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QUALIA AIN'T OUT HERE EITHER

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 December 2019

Christopher Searle
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Abstract

What follows is a short thought experiment that aims to show, reductio ad absurdum, that narrow qualia internalism is probably inconsistent with a physicalist/functionalist theory of mind. Those wishing to rebut the argument presented here will need to demonstrate why spatial proximity and the right sort of causal connection of functionally isolated components are necessary to the instantiation of qualia.

Type
Research Article
Information
Think , Volume 19 , Issue 54 , Spring 2020 , pp. 31 - 35
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2019

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