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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 October 2017
In this article, I argue that Berkeley's master argument is not the worst argument in the world – more like third or fourth.
1 Berkeley, George, Principles, 23, in Clarke, Desmond M. (ed.), Berkeley: Philosophical Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 91Google Scholar.
2 See Franklin, J., ‘David Stove's Discovery of the Worst Argument in the World’, Philosophy 77 (2002), 615–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Gallois, Andre (‘Berkeley's Master Argument’, The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 55–69)CrossRefGoogle Scholar christened it Berkeley's ‘master argument’, not because he thought it was good, but because Berkeley places all his money on it: ‘I am content to put the whole upon this issue’, he boasts, right before dropping the bomb (Principles, 22).
3 Read it in the tub: Prior, A. N., ‘Berkeley in Logical Form’, Theoria 21 (1955), 117–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4 Van Cleve, James, Problems from Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 140–1Google Scholar. Shedding the formal wear, ‘∃x(Cx & ¬Cx)’ means ‘There is an x such that I conceive x and I do not conceive x’. ‘C(∃x¬Cx)’ means ‘I conceive that there is an x such that x is not conceived’. The ‘quantifier’ – think of it like a bowtie – is the ‘there is an x’ part.
5 My compliments to Breidert for preserving the exquisite phrase ‘philosophy of thrashing’ – really brightens the skies for me. See Breidert, W., ‘On the Early Reception of Berkeley in Germany’, in Sosa, Ernest (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of George Berkeley (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1987), 231–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at p. 235.
6 Richmond, Alasdair, Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge: A Reader's Guide (London: Bloomsbury, 2009), 60Google Scholar.
7 Mackie, J. L., Problems from Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 53CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
8 Mackie, Problems from Locke, 53.
9 Pitcher, George, Berkeley (London: Routledge, 1977), 110ffGoogle Scholar.
10 Richmond, Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge, 60.
11 Gallois, ‘Berkeley's Master Argument’, 62. Not that I'm looking for allies, but Gallois is superb on this point.
12 I refer, of course, to David Lewis (1941–2001), a philosopher who was so smart he could demonstrate principles that were plainly false.