Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-q99xh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T05:33:25.308Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

An Empirical Analysis of California Budget Gridlock

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2021

Jeff Cummins
Jeff Cummins*
Affiliation:
California State University, Fresno, USA
*
Jeff Cummins, Department of Political Science, California State University, Fresno 2225 East San Ramon M/S MF 19, Fresno, CA 93740-8029 Email: jcummins@csufresno.edu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

California is notorious for its budget gridlock. From 1950 to 2008, the budget was adopted late 44% of the time. Although short delays have few consequences, delays in passage have become longer in the last two decades, leading to more severe consequences, such as a lower credit rating and higher borrowing costs. The purpose of this article is to systematically analyze late adoptions of the state budget. I examine annual data from 1901 to 2008 and conduct regression analysis of the length of budget delays, controlling for economic conditions. This study reveals that political and economic conditions, tax policy, and voter-passed initiatives all prolong delays. Interestingly, election years do not reduce budget gridlock despite the potential electoral pressure on the governor and legislature to reach a compromise. I conclude by discussing the study's implications for investigations of budget gridlock in other states and at the national level.

Keywords

budgetingfiscal policylegislative behaviorlegislative/executive interactionterm limits
Type
Research Article
Information
State Politics & Policy Quarterly , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , March 2012 , pp. 23 - 42
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Alt, James E., and Lowry, Robert C.. 1994. “Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget Deficits: Evidence from the States.” American Political Science Review 88:811–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Anderson, Asger L., Lassen, David Dreyer, and Nielsen, Lasse Holboll Westh. 2010. “Late Budgets.” EPRU Working Paper No. 2010-04. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1599437 (January 17, 2011).Google Scholar
Binder, Sarah. 1999. “The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock.” American Political Science Review 93:519–33.Google Scholar
Bohn, Henning, and Inman, Robert P.. 1996. “Balanced-Budget Rules and Deficits: Evidence from the U.S. States.” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 45:13–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cain, Bruce, Kousser, Thad, and Kurtz, Karl. 2006. “California: A Professional Legislature after Term Limits.” In Governing California: Politics, Government, and Public Policy in the Golden State, ed. Lubenow, Gerald C.. Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, 39–65.Google Scholar
Clarke, Wes. 1998. “Divided Government and Budget Conflict in the U.S. States.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 23:5–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clingermayer, James C., and Dan Wood, B.. 1995. “Disentangling Patterns of State Debt Financing.” American Political Science Review 89:108–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Conley, Richard S. (2002). The Presidency, Congress, and Divided Government: A postwar assessment. College Station: Texas A & M University Press.Google Scholar
Fleisher, Richard, and Bond, Jon R.. 2004. “The Shrinking Middle in the U.S. Congress.” British Journal of Political Science 34:429–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gilligan, Thomas W., and Matsusaka, John G.. 1995. “Deviations from Constituent Interests: The Role of Legislative Structure and Political Parties in the States.” Economic Inquiry 33:383–401.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gilligan, Thomas W., and Matsusaka, John G.. 2001. “Fiscal Policy, Legislature Size, and Political Parties: Evidence from State and Local Governments in the First Half of the 20th Century.” National Tax Journal 54:57–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Klarner, Carl E., Phillips, Justin H., and Muckler, Matt. 2010. “The Causes of Fiscal Stalemate.” August 17. http://www.columbia.edu/~jhp2121/workingpapers/FiscalStalemate.pdf (January 17, 2011).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kousser, Thad. 2010. “Does Party Polarization Lead to Policy Gridlock in California.” California Journal of Politics and Policy 2 (2):1–23..Google Scholar
Layman, Geoffrey C., Carsey, Thomas M., and Horowitz, Juliana Menasce. 2006. “Party Polarization in American Politics: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences.” Annual Review of Political Science 9:83–110.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Legislative Analyst's Office. California Legislature. 2005. Revenue Volatility in California. Sacramento, CA: Legislative Analyst's Office.Google Scholar
Little, Thomas H., and Farmer, Rick. 2007. “Legislative Leadership.” In Institutional Change in American Politics: The Case of Term Limits, eds. Kurtz, Karl T., Cain, Bruce, and Niemi, Richard G.. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 55–72.Google Scholar
Masket, Seth. 2007. “It Takes an Outsider: Extralegislative Organization and Partisanship in the California Assembly, 1849-2006.” American Journal of Political Science 51:482–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Matsusaka, John G. 2010. “A Case Study on Direct Democracy: Direct Democracy and Fiscal Gridlock: Have Voter Initiatives Paralyzed the California Budget?” In The Book of the States. Lexington, KY: The Council of State Governments.Google Scholar
Mayhew, David R. [1991] (2005). Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1976-2002. New Haven, London: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
McCarty, Nolan, Poole, Keith T., and Rosenthal, Howard. 2009. “Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization.” American Journal of Political Science 53:666–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Poterba, James M. 1994. “State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics.” Journal of Political Economy 102:799–821.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Savage, James D. 1992. “California's Structural Deficit Crisis.” Public Budgeting and Finance 12:82–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Squire, Peverill. 1988. “Member Career Opportunities and the Internal Organization of Legislatures.” Journal of Politics 50:726–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Squire, Peverill. 2007. “Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited.” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 7:211–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
White v. Davis. 2003. Supreme Court of California.Google Scholar