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Morality, Rational Choice, and Semantic Representation

A Reply to My Critics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2009

David Gauthier
David Gauthier
Affiliation:
Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh
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Extract

(1) In his recent paper, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” John Rawls makes use of a footnote to disown what to many readers must have seemed one of the most striking and original underlying ideas of his theory of justice, that it “is a part, perhaps the most significant part, of the theory of rational choice.” That Rawls should issue this disclaimer indicates, at least in my view, that he has a much clearer understanding of his theory, and its relationship to rational choice than he did at the time that he wrote A Theory of Justice. As I note in Morals by Agreement (pp.4–5), Rawls does not show that principles of justice are principles of rational choice. Hence, in appropriating the idea, I can claim diat I am undertaking a pioneering enterprise. No doubt Thomas Hobbes would have undertaken it had the resources of the theory of rational choice been at his disposal, but I do not intend to pursue counterfactuals in a search for historical antecedents. Moral theory as rational choice theory is, I claim, a new venture.

Type
Research Article
Information
Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 5 , Issue 2 , Spring 1988 , pp. 173 - 221
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1988

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References

1 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p.16.Google Scholar The footnote is in Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 14 (1985), p.237, n.20.Google Scholar

2 I should, however, note that I am increasingly aware that the case for incorporating maximization into practical rationality needs to be argued, and not simply assumed. But I cannot argue it here.

3 I am using ‘desire’ here, although in Morals by Agreement I speak of ‘preference’. I don't think this matters for my present purpose.

4 This problem seems to plague social choice, in which the attempt to impose plausible conditions on a choice set, given that these conditions are to define a non-empty choice set for any finite set of individual preference orderings over any finite number of alternatives, leads to including the entire range of Pareto-optimal outcomes in the choice set.

5 As Raymond Geuss characterizes it, the ideal speech situation is one “of absolutely uncoerced and unlimited discussion between completely free and equal human agents.” See Geuss, Raymond, The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas & the Frankfurt School (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.65.Google Scholar

6 Before concluding my discussion of Fishkin, I should note that his three-person dinner party does not, as he supposes, indicate a way of bypassing violations of the proviso. Although he correctly notes that C does not violate the proviso in bargaining with BA, in forcing B to choose between bargaining with C and being tortured, worsens B's situation and violates the proviso. And of course, if A and C were to collude in exchanging opportunities to extort money from dinner guests, then both would violate the proviso.

7 See Ullman-Margalit, Edna, The Emergence of Norms (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), pp.41–45.Google Scholar

8 Hume, David, An Enquire Concerning the Principles of Morals, 1751, Section III, Part I.Google Scholar

9 ibid.

10 See Elster, Jon, Ulysses and the Sirens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979)Google Scholar, and McClennen, E.F., “Prisoner's Dilemma and Resolute Choice” in Campbell, Richmond and Sowden, Lanning, eds., Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1985), pp.94–104.Google Scholar

11 For the distinction between myopic and sophisticated choice, see Hammond, Peter, “Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 43 (1976), pp.159–173.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

12 See my “Deterrence, Maximization, and Rationality,” Ethics, Vol. 94 (1984), pp.474–495.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13 Those who are critical of America's relations with South Africa may think that they think that Charles is so required. If they do think this (and of course, they may not, while remaining critical of America's relations with South Africa), then, to be consistent, they must also think that America is required not to cooperate with the Soviet Union. Since virtually no one holds that America should cooperate neither with the Soviet Union nor with South Africa, virtually no one consistently thinks that Charles is morally required to refuse to cooperate with Adolf. If I were concerned to reconcile my theory with our moral intuitions, I might want to emphasize this.

14 There are social theorists, some of whom unfortunately attain power, who endorse this unanimity requirement on preferences; each of these theorists and leaders, however, has sought a rather peculiar form of unanimity - that everyone else share his preferences.