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Mind as Brain

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2015

Graeme A. Galloway
Graeme A. Galloway*
Affiliation:
Department of Social Sciences, La Trobe University College of Northern Victoria
*
Department of Social Sciences, La Trobe University College of Northern Victoria, PO Box 199, Bendigo, 3550, Australia
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Abstract

Views presented in this journal by Lea (1991) and Mules (1992) concerning whether human mental states can be studied empirically are evaluated in this article; I conclude that both authors' positions are self-defeating. Specifically, Lea's subjectivistic analysis of mind results in it being impossible to know the meaning of mental terms both in our own case and in the case of others; this problem cannot be avoided by using argument by analogy. The relativistic theory of knowledge, within which Mules suggests that the empirical study of mind can proceed, does not enable us to have knowledge about mental states or anything else. It is argued that mind-brain identity theory provides a defensible account of the mind which does not rule out in principle the possibility of studying it empirically.

Type
Articles
Information
South Pacific Journal of Psychology , Volume 6 , 1993 , pp. 24 - 28
Copyright
Copyright © University of Papua New Guinea & University of Central Queensland 1993

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References

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