Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-jkksz Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T11:46:59.683Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

ON RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 December 2021

C. P. Ruloff  and
Patrick Findler
Get access

Abstract

Hsiao has recently developed what he considers a ‘simple and straightforward’ argument for the moral permissibility of corporal punishment. In this article we argue that Hsiao's argument is seriously flawed for at least two reasons. Specifically, we argue that (i) a key premise of Hsiao's argument is question-begging, and (ii) Hsiao's argument depends upon a pair of false underlying assumptions, namely, the assumption that children are moral agents, and the assumption that all forms of wrongdoing demand retribution.

Type
Research Article
Information
Think , Volume 21 , Issue 60 , Spring 2022 , pp. 57 - 64
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of Philosophy

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Hsiao, T. (2020) ‘In Defence of Spanking’, Think, 19.54: 49–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rudy-Hiller, F. (2021) ‘The Epistemic Condition for Moral Responsibility’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility-epistemic/>..>Google Scholar
Walen, A. (2021) ‘Retributive Justice’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-retributive/>..>Google Scholar