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Why do Philosophers and Psychologists Prefer to Ignore Each Other's Work?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2015

David R. Lea
David R. Lea*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology and Philosophy, University of Papua New Guinea
*
Department of Psychology and Philosophy, University of Papua New Guinea, P.O. Box 320, University, NCD, Papua New Guinea
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Abstract

This paper aims to clarify certain assumptions, methods and conclusions which have tended to divide philosophy and psychology. In order to demonstrate these diffenees, I have selected certain issues and developments within the philosophy of language which are relevant to behaviourism and cognitive theory. What I will demonstrate is that the assumptions, methods, and conclusions of an enquiry are often related to beliefs about the duality of the human subject. I also point out that philosophers are not unanimous about the existence of this alleged duality. Accordingly, I show that when philosophers abandon the dualistic interpretation, they also reject the idea that philosophy and psychology are fundamentally irreconcilable disciplines. In demonstrating this point, I refer to the work of Noam Chomsky on linguistic structure and cognitive capacity.

Type
Research Article
Information
South Pacific Journal of Psychology , Volume 3 , 1990 , pp. 10 - 20
Copyright
Copyright © University of Papua New Guinea 1990

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References

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