The impact of U.S. Supreme Court decisions is contingent on the willingness of other political actors to implement those decisions. One important group of implementers is the U.S. state legislatures. However, in the pursuit of policy, state legislators must consider multiple goals when choosing among alternative policy options. In addition to considering the likelihood of review by state high courts and the U.S. Supreme Court, state legislators have their own ideas about good policy and must also face reelection. When are legislators likely to follow precedent and when are they likely to ignore it in pursuit of these other goals? In this article, I examine the enactment of state minimum wage legislation for women in the first half of the twentieth century. The results show that even after controlling for legislative and constituent preferences, legislators heed the preferences of the U.S. Supreme Court—but not necessarily their own high courts—when deciding to pass minimum wage legislation. The results point to the need for scholars of state politics to pay greater attention to the role of judicial actors when studying policy adoption and legislative behavior.

We assess the conditions under which majority status generates benefits for incumbent legislators and how these benefits are distributed among members of the majority party. We argue that majority status is valuable only in procedurally partisan chambers; that is, when the majority party monopolizes chamber leadership positions and control of the legislative agenda. Contrary to the existing literature, we also posit that these rewards should be distributed broadly across the majority party. To test our expectations, we utilize 10 recent transitions in the partisan control of U.S. state legislatures and data on campaign contributions. Consistent with our expectations, majority status is valuable, but only in procedurally partisan chambers. Furthermore, the premium in campaign contributions enjoyed by the majority party is primarily distributed to backbenchers, although top party leaders also benefit. These results provide important insights into the distribution of power and influence in U.S. state legislatures.

We address a fundamental question in judicial politics: other factors being equal, do African-American judges behave differently than white judges? Many presume that white judges differ from their minority counterparts in terms of sentencing, deliberation, and propensity to overturn decisions. However, to date, little empirical evidence exists to suggest systematic differences in behavior between these judges. Here, we utilize the newly created judge-level U.S. State Supreme Court Database to assess whether judicial decisionmaking is affected by the race of the judge. Looking at all criminal cases decided by U.S. state supreme court judges from 1995 to 1998, we find evidence of differences between white and non-white judges, but only in states lacking an intermediate appellate court. This finding suggests the effects of race on judicial decisionmaking are conditioned by the institutional structure of the court system.

While much scholarly research has focused on the quality of candidates in U.S. elections, the quantity of candidate participation has received much less attention. Consequently, there is little systematic evidence on what factors stimulate or dampen candidate entry into electoral contests, especially at the state level. In this article, we examine the effects of electoral laws, states' social and political climates, and incumbency on gubernatorial candidacies. We test our claims using an event-count model with the number of candidates contesting each gubernatorial election from 1980 to 2005 as the outcome of interest. We divide total candidate participation into major and third party candidates to observe whether the factors affect neither, one, or both types of candidacies. We find that electoral laws and incumbency play an important role in determining the number of candidacies in these elections, but the effect of these factors varies for the two types of candidates.

Critics of U.S. congressional and state legislative redistricting have argued that gerrymandering severely undermines electoral competitiveness to the point of violating constitutional equal protection standards. In this article, we evaluate whether redistricting principles and processes have any measurable consequence on state legislative electoral competition. In addition to their substantive importance, state legislative general election contests provide greater variance than congressional data for empirically assessing theoretical propositions regarding redistricting principles and processes. We find that electoral competitiveness in state legislative races declined throughout the 1990s, even after term limit reforms were implemented. The proportion of uncontested state legislative seats has doubled since the 1970s, and there has also been a slight increase in average margin of election district victory. Our results show that political principles and some traditional, “politically-neutral” redistricting principles significantly decrease the probability of uncontested state legislative elections. In contrast, independent redistricting commissions did not appear to affect state legislative competition. We conclude with a discussion of how our findings relate to the redistricting reform debate.

In this article, I examine the environmental race-to-the-bottom argument by studying whether state susceptibility to interstate economic competition helps explain which U.S. states engage in environmental regulatory competition. Specifically, I create a susceptibility index using four state economic attributes: overall growth, unemployment, manufacturing growth, and manufacturing employment. Studying state enforcement of federal environmental programs, I find little evidence that states, which are theoretically more susceptible to interstate economic competition are more likely to respond strategically to the regulatory behavior of economic competitor states. These results cast doubt on the idea that the environmental regulatory competition predicted by race-to-the-bottom theory is mediated by intrastate economic conditions.

This article examines the influence of several canons within state codes of judicial ethics aimed at constraining the campaigning of candidates running for U.S. state judicial office. These canons have been much debated since 2002, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that one of them, the announce clause, unconstitutionally restricted the free speech rights of candidates. Based on their likely influence on the availability of information in judicial contests, I hypothesize that the primary effect of these canons is to make incumbents less accountable to the public. Looking at U.S. state supreme court contests from 1998 to 2006 where incumbents are seeking re-election, I find strong evidence that four of the five canons make it less likely for challengers to arise, and I also find evidence that restrictions on candidate solicitation of funds favor incumbents in the general election.

Although political parties in U.S. legislatures cannot compel discipline with the threat of expulsion from the legislature, they can encourage greater party loyalty by strategically bestowing benefits upon favored members. This article explores the use of plum committee assignments to encourage legislators' loyalty to their parties. I outline a theory of how party leaders can use committee assignments strategically to encourage more loyal legislative behavior. This occurs when legislative rules meet two criteria: (1) parties and their leaders can determine who serves on committees and (2) committees have real authority over policy outcomes. I test the theory using data from five state legislatures that differ on the relevant set of legislative rules, finding more party loyalty shown by legislators who receive plum committee assignments when rules meet both criteria and no effect when they do not.

We report the results of a survey of over 300 lobbyists in three states—Colorado, Ohio, and West Virginia. In the first half of this article, we provide a comprehensive portrait of state lobbyists' attempts to affect state government decisions. In the second half, we address the following research question: What factors affect the lobbying behavior of state lobbyists? Our results suggest a number of conclusions about lobbying in the new millennium, including the following: (1) state lobbyists target the governor's office more than most previous studies suggest; (2) state lobbyists aim their grassroots lobbying efforts at the governor and executive agency bureaucrats as well as legislators; (3) state lobbying remains an intensely personal game, as techniques involving face-to-face contact with government officials remain the most effective; and (4) several variables affect a lobbyist's decisions regarding which techniques to use and where to aim his or her efforts, including the receptivity of potential targets and the type of group for which the lobbyist works.

Scholars have done an admirable job explaining the political forces behind the build up in punitive crime policies over the past three decades. This research investigates whether one of these factors—the politics of race—structures the extent to which crime prevention-centered policies are incorporated into states' correctional systems. Using the General Social Survey to create reliable aggregate measures of racial attitudes across the states, I question the extent to which racial attitudes and racial context impact states' propensity to incorporate “softer” prisoner rehabilitation services into their correctional systems. Results show that whites' attitudes toward African Americans and the size of a state's minority population influenced the percentage of prisoners in each state that receive access to education and mental health services in 1995 and 2000. In states with greater racial diversity and states in which whites are less tolerant toward African Americans, state prisoners are less likely to receive rehabilitation services.

We consider the impact of direct democracy on state public policy by examining whether initiatives alter the effects of predictors in models of general state policy liberalism. These analyses are couched in Erikson, Wright, and McIver's (1993) opinion liberalism model of state public policy, as augmented by Gray et al.'s (2004) inclusion of measures of organized interests. After presenting our theoretical expectations, we test the different ways that public opinion, organized interests, and initiatives can interact in the determination of public policy with a variety of models. We find little evidence that initiatives alter the congruence between opinion and policy.

States and the federal government have initiated reforms designed to increase voting participation. Research has focused on the effects of these reforms—specifically, the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA)—on voter turnout, but little research has focused directly on voter registration. Moving beyond the question of whether the NVRA increased registration, we ask: Did its implementation diminish the influence of core demographic variables on registration, producing a more representative pool of registered citizens? Relying on data from Current Population Surveys, our analyses provide limited affirmative support. The NVRA attenuated the influence of income in the states with no previous Motor Voter laws. It also reduced the on-year influence of age and the off-year influence of residential stability in these states and those that had prior passive Motor Voter laws. It did not have a similar effect on the influence of other core characteristics.

While previous work suggests that enacting coalitions' use of ex ante control devices shapes future legislatures' incentives to intervene in the bureaucracy, it is less clear how such insulation motivates individual legislators. We advance an individual-level account of how legislative rule review, a control device that structures an agency's insulation from political interference, differentially shapes legislators' preferences for direct and statutory intervention tactics. Using an original survey of U.S. state legislators, we find that insulation reduces the expected policy benefits of direct interventions, making these tactics less attractive to legislators. Moreover, to capitalize on more permeable agency design, legislators must have access to key resources. For statutory tactics, insulation has no effect on legislators' intervention preferences. Our findings suggest that insulation is a durable control device that casts a long shadow in protecting an enacting coalition's interest in agency affairs.

This article examines the responses of sub-national governments to international agreements that severely reduce their policy discretion. I focus on their decision to subject public procurement to international competition by joining the Agreement of Government Procurement (GPA) of the World Trade Organization. In a public procurement market, a government becomes both a market participant and a market regulator. I argue that the propensity of governments to join the GPA, thus reducing their discretion as market regulators, depends on the degree of local political competition. Studying state governments in the United States, I find that the degree of political competition positively affects not only the propensity to join the GPA but also the amount of procurement that a government subjects to international competition.

In order to understand what factors drive child welfare policymaking, this research analyzes data on spending and legislation from the U.S. states over a three-year period. The key independent variables are scandal, litigation, federal oversight, and local discretion. While states that experience a scandal or a lawsuit do not increase their spending levels over previous years, they do enact more child welfare legislation. This raises the possibility that states engage in symbolic rather than substantive responses to child welfare crises. The administrative structure of the child welfare system also affects state policymaking.

After an exceptionally swift reform movement in the 1990s, 15 states are now adjusting to the most significant institutional change to their governments in a generation—legislative term limits. Beyond the basic task of identifying and cataloguing their various substantive impacts, term limits have presented scholars with an exceptional opportunity to test legislative theory for two reasons. First, most legislative theory is based on behavioral assumptions that term limits appear to affect systematically, such as the reelection motivation. Second, the distribution of term limits across the states gives scholars exceptional methodological advantages for testing theory. In this article, I review the scholarly literature on the impacts of state legislative term limits, describe their theoretically relevant implications and methodological advantages, and advocate using the reform to develop an important research agenda.

Scholars have begun to move beyond the dichotomous dependent variable—indicating whether a state adopts a policy or not in a given year—usually employed in event history analysis. In particular, they have devoted increasing attention to the components of policies that states adopt. I discuss a variety of estimators that have been employed to analyze the adoption and modification of policies with multiple components, including various forms of event history analysis, OLS, and event count models. With various modifications, the researcher can estimate models that treat each component as distinct, pool these models to leverage commonalities across components, or treat the components as identical parts of the same process. Each of these has its strengths and may be appropriate in certain circumstances. Nonetheless, in the majority of cases, some version of event history analysis for multiple or repeat failures is likely to be preferred. The different approaches are illustrated by studying state adoption of various obesity-related policies.

Roll-call data have become a staple of contemporary scholarship on legislative behavior. Recent methodological innovations in the analysis of roll-call data have produced a number of important theoretical insights, such as understanding the structure of congressional decisionmaking and the role of parties and ideology in Congress. Many of the methodological innovations and theoretical questions sparked by congressional scholarship have been difficult to test at the state level because of the lack of comprehensive data on various forms of state legislative behavior, including roll-call voting. The Representation in America's Legislatures project rectifies that problem through collection of comprehensive state legislative roll-call votes across all 99 state legislative chambers for the 1999–2000 and 2003–04 legislative sessions. In this article, we describe the data available through this project as well as our data acquisition procedures, including Stata and Perl programming and OCR of paper documents, with suggestions about how to use these methods to collect a wide range of state-level data.