The creation of racial/ethnic majority-minority districts lies at the heart of debates regarding the utility of descriptive representation for minority policy advocacy. The general puzzle that emerges from these debates, however, rests on the possibility that by electing representatives who are policy outsiders, minority interests would exert little influence in the policy decisions of median-dominated institutions. The authors present a model that shows how majority-minority districts can act to (1) increase the likelihood of electing minority representatives who are unique policy advocates and (2) concurrently increase the level of institutional status of descriptive representatives. The empirical analysis employs a novel data set of observations on political, sociodemographic, roll-call and institutional position, covering twenty U.S. states in the late 1990s and over 2,600 state legislative seats to show how majority-minority districts produce policy outsiders as well as institutional insiders.

Critics of U.S. congressional and state legislative redistricting have argued that gerrymandering severely undermines electoral competitiveness to the point of violating constitutional equal protection standards. In this article, we evaluate whether redistricting principles and processes have any measurable consequence on state legislative electoral competition. In addition to their substantive importance, state legislative general election contests provide greater variance than congressional data for empirically assessing theoretical propositions regarding redistricting principles and processes. We find that electoral competitiveness in state legislative races declined throughout the 1990s, even after term limit reforms were implemented. The proportion of uncontested state legislative seats has doubled since the 1970s, and there has also been a slight increase in average margin of election district victory. Our results show that political principles and some traditional, “politically-neutral” redistricting principles significantly decrease the probability of uncontested state legislative elections. In contrast, independent redistricting commissions did not appear to affect state legislative competition. We conclude with a discussion of how our findings relate to the redistricting reform debate.

We present a new unified dataset of common-space ideal points, committee assignments, and financial interests for all state legislators in 1999. We describe the compilation of the dataset and offer a few possible applications.

Prior research has found that descriptive representation by race, ethnicity, or gender increases political action, but it has paid less attention to how the intersection of these identities influences participation. We extend this literature by assessing the effects on voter turnout of collective descriptive representation in U.S. state legislatures on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, and their intersections. We argue that members of historically excluded groups respond to the overall composition of their state's legislature. We test this proposition in seven elections (2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012). Our results are consistent with the minority empowerment literature, as overall collective representation does substantially increase turnout among previously excluded groups. However, the impact varies intersectionally. For white women, gender trumps race, as higher collective gender representation, regardless of race or ethnicity, increases voter turnout. For African Americans, race trumps gender, as both black men and women respond most consistently to higher levels of collective racial representation. For Latinos, we find less consistent results, but note a collective ethnic turnout effect for 2002 and 2006. We conclude that collective representation, especially at the intersection of identities, is an important factor influencing levels of turnout among previously excluded groups.

Writing this reply presents a challenge for us since the authors of the preceding article reinforce most of our substantive points published previously (Brace et al. 2004, 2006). In this new article, Berry et al. (2007) acknowledge that there is more cross-sectional than longitudinal variation in the Berry et al. (1998) measure of state citizen ideology and imply that researchers should take precautions not to confuse them. They admit that their measure is tapping something different from survey-based self-identification, and they also note the distinction between absolute and relative change in their ideology measure. Given our many points of agreement, this reply focuses on four key points made by Berry et al. in the preceding article on which we differ. First, we address the argument that focusing on intra-state attitude change ignores important attitude change affecting all states simultaneously. Second, we discuss Berry et al.‘s distinction between symbolic ideology and operational ideology. Third, we consider the validity and reliability of the various measures. Finally, we revisit our choice of statistical methods. Although we certainly do not conclude that Berry et al.‘s measure lacks clear utility or relevance, we believe it may serve a more limited purpose than the authors intended. We urge researchers to consider the conceptual, methodological, and epistemological concerns raised in our response before using any indicator of state public opinion.

Two very different kinds of models—cross-sectional models based on the logic of island biogeography and time series models of density dependence—are used to understand interest system density. While they share much in common, it is not at all clear how results derived from cross-sectional models are to be understood in terms of the temporal focus of the time series approach. Thus, the first purpose of this article is to more thoroughly think through how these two modeling strategies and their empirical findings are related to each other. We empirically assess several theoretical conjectures about the relationship of the two modeling strategies by adding a temporal element to the typical cross-sectional analysis of state interest systems via modeling density dependence pooled across four cross-sections from 1980, 1990, 1997, and 2007. By doing so, we add to the literature on state interest system density by examining how it has changed since 1980. Finally, we discuss the nature of this change and what it implies for the temporal development of state interest communities, the second focus of this analysis.

The implementation of federal programs provides an opportunity for state officials to impose their own interests on the policy process. The federal government delegates administrative power to the states to implement federal programs. Because elected state officials serve as one of the principals to street-level bureaucrats, these officials should be able to influence these street-level agents to implement policy to further state needs. However, very little research has examined whether street-level bureaucrats act strategically to benefit state interests as they implement policy. In this article, I use Seemingly Unrelated Regression analysis to examine variation in award rates across the 50 states in two federal disability programs, SSI and SSDI. My findings reveal that program incentives lead state street-level bureaucrats to act strategically in implementing these programs. State bureaucrats reduce access to federal programs when state governments incur costs associated with those programs, especially under conditions of fiscal stress.

The cross-sectional variation among state legislative leaders' formal powers provides a unique opportunity to test a variety of hypotheses of the American legislative process that involve the causes and effects of these powers. But to date, measures of these powers have been developed primarily for single years or biennia, limiting their applicability, especially for drawing causal conclusions. In this note, I develop an index of state House speakers' formal powers for each biennia from 1981 to 2010 (for even-year-election states) and from 1982 to 2009 (for odd-year-election states).

Are the origins of trust in state government different from the reasons why people trust the national government? I argue that trust in state government has distinctive origins, tied to differences in how states operate within a federal system of government. Leveraging variations in the character of the states, I consider whether trust in state government is a function of its proximity to citizens, people's relative preferences for smaller government, and the homogeneity of state electorates. Using responses to the 2017 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, I show feelings of trust in state government follow not only from state political conditions and economic performance but also from the distinctive character of the states. These findings challenge prior accounts that argue that diffuse trust in state government reflects only how people feel about the national government, and highlight how large states and small states face different challenges in cultivating trust in state government.

Extant findings show that voter fraud is extremely rare and difficult to prove in the United States. Voter's knowledge about voter fraud allegations likely comes through the media, who tend to sensationalize the issue. In this study, we argue that the more voters are exposed to media coverage of voter fraud allegations, the more likely that they will perceive that voter fraud is a frequent problem. We merge the 2012 Survey of Performance of American Elections with state-level media coverage of voter fraud leading up to the 2012 election. Our results show that media coverage of voter fraud is associated with public beliefs about voter fraud. In states where fraud was more frequently featured in local media outlets, public concerns about voter fraud were heightened. In particular, we find that press attention to voter fraud has a larger influence on Republicans than Democrats and Independents. We further find that media coverage of voter fraud does not further polarize partisan perceptions of voter fraud. Rather, political interest moderates state media coverage on voter fraud beliefs only among Republicans. Last, our results provide no support that demographic changes, approval of election administration, or information concerning actual reported voting irregularities have any discernable effects on partisan perceptions.

Using research on the initiative as a point of comparison, we consider how frequently and for what ends state legislators use the referendum. Akin to initiative use, we find that legislators are constrained by procedural hurdles in their ability to place referendums on the ballot. However, in contrast to research on the initiative, which emphasizes the role of interest groups as the drivers of initiatives, our analysis suggests that referendum use is motivated by partisan legislative majorities seeking to achieve a mix of political and policy goals.

Members of historically underrepresented groups—women, African Americans, Latinos, and workers—are serving in American legislatures in increasing numbers. However, legislators wield substantially greater power in the lawmaking process when they hold leadership positions. Incorporation of these groups into leadership positions could indicate fuller political representation, but scholars to date have not assessed how well these groups are represented in leadership. We analyze original data describing the backgrounds of approximately 2,200 leaders in 30 states between 2003 and 2014. The data show that, on average across states, members of these groups are as well represented in state legislative leadership positions as they are in rank-and-file membership, but there is substantial variation across states and across parties. We then ask what factors might explain this variation and explore institutional characteristics, like the number of leadership positions or leader selection methods. The results show that legislative chambers with a higher number of leadership posts tend to have more women in leadership, and that selection through elections is associated with decreased African American presence in leadership. The findings have implications for minority incorporation and influence in American politics.

Political scientists have long distinguished between incremental and non-incremental policymaking. In this study, I illustrate the relevance of this distinction for comparative state policy research by modeling both incremental and non-incremental change in the same policy area: Medicaid nursing facility reimbursement. I use mixed-modeling techniques to model incremental year-to-year changes in per diem rates and payments per recipient and event history analysis and ordered logit to model non-incremental comprehensive innovation in this policy area. My results indicate that federal action prompted non-incremental change in capital reimbursement policy by limiting state discretion over incremental year-to-year spending decisions. Incremental policy appears to be affected by regional diffusion, but there is no evidence of this effect for non-incremental policy. Furthermore, when a state's fiscal health declined and the demand for government services grew, it was more likely to respond by making incremental adjustments than non-incremental system overhauls. Whereas governing capacity influenced both incremental and non-incremental change, state ideology influenced only incremental change. The rate at which states pursue incremental or non-incremental policy change depends on their relative vulnerability to federal policy changes, their receptivity to neighboring state influences, and their susceptibility to internal political, economic, and programmatic conditions.

Recently, several studies of Congress and the state legislatures have found evidence to support the information theory of legislative organization, that is, that legislatures develop committees whose characteristics reflect those of the parent body so as to acquire unbiased policy and political information. However, most of these studies have been conducted on the lower, larger legislative chambers. Senates, as smaller bodies that often follow the lead of legislation originating in their lower chambers, may have less need for unbiased information, perhaps allowing those bodies to develop more outlying, unrepresentative committees. We test this hypothesis in 42 state senates and find that unrepresentative committees also tend to be the exception in these upper chambers. Furthermore, as shown in previous studies of state house committees, the frequency of committee outliers in state senates appears to be idiosyncratic, with cultural, political, and institutional variables being unable to account for their observed patterns. While results support the information theory of legislative organization, evidence of outliers among party delegations on committees in these senates provides some support for the party-dominant theory.

Many hypotheses in U.S. state politics research are multi-level, positing that state-level variables affect individual-level behavior. Unadjusted standard errors for state-level variables are too small, leading to overconfidence and possible false rejection of null hypotheses. Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo (2007) explore this problem in their reanalysis of Wolfinger, Highton, and Mullin's (2005) data on the effects of post-registration laws on voter turnout. Primo et al. advocate the use of clustered standard errors to solve the overconfidence problem, but we offer an alternative solution: randomization tests. Randomization tests are non-parametric tests that do not rely on comparisons to theoretical test statistic distributions. Instead, they use distributions tailored to the data, created by randomly scrambling the data many times to simulate what would be observed under the null hypothesis. Unlike with clustering, with the randomization test, U.S. state-level reforms generally fail to be significant both as additive effects and as interactions with individual characteristics.

While Lowi (1964) claims that policies can be classified as one of three types, distributive, redistributive, or regulatory, his work has been criticized as incomplete. Policies are frequently multidimensional, and his categories are neither comprehensive nor mutually exclusive. A fourth policy type, morality policy, has now been well-established as distinct from the other three types (e.g., Meier 1994; Mooney 2001). Evidence suggests that some policies can be framed as multidimensional policy types. Abortion funding is one such policy issue that has aspects of both morality policy and redistributive policy in its politics. In this study, we develop models of government abortion funding based on abortion as a morality and a redistributive policy. We estimate these models using weighted least squares to explain the voting outcomes of county-level votes in six state referenda elections for government funding of abortions. Then, we test a combined model and find clear evidence that the combined model, and variables from both perspectives, provide a stronger case than a single policy typology model alone. A practical implication is that policy advocates may purposely emphasize different values and results of the policies. Thus, testing policy theories may need to include more complex views of policies based on policy types.

This study assesses the impact of campaign effort and election reform on voter turnout in state legislative elections. It uses a nationwide survey of state legislative candidates to measure various campaign activities and combines this information with data on election laws, political conditions, and district-level demographics. The primary finding is that candidate expenditures, party get-out-the-vote efforts, and Election Day registration laws have a synergistic effect on turnout. Campaign efforts heighten citizen interest in politics close to the election, often after registration deadlines have passed. Unlike other election reforms, Election Day registration allows citizens' late-campaign interest to be translated into increased voter turnout.

Many theories of policy diffusion contend that the flow of information is the driving force in the diffusion process. Prior scholarship has identified at least two types of information: information about policy and information about political viability. Few empirical approaches have been able to distinguish between these separate mechanisms. The authors argue that an analysis of policy proposals can untangle political information from policy-based information. They employ their strategy with data on the proposal of tax and expenditure limits (TELs) in the U.S. states since 1970 through direct democracy. The authors find that states in close geographic proximity to states that have rejected TELs are significantly less likely to propose TELs themselves. Since this event does not reveal information about policy effectiveness, the authors conclude that information about political viability systematically diffuses from state to state at the proposal stage of policy making.

The rapid growth of the Latino population in the U.S. over the past 15 years has led to a significant increase in levels of primary and secondary school enrollment rates of Latino children. Research on Latino education has demonstrated the institutional and contextual challenges faced by this increasingly significant group, but studies that link Latino representation and Latino educational performance have neglected to sort out the direct and indirect effects of representation on student achievement. The central assumption in these studies outlines a causal chain running from Latino political representation (school boards), to Latino bureaucratic representation (administrators and teachers), to Latino student performance. This study tests these theoretical assumptions by employing a path analytic model using data from 1,040 Texas school districts for the years 1997–2001 to tease out the direct and indirect effects of Latino representation on Latino student achievement. We find robust evidence of the impact of Latino political representation on Latino educational attainment in Texas, operating via a direct effect on the number of Latino administrators and teachers and an indirect effect on Latino student performance. Additionally, our results demonstrate that descriptive representation becomes substantive representation in the area of education policy for Latinos and that this relationship remains strong over time. These findings underscore the importance of school board elections and school district hiring practices on Latino student performance.

The study of U.S. state supreme courts has been significantly constrained by a lack of available data. To remedy this deficiency, this article introduces an original data set of every state supreme court ruling from 1995 through 2010. We utilize automated textual analysis to search the text of thousands of state supreme court decisions and extract critical information on each case. This automated coding approach produces reliable measures of state supreme court decision making when compared with data collected by human coders. We present trends in docket size, dissent rates, and legal issues being heard in front of the court. This new data set will offer scholars numerous opportunities to expand our knowledge of judicial politics in the American states.