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THE PROBLEMS WITH MORAL SUBJECTIVISM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2017

Seow Hon Tan
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Abstract

Moral dialogue for moral subjectivists is gravely limited. As soon as moral subjectivists hold another person to any moral standard independent of the person's belief, they must give up their moral subjectivism. Some moral subjectivists might turn out to be moral realists who accord primacy to autonomy. This, however, is a senseless position that renders all persons equally worthless, unless such moral realists concede that norms that limit autonomy exist. But if so, they are not different from any other moral realists after all.

Type
Research Article
Information
Think , Volume 16 , Issue 46 , Summer 2017 , pp. 25 - 36
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2017 

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References

Notes

1 Dworkin, Ronald, ‘Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 25 (1996), 87–139 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at p. 87.

2 Burnyeat, Myles, ‘Can the Sceptic Live his Scepticism?’, in Schofield, , Burnyeat, , Barnes, eds., Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology (Clarendon Press, 1980), 20, at pp. 52–3Google Scholar.