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The Virtue in Self-Interest*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2009

Michael Slote
Michael Slote
Affiliation:
Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park
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Extract

As a motive, self-interest is constituted by a certain kind of concern for oneself; but we also use the term “self-interest” to refer to the object of such a motive, to the well-being or good life sought by a self-interested agent. In this essay, I want to concentrate on self-interest in the latter sense and say something about how self-interest or well-being relates to virtue. One reason to be interested in this relationship stems from our concern to know whether virtue pays, i.e., is in the moral agent's self-interest, a question which Plato notably asks in the Republic and which has been of concern to moral philosophers ever since. But the importance for ethics of notions like virtue and self-interest is hardly exhausted by their role in the debate over whether virtue pays; indeed, any large-scale ethical theory will presumably have something to say about how these major notions relate, so we have reason to want to understand this relationship independent of the particular desire to show that morality or virtue is in the self-interest of the (virtuous) agent.

It will be a background assumption of this essay that some ways of connecting virtue and well-being/self-interest redound to the advantage of the larger theories that incorporate them. If, in particular, we believe in the bona fides of ethical theory, then unifying power is a desideratum in ethics and it stands in favor of utilitarianism (and Epicureanism) that it offers us a way of unifying our understanding of virtue and well-being. To be sure, that advantage may to some extent or ultimately be undercut if unification leads to counterintuitive ethical consequences.

Type
Research Article
Information
Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 14 , Issue 1 , Winter 1997 , pp. 264 - 285
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1997

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References

1 “Virtue ethics” refers to ethical views that focus on the character or motives of agents rather than on good consequences or conformity to rules. Virtue ethics predominated in the ancient world, and Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Epicureans are all good examples of this approach; but there are also some modern instances, and very recently there has been a strong resurgence of interest in virtue ethics.

2 One can also try to reduce the number of entities or concepts one refers to or makes use of in a theory, but this notion of reduction cuts across the distinctions I am making in the text, and I shall ignore it in what follows.

3 See especially Kant, Immanuel, ritique of Practical Reason, 3d ed., ed. Lewis, White Beck (New York:Macmillan, 1992),Google Scholarpart I, book I, ch. ii.

4 See Broadie, Sarah, Ethics with Aristotle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 376.Google Scholar

5 Plato, Gorgias, in The Dialogues of Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowert (New York: Random House, 1937), S. 506.

6 Actually, I shall only argue that appetitive goods require that one not be totally immoderate (and similarly for the other goods to be mentioned), but for simplicity's sake I shall continue to speak as I have in the text above.

7 See Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Culture and Value (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), p. 52e.Google Scholar

8 We are then committed to saying that sheer information, however instrumentally valuable, is not intrinsically good for people. Note, however, that where knowledge does not require courage but is difficult to attain, it can still count as a personally beneficial achievement. (Something similar may even be true of the insatiable person who gains more and more power or pleasure through persistent efforts.)

9 The elevationist view I am proposing must insist that the virtue status of moderation, unselfishness, generosity, and the other character traits said to be essential to various personal goods does not depend on their having good consequences for human life. Otherwise it would be saying, circularly, that these virtues both ground and are grounded in facts about human well-being. But it is not implausible to hold that generosity, for example, is morally admirable even if, despite the best of efforts (and perhaps unbeknownst to everyone), it fails to achieve its aims; and the courage to face and not deceive oneself about unpleasant facts seems an inherent part of being rational, rather than depending on its consequences for its status as a virtue. (Indeed, the courage, e.g., to face the fact that one has cancer may easily tend to make things harder, worse, for oneself and for those around one, but that does not undercut what we find admirable about such courage. On this point, see my book From Morality to Virtue [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995], p. 130f.) In a similar fashion, finally, I think an insatiable dependence on or greed for, say, gustatory pleasures seems inherently less than admirable (Aristotle calls people who are like this “belly gods”). We needn't be making assumptions about the consequences of such traits to have this opinion.10 Of course, someone might claim that nothing counts as pleasure unless the individual is in some degree satisfied with it. But this assumption clearly makes it easier for Platonic elevationism to hold that appetitive goods require some degree of virtue, and it is in any event very questionable. The French use the term “alumette” (literally “match”) to refer to hors d'oeuvres that are supposed to inflame one's appetite, and this more than suggests that such appetizers are pleasurable yet the very opposite of satisfying.

11 The elevationist theory I am proposing entails not only that pleasure may fail to give rise to an appetitive (or other) good, but that appetitive desire-fulfillment may also fail to result in any good for an individual. Someone insatiably seeking a certain kind of pleasure may have an open-ended desire that is never fulfilled, but will certainly have particular desires along the way: the desire for a given piece of foie gras, for example. That desire is certainly fulfilled, but on the account offered here, the insatiable person gains nothing good thereby. (We also speak of the desire being “satisfied,” but if the individual is in no way satisfied with the resultant state of affairs, then she has gained nothing good from the fulfillment or satisfaction of the particular desire. I am indebted here to discussion with Richard Wollheim.)

12 See Martineau, James,Types of Ethical Theory, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1891).Google Scholar

13 I have here been speaking of intra-ethical elevationism; but an elevationism that seeks to understand well-being in terms of virtue might ultimately attempt to understand or account for the virtues in purely naturalistic terms. Thus, elevationism within the ethical is compatible with reductionism respecting the entire sphere of the ethical.