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IMAGINATIVE RESISTANCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL NECESSITY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 December 2007

Julia Driver
Julia Driver
Affiliation:
Philosophy, Dartmouth College
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Abstract

Some of our moral commitments strike us as necessary, and this feature of moral phenomenology is sometimes viewed as incompatible with sentimentalism, since sentimentalism holds that our commitments depend, in some way, on sentiment. His dependence, or contingency, is what seems incompatible with necessity. In response to this sentimentalists hold that the commitments are psychologically necessary. However, little has been done to explore this kind of necessity. In this essay I discuss psychological necessity, and how the phenomenon of imaginative resistance offers some evidence that we regard our moral commitments as necessary, but in a way compatible with viewing them as dependent on desires (in some way). A limited strategy for defending sentimentalism against a common criticism is also offered.

Type
Research Article
Information
Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 25 , Issue 1 , January 2008 , pp. 301 - 313
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 2008

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References

1 Moral sentimentalism is the view that moral norms derive authority from our passions (what we desire, what we care about). There are many different ways to spell this out in more detail; for example, sentimentalism can be either cognitivist or noncognitivist.

2 Gendler, Tamar, “The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance,” The Journal of Philosophy 97, no. 2 (February 2002): 55–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 Weatherson, Brian, “Morality, Fiction, and Possibility,” Philosophers' Imprint 1, no. 3 (2004): 1Google Scholar.

4 For example, in “Moral Phenomenology and Moral Theory,” Philosophical Issues 15 (2005): 56–77, Horgan, Terry and Timmons, MarkCrossRefGoogle Scholar discuss Maurice Mandelbaum's view that moral judgments seem to impose demands on us categorically (that is, that they have “objective pretensions”). Though these authors do not speak in terms of a feeling of necessity, their description of the categoricity of moral experience implies this. The sentimentalist does not deny that the feeling is there, but only denies that it necessarily indicates something objective “out there” that imposes duties.

5 Gendler, “The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance,” 56.

6 Ibid.

7 Weatherson, “Morality, Fiction, and Possibility,” 18.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., 20.

10 Connie Rosati and Scott MacDonald have both suggested to me that what underlies imaginative resistance in stories like Death might simply be the fact that the story as a whole just doesn't seem very convincing. It is not a persuasively told story; thus, we find it difficult to go along with Craig's claim. This would change the nature of the problem. It would still be puzzling that we go along with poorly told stories that rest on unusual descriptive claims.

11 From The National Era, published in Washington D.C. by Gamaliel Bailey, April 15, 1852, quoting from the Congregationalist. Electronic edition published by Stephen Railton, Institute for Advanced Technology in the Humanities, Electronic Text Center, Charlottesville, Virginia, 2006; http://www.iath.virginia.edu/utc/reviews/rere01czt.html.

12 Letter of S. E. M. from Arispe, Bureau County, Illinois, January 29, 1852, to the editor of The National Era, published online by Stephen Railton, Institute for Advanced Technology in the Humanities, Electronic Text Center, Charlottesville, Virginia, 2006; http://www.iath.virginia.edu/utc/notices/noar01tt.html.

13 Peter Vranas, “I Ought, Therefore I Can,” Philosophical Studies (forthcoming).

14 See Jackson, Frank, Conditionals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991)Google Scholar.

15 Someone might hold that conditional (2) is vacuously robust because what is really doing the work is the rejection, plain and simple, of the antecedent. Consider, then, (2a).

16 There are other possible payoffs to be explored. There are other appeals to psychological necessity made in the literature, and they generally occur in contexts in which practical matters are at issue. Do I leave by the window or by the door? Should I give all I own to Oxfam, or should I save some resources for my own family? If we are in a certain frame of mind, we can experience a kind of practical incoherence where some combinations of beliefs and commitments are in conflict. Extreme cases would involve issues of whether to sacrifice one family member to save two strangers. But consider a more normal case: Claudia must decide between paying for her daughter's expensive orthodontia, or giving the money to Oxfam. Sacrificing her daughter's well-being even for the much greater well-being of others is something she could do, in a sense, since she is quite physically capable of writing the check and putting it in the mail, but almost all of her emotional commitments militate against it. Thus, there is also a sense in which she cannot bring herself to do it. She knows that if she were to do it she would feel like a miserable failure of a mother. She cannot do it without feeling she has wronged her daughter. It is against the backdrop of these deep emotional commitments (and the norms they reflect) that it is not a real option for her. And, as long as we believe these commitments are good ones, there will be little pressure for change. These commitments can be rationally endorsed.

17 Joyce, Richard, The Myth of Morality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002)Google Scholar.

18 This possibility raises interesting problems for the sentimentalist regarding how to demarcate social groups. There may be concerns here similar to those that crop up in the philosophy of biology about demarcating species.