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A TAXONOMY OF INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 May 2019

Maria Paola Ferretti
Maria Paola Ferretti*
Affiliation:
Political Theory, Goethe University at Frankfurt on Main
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Abstract:

In this essay I take issue with the problem of institutional corruption. A number of scholars have recently established a discontinuity thesis, according to which an institution may be corrupt even if its members are not. Against this view, I defend a continuity thesis and argue that institutional corruption can always be traced back to the blameworthy corrupt behavior of individual agents. Certain instances of corrupt behavior spread their effects and tip in a way that subvert (and not simply violate) the public rules that govern an institution. This occurs, I argue, following either summative, morphological, or systemic modalities. I show that such a taxonomy of institutional corruption is useful for the purpose of disentangling and understanding the variety of mechanisms that generate the phenomenon. Most importantly, the taxonomy allows for a more nuanced way of attributing responsibility for political corruption, including collective responsibility. I conclude that a continuity approach offers the tools for diagnosing institutional corruption, but also facilitates the task of formulating answers to political corruption, both from a backward-looking and from a forward-looking perspective.

Keywords

Accountabilitydiscontinuity thesisinstitutionspolitical corruptionresponsibility
Type
Research Article
Information
Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 35 , Issue 2 , Winter 2018 , pp. 242 - 263
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 2019 

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Footnotes

*

Earlier versions of this essay were presented at meetings in Darmstadt, Delft, Dublin, Harvard, Hermosa Beach, and Pavia. I am grateful to the participants for insightful discussions and very helpful comments. For written and perceptive comments I wish to thank Emanuela Ceva, Tim Scanlon, Veith Selk and the journal’s anonymous reviewer.

References

1 Lawrence, Lessig, “Institutional Corruption Defined,” Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics 41 (2013): 553–55;Google Scholar Sandel, Michael, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (London: Allen Lane, 2012).Google Scholar

2 Philp, Mark, “Conceptualising Political Corruption,” in Heidenheimer, Arnold J. and Johnston, Michael, eds., Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2007);Google Scholar Warren, Mark, “What Does Corruption Mean in a Democracy?” American Journal of Political Science 48 (2004): 328–43;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Block, Gillian, “Institutional Integrity, Corruption and Taxation,” Edomond Safra Working Papers 39. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paperscfm?abstractid=2408183. (Accessed 18 November 2017.)Google Scholar

3 Thompson, Dennis, Ethics in Congress: From Individual to Institutional Corruption (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995).Google Scholar

4 I take it here that being morally responsible implies blameworthiness. Institutionalists generally understand moral responsibility for political corruption in terms of intentional and free contribution to the undermining of the integrity of an institution, for example by causing it to deviate from its purpose ( Miller, Seumas, Institutional Corruption [Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017], 134CrossRefGoogle Scholar ). Dennis Thompson maintains a conceptual distinction between personal and institutional corruption, but recognizes that individual corrupt behavior may cause institutional corruption: “Institutional corruption occurs when an institution or its officials receive a benefit that is directly useful to performing an institutional purpose, and systematically provides a service to the benefactor under conditions that tend to undermine procedures that support the primary purposes of the institution” (Thompson, Dennis, “Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Electoral Campaigns Safe for Democracy,” George Washington Law Review 73, no. 12 [2015]: 1036–1069;Google Scholar see also Lawrence, Lessig, “What An Originalist Would Understand ‘Corruption’ to Mean,” California Law Review 102 [2014]: 1–24).Google Scholar

5 It is worth noting that the sponsoring system in the United States is a very complex and entrenched one. The equation of private sponsoring and sponsoring by affluent supporters and corporations is a simplification, because large numbers of small donors may also influence policies. This does not diminish, however, the force of Lessig’s example, which points at situations in which some groups keep politicians hostage to their preferences. What is objectionable is not only the kind of interests promoted but the way in which they are promoted, which Lessig and Thompson judge to be undemocratic.

6 Lessig, “What An Originalist Would Understand ‘Corruption’ to Mean”; Thompson, “Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Electoral Campaigns Safe for Democracy.”

7 Miller, Seumas, “Institutions” in Zalta, E., ed., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-institutions/ (accessed 18 November 2017).Google Scholar

8 Philp, Mark, “Defining Political Corruption,” Political Studies 45 (1997): 436–62, at 446.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 For discussion, see Barry, Brian, Justice and Impartiality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 214;Google Scholar Pogge, Thomas, Realising Rawls (Ithaca, NY; Cornell University Press, 1989), 32.Google Scholar Rawls appeals to a sense of justice not as an ideal of the good life or as a virtue of character, but as a guarantee that the justice agreed upon will also be the justice we comply with; it makes us, as citizens, faithful to the original agreement and guarantees compliance with institutions that we should regard as just.

10 On discretion see, for example, Davis, Kenneth Culp, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), 4.Google Scholar

11 The groundwork for this definition of political corruption is presented in Ceva, Emanuela and Ferretti, Maria Paola, “Political Corruption, Individual Behavior and the Quality of Institutions,” in Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17, no. 2 (2018). First Published October 3, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1177/1470594X17732067.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

12 For an extended discussion of the duties of public accountability as understood here and a defense of the definition of political corruption as a relational injustice, see Emanuela Ceva in this volume (Emanuela Ceva, “Political Corruption as a Relational Injustice”).

13 On the distinction between cases of corruption and civil disobedience, see Ceva and Ferretti, “Political Corruption, Individual Behavior and the Quality of Institutions”; and Ceva, Emanuela and Ferretti, Maria Paola, “Political Corruption,” Philosophy Compass (2017);12: e12461. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12461CrossRefGoogle Scholar

14 For a discussion of possible conflicts of interest between personal beliefs and institutional purposes see Thompson, Ethics in Congress; Stark, Andrew, “Beyond Quid Pro Quo: What Is Wrong with Private Gain from Public Office,” American Political Science Review 91, no. 1 (1997): 108–120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15 See Ceva and Ferretti, “Political Corruption, Individual Behavior and the Quality of Institutions.”

16 Konzelmann Ziv, Anita, “Institutional Virtue: How Consensus Matters,” Philosophical Studies 161 (2012): 87–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17 Miller, Seumas, “Social Institutions”; and “Collective Moral Responsibility: An Individualist Approach,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (2006): 176–93;CrossRefGoogle Scholar French, Peter, Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994): 13–14.Google Scholar

18 On the relevance of information and the power of blackmail see della Porta, Donatella and Vannucci, Alberto, The Hidden Order of Corruption (London: Ashgate 1999): 55–56.Google Scholar

19 “The charges are brought against the few “bad apples” who misbehaved, even if the conduct in less egregious form is widespread and cultivated by the institution” (Thompson, “Two Concepts of Corruption,” 16).

20 To say that an agent is causally responsible for a certain outcome normally implies that the action of that agent was necessary and sufficient to generate such an outcome; the conditions both of necessity and sufficiency are relaxed when considering contributory responsibility.

21 Miller, Seumas “Corruption,” in: Zalta, E. ed., Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/corruption/ (accessed 18 July 2017).Google Scholar

22 Thompson, Dennis, “Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem of Many Hands,” The American Political Science Review 74, no. 4 (1980): 905–16;CrossRefGoogle Scholar de Poel, Ibo Van and Royakkers, Lamber, Moral Responsibility and the Problem of Many Hands (London: Routledge, 2015).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

23 Duff, Anthony, Answering for Crime (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), 19–25.Google Scholar For a taxonomy of responsibility see Hart, H. L. A, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968): 210–37.Google Scholar

24 Joel Feinberg discusses this and points out that under current criminal law, holding of superiors liable for crimes entirely done by their subordinates will be considered uncivilized. In fact, often this kind of liability captures some minimal forms of blameworthiness, such as negligence. Feinberg, Joel, “Collective Responsibility,” Journal of Philosophy 65, no. 21 (1968): 674–88, at 676.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Thompson, “Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem of Many Hands,” 906. For a discussion of possible justifications of strict liability see Simons, Kenneth, “When Is Strict Criminal Liability Just?” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 87, no. 4 (1997): 1075–1110.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

25 May, Larry, The Morality of Groups (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997): 55.Google Scholar

26 Iris Marion Young has written that political responsibility is mainly to be understood in terms of forward-looking responsibility. In the political context, blaming and finger pointing lead more to defensive behavior than to constructive action ( Young, Iris Marion, “Responsibility and Global Labour Justice,” in Ognjenovic, Gorana, ed., Responsibility in Context: Perspectives (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010): 53–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

27 An analogous case is discussed by Feinberg, Joel, “Collective Responsibility,” Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968): 674–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

28 On the importance of “cultural entry points” see for example Laver, Roberto, “Systemic Corruption: Considering Culture in Second-Generation Reforms” (June 5, 2014), Edmond J. Safra Working Papers, No. 45. Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2446657&rec=1&srcabs=2433257&alg=1&pos=6 (accessed 18 November 2017).Google Scholar

29 Rothstein, Bo, “Anticorruption, An Indirect “Big-Bang” Approach,” Review of International Political Economy 18, no. 2 (2011): 228–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

30 See for example UNODC, 2003, UN Guide for anticorruption policies, Global Programme Against Corruption, Available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/UN_Guide.pd (accessed 18 November 2017).Google Scholar