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WHY GOD IS MOST ASSUREDLY EVIL: CHALLENGING THE EVIL GOD CHALLENGE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2019

Chris Byron
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Abstract

The evil God challenge argues that for every theodicy that justifies the existence of an omnibenevolent God in the face of evil, there is a mirror theodicy that can defend the existence of an omnimalevolent God in the face of good. People who invoke the evil God challenge further argue that because we find evil God theodicies to be implausible, we should find good God theodicies to be equally implausible. This article argues that in fact evil God theodicies are more reasonable than good God theodicies by expanding upon arguments offered by David Benatar regarding the nature of existence, and David Hume regarding the asymmetry in our sensations of pain and pleasure.

Type
Research Article
Information
Think , Volume 18 , Issue 51 , Spring 2019 , pp. 25 - 35
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2019 

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Footnotes

I am grateful to Jonathan Matheson at the University of North Florida, and Justin Simpson at the University of Georgia, for their helpful comments and suggestions.