Christianity—and the understanding of virtue and friendship characteristic of Aristotelian ethical analysis. Finally, Section IV argues that cosmopolitan altruism does not represent moral progress simpliciter over other, less inclusive views, and that the widening of moral sympathy to encompass endangered strangers entails significant moral costs.

Type
Research Article
Information
Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 10 , Issue 1 , Winter 1993 , pp. 118 - 134
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1993

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References

1 For general discussion, see Milo, Ronald D.'s introduction to Egoism and Altruism (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1973).Google Scholar

2 See Monroe, Kristen, “John Donne's People: Explaining Differences between Rational Actors and Altruists through Cognitive Frameworks”, Journal of Politics, vol. 53, no. 2 (05 1991), pp. 394–433CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Monroe, Barton, Michael C., and Klingemann, Ute, “Altruism and the Theory of Rational Action: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe”, Ethics, vol. 101, no. 1 (10 1990), pp. 103–22.Google Scholar

3 Badhwar, Neera Kapur, “Altruism Versus Self-Interest: Sometimes a False Dichotomy”Google Scholar, in this volume.

4 Ibid.

5 Hampton, Jean, “Selflessness and the Loss of Self”Google Scholar, in this volume. It is worth pointing out, however, that the self-abnegation Hampton and I both reject might well be more positively valued within certain religious traditions. Here as elsewhere, the decision to conduct moral analysis within a secular philosophic frame carries with it assumptions (typically tacit and even invisible) concerning the weight properly accorded to the self.

6 Nagel, Thomas, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 159–62Google Scholar. Nagel's point is not that empathetic identification with the interests of others necessarily depends upon the construction of a rational argument, but rather that certain kinds of self-preference with regard to certain interests are self-contradictory. Once subjected to challenge, Nagel claims, exclusive self-preference concerning (say) pain cannot be maintained as a rational moral stance.

7 Ibid., pp. 166–68. The argument Nagel discusses is advanced in Scanion, T. M., “Preference and Urgency”, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 72 (1975), pp. 655–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 Korsgaard, Christine M., “The Reasons We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction between Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values”Google Scholar, in this volume.

9 See especially Blum, Lawrence A., Friendship, Altruism, and Morality (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980).Google Scholar

10 See especially Nagel, Thomas, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).Google Scholar

11 Monroe, et al. , “Altruism and the Theory of Rational Action”, p. 119.Google Scholar

12 In this notorious New York City incident. Genovese was assaulted within earshot of dozens of people living in a nearby apartment building. No one came to her assistance-including individuals who were not only hearing but actually witnessing the assault. For an extended period, no one even bothered to call the police!

13 Rorty, Richard, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 192.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14 Berlin, Isaiah, Four Essays on Liberty (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 169.Google Scholar

15 Wolf, Susan, “Moral Saints”, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 79, no. 8 (08 1982), pp. 419–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

16 “Several rescuers had to go against critical loved ones in order to rescue Jews” (Monroe, et al. , “Altruism and the Theory of Rational Action”, p. 113)Google Scholar. In more than one case, rescuers hid their activities from relatives and spouses who were nonetheless implicated and paid with their lives (Ibid., pp. 113 n. 30, 115).

17 Monroe, , “John Donne's People”, pp. 423–24Google Scholar: “Most rescuers shrugged off their rescue actions as ‘no big deal’.”

18 Monroe, et al. , “Altruism and the Theory of Rational Action”, p. 109Google Scholar: “The honors or thanks the rescuers received were not sought and were as often as not a source of embarrassment as one of pride.… [For example,] Leonie refused the Yad Vashem award, saying she had not really done enough to deserve it.”

19 Badhwar is quite right to emphasize the great confidence rescuers displayed in their own judgment, intelligence, courage, and endurance—in themselves as independent actors (“Altruism Versus Self-Interest”). But I do not believe (as she does) that Monroe et al. meant to deny this. The point is rather that the rescuers' capacity to identify with humanity as a whole gave them the inner resources to resist the pressure of family, neighbors, and the political community. This might be taken as an instance of the more general hypothesis that the ability to resist social pressure, to develop and display true individuality, must somehow be rooted in potent countervailing forces.