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Moral Credentials, Intergroup Attitudes, and Regulatory Focus Interactively Affect Support for Affirmative Action
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 December 2019
Abstract
People generally tend to stay consistent in their attitudes and actions but can feel licensed to act less-than-virtuously when an initial moral action provides an excuse to do so (i.e., moral self-licensing). A handful of studies have tested how relevant initial attitudes moderate the self-licensing effect but yielded mixed findings: Initial attitudes either decrease, increase, or do not influence licensing dynamics. To account for these inconsistent findings, we propose that the effect of attitudes could itself interact with other factors, notably motivational orientation. We conducted two studies taking into account initial attitudes, absence/presence of moral credentials, and participants’ chronic regulatory focus. Drawing from self-completion theory, we expected self-licensing to occur specifically amongst prevention-focused participants holding positive intergroup attitudes. Results supported this prediction. Prevention-focused participants with positive intergroup attitudes supported affirmative action policies to a lesser extent when they had acquired moral credentials, as compared to when they had not (i.e., self-licensing), t(329) = –3.79, p < .001, d = –.42, 95% CI [–.64, –.20]. Additionally, promotion-focused participants holding positive intergroup attitudes supported affirmative action policies to a greater extent when they had acquired moral credentials (i.e., behavioral consistency), t(329) = 2.44, p = .015, d = .27, 95% CI [.05, .49].
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- Research Article
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- Copyright © Universidad Complutense de Madrid and Colegio Oficial de Psicólogos de Madrid 2019
Footnotes
Lalot, F., & Falomir-Pichastor, J. M. (2019). Moral credentials, intergroup attitudes, and regulatory focus interactively affect support for affirmative action. The Spanish Journal of Psychology, 22. e49. Doi:10.1017/sjp.2019.55