aττε
and πo
ε
against θεω
a. But for a reminder that Aristotle still differentiates between the productive and prudential see Nic. Ethics 2.4.3 where the distinction resides in the intention of the agent. See also QF 113ff., Else 305, and Huntington Cairns, Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel (Baltimore 1949) 79ff., esp. n. 3.
γà
)… . Also the warning given must not be forgotten; we must not look for equal exactness (
) in all departments of study, but only such a degree as is appropriate to the particular line of enquiry.’
τò πoλὺ), such a conclusion in Dialectic is called a syllogism, in Rhetoric an enthymeme.’
a below, p. 37.
of the rhetorical premises to be identical with the premise for discovery 
, making the kinds of premises in each case correspond exactly: ‘I call those necessary signs from which a logical syllogism can be constructed, wherefore such a sign is called tekmèrion. …’
). Else considers the second passage an interpolation (626). Note, however, how well Aeschylus in the Choephoroi has learned his lesson from Homer, where Orestes’ false report of his identity enables him to enter the palace and effect his revenge. For the legal connotations of the poet as liar see Trimpi, QF 117.
, γνμη, and σvγγν
μη are all related to 
(pardon or forgiveness) is discussed below.
) and 86a5–10: ‘Again, the more particular causes are, the more they tend to form an infinite regress, whereas universal demonstration tends towards the simple and finite; and causes qua infinite are not knowable, whereas qua finite they are knowable. Hence causes are more knowable qua universal than qua particular; and therefore universal causes are more demonstrable. But the demonstration of things which are more demonstrable is more truly demonstration; for correlatives vary simultaneously in degree. Hence universal demonstration is superior, inasmuch as it is more truly demonstrable.’
and for the relation between π
óνo
a and 
. See also David Daube, Aspects of Roman Law (Edinburgh 1969), especially chapter 3, the section on ‘intent’ (163–75), and the section on ‘negligence’ (157–63).
.
λλων, are the first hint of what will turn out to be a very important principle: that the crucial thing about the pathos, so far as its emotional effect is concerned, is not the act itself but the intention.’ See also his note on 
, 378 n. 43. For the central importance of intention in Aristotle's concept of 
, see Walter Lock, ‘The Use of 
in Aristotle's 
results from 
(379) and that, like the 
, it is part of the complex plot (384–85).
), wrong acts (τà
) and misfortunes (τà
) must not be thought deserving of the same penalty. Misfortunes are all such things as are unexpected (πa
áλoγa), but are not vicious (
); errors are not unexpected, but are not vicious; wrong acts are such as might be expected and vicious, for acts committed through desire arise from vice.’
) of legal justice. The reason for this is that law is always a general statement (
aθóλov), yet there are cases which it is not possible to cover in a general statement. In matters therefore where, while it is necessary to speak in general terms, it is not possible to do so correctly, the law takes into consideration the majority of cases (τò
oν), although it is not unaware of the error this involves. And this does not make it a wrong law; for the error is not in the law nor in the lawgiver, but in the nature of the case: the material (
vλη) of the conduct is essentially irregular. When therefore the law lays down a general rule (
aθóλov), and thereafter a case arises which is an exception to the rule, it is then right, where the lawgiver's pronouncement because of its absoluteness (
) is defective and erroneous, to rectify the defect by deciding as the lawgiver would himself decide if he were present on the occasion, and would have enacted if he had been cognizant of the case in question. Hence, while the equitable is just, and is superior to one sort of justice, it is not superior to absolute justice, but only to the error due to its absolute statement (τoῦ
). This is the essential nature of the equitable: it is a rectification of law where law is defective because of its generality (
). In fact this is the reason why things are not all determined by law: it is because there are some cases for which it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a special ordinance becomes necessary. For what is itself indefinite can only be measured by an indefinite standard, like the leaden rule used by Lesbian builders; just as that rule is not rigid but can be bent to the shape of the stone, so a special ordinance is made to fit the circumstances of the case.’
τòν λòγoν) but to the intention of the legislator (
); not to the action itself (
), but to the moral purpose (
); not to the part, but to the whole, not to what a man is now, but to what he has been, always or generally (
τò πoλύ); to remember good rather than ill treatment, and benefits received rather than those conferred; to bear injury with patience; to be willing to appeal to the judgment of reason rather than to violence; to prefer arbitration to the law court, for the arbitrator keeps equity in view, whereas the dicast looks only to the law, and the reason why arbitrators were appointed was that equity might prevail.’
) of justice, the Statesman (284e) provides an adumbration of the Aristotelian distinction, where the science of measurement concerned with ‘number, length, depth, breadth and thickness and their opposites’ is contrasted with the science of measure applicable in the arts — one concerned rather with the moderate (τò
), the fitting (τò π
πoν), the opportune (
), the needful (τò δ
oν), and ‘all the other standards that are situated in the mean between the extremes.’
and 
see Metaphysics 11.8.11; Eudemian Ethics 2.7.2–2.8.2; Nic. Ethics 3.2.16–17 and Cope's discussion of Rhetoric 1.13.15–17 (I 257–58). For Plato's use of 
to designate intention see Laws 876e–77a. For an earlier example see Aeschylus, Eumenides 985 and 1013.
) becomes stylistic decorum (τò π
πoν). For Aristotle's discussion of decorum (τò π
πoν) see Rhet. 3.7.1; for the appropriateness of speech to character see Rhet. 3.7.6–7 and Poetics 15.10 and 25.15. For decorum as the measure for all discourse see Poetics 22.11 and compare Rhet. 3.2.1 and 3.12.6. In ethical matters, appropriateness is equity (τò
). For Aristotle's treatment of equity see n. 29 above.
πàσχεν) is quoted by 
aπáτη and ψεῦδo
(I 179): ‘Meglio coglie nel segno chi vede in ψεῦδo
l'aspetto obbiettivo del falso, senza badare alla diversità del momento subiettivo che lo ha determinato, sia che si tratta di errore, sia di consapevole bugia; in
aπàτη viene riconosciuto il momento subbiettivo, in quanto si mette in luce l'intento d'ingannare, che non se lascia ben definire, poiché si può manifestare per molteplici vie.’ For the basis of this distinction in Thucydides and Plato see 200–201 n. 23. The distinction perhaps anticipates Augustine's division between the mendax and the fallax in his Soliloquies.
) than anybody else, our tacit rejoinder must be that he is a simple fellow, who apparently has met a magician or sleight-of-hand man and imitator and has been deceived by him (γó
) into belief that he is all-wise, because of his own inability to put to the proof and distinguish knowledge, ignorance, and imitation (
).’
a see Phaedrus, trans. Harold North Fowler (London 
δóξaν).
and 
which belong entirely to physical and not to moral processes. In a response to Schadewaldt — ‘Furcht und Mitleid?’ 
, in contradistinction to 
the former he defines as ‘nicht nur ein Gefühl, sondern ein Impuls zum Handeln’ (52).
and 
see Antiphon, ‘The Prosecution of the Stepmother for Poisoning,’ 25. For its transmission into Christian ethics see Romans 9:15. As I have argued elsewhere, Aristotle's isolation of fear and pity as the two emotions most operative in ethical action becomes a central doctrine in Christian ethics, most clearly illustrated in the Christian perspective on the relation between the Old Dispensation under Yahweh and the New under Christ: the one of fear (ϕóβo
) and punishment, the other of pity (
mercy) and pardon.
. That is to say, there must be some error committed. Compare Plato's man deserving pity (Laws 936b, trans. 
).’ For the similar position in Plato see Laws 876e–77a.
for the defense, see Rhetorica ad Alexandrum 1427a23–43.
Crossref Citations
This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by Crossref.
McNair, Maria Devlin
2019.
The Faerie Queene as an Aristotelian Inquiry into Ethics.
Spenser Studies,
Vol. 33,
Issue. ,
p.
103.
Pappas, Nickolas
2021.
The Palgrave Handbook of Image Studies.
p.
37.