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A Rationale for Material Elements of Christ's Human Cognition: Reading Aquinas within His Dominican Theological and Political Context

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 February 2016

John Inglis
John Inglis*
Affiliation:
University of Dayton
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Extract

Historians of philosophy have often discussed Aquinas's view of human knowledge as it appears in the first part of the Summa theologiae. They have observed that he represents a more philosophical view than the Augustinian account of divine illumination. Yet little attention has been paid to the relation between this discussion of human knowledge and the account of Christ's knowledge in the third part of the Summa theologiae. One reason for this neglect is that scholarship is often practiced within the spheres of intellectual inquiry that were framed during the modern period. We ignore issues present in primary texts in order to construct proof texts that respond to present-day philosophical interests. In pursuit of questions having to do with epistemology, logic, metaphysics, and ethics, rarely do historians or philosophers attempt to unravel the historical and theological context of specific texts. In regard to human knowledge, rarely do we read beyond questions 84 through 86 on the human knowledge of material objects, and even more rarely do we consider what Aquinas has to say about the knowledge of Christ. Rather, we treat questions on the human knowledge of material things as if they concerned issues raised today in epistemology or philosophy of mind.

Type
Research Article
Information
Traditio , Volume 58 , 2003 , pp. 257 - 284
Copyright
Copyright © 2003 by Fordham University 

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References

1 Etienne Gilson and Julius Weinberg offer classic statements of this view. See Gilson, Etienne, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York, 1955), 361–62; and Weinberg, Julius, A Short History of Medieval Philosophy (Princeton, 1964), 206–7. Abbreviations for primary texts in the order of appearance are: SACV = Summa adversus Catharos et Valdenses, In Sent. = Commentary on the Sentences, ST = Summa theologiae, DQV = De veritate, CT = Compendium theologiae, SCG = Summa contra gentiles. Google Scholar

2 Recent works on Christ's knowledge include the following: Madigan, Kevin, “Did Jesus ‘Progress in Wisdom’? Thomas Aquinas on Luke 2:52 in Ancient and High-Medieval Context,” Traditio 52 (1997): 179–200; Naab, Erich, “Sich schenkendes Wissen: Überlegungen zum Wissen Christi des Hauptes im Anschluß an Thomas von Aquin,” in Kaiser, Philipp and Franz, Albert, eds., Glauben, Wissen, Handeln: Beiträge aus Theologie, Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft zu Grundfragen christlicher Existenz (Würzburg, 1994), 105–24; Ernst, Johannes Theodorus, Die Lehre der hochmittelalterlichen Theologen von der vollkommenen Erkenntnis Christi: Ein Versuch zur Auslegung der klassischen Dreiteilung visio beata, scientia infusa und scientia acquisita (Freiburg, 1971); Kaiser, Philipp, Das Wissen Jesu Christi in der lateinischen (westlichen) Theologie (Regensburg, 1981); and Torrell, J.-P., “S. Thomas d'Aquin et la science du Christ: Une relecture des questions 9–12 de la ‘Tertia Pars’ de la Somme de Théologie,” in Bonino, Serge-Thomas, ed., Saint Thomas au XXe siècle (Paris, 1994), 394–409. Written from the perspective of theology as presented in the twentieth century, little attention is paid in these texts to Aquinas's classic account of human knowledge.Google Scholar

3 For example, see Pasnau, Robert, Theories of Cognition in the Late Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1997); MacDonald, Scott, “Theory of Knowledge,” in Kretzmann, Norman and Stump, Eleonore, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas (Cambridge, 1993), 160–95; and Kenny, Anthony, Aquinas on Mind (London, 1993). Interestingly enough, Pasnau widens his scope in his most recent book by also treating questions 87 and 88 on the human knowledge of self and of God, but he does not recognize that this is Aquinas's longstanding framework for considering human cognition and that Aquinas has theological reasons for doing so. See Pasnau, Robert, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae Ia, 75–89 (Cambridge, 2002).Google Scholar

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14 The other purposes are to demonstrate the preambles of faith and to shed light on the contents of faith. See Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate 2.3. Edition used: Expositio super Librum Boethii de Trinitate , ed., Decker, B. (Leiden, 1959).Google Scholar

15 It is much easier to point to the foils in the works of Bonaventure, because he often labels whom he is opposing.Google Scholar

16 In a general account of the polemics between the Cathars and their opponents, Gedaliahu Stroumsa concludes that Aquinas does not seem to offer a serious response to the position of the Cathars. Aquinas did not write a specific treatise against the Cathars, but that is no reason to think that he did not respond. I argue below that he provides such a response in his treatment of knowledge and the Incarnation in the Summa theologiae. See Stroumsa, Gedaliahu G., “Anti-Cathar Polemics and the Liber De Duobus Principiis.” in Lewis, Bernard and Niewöhner, Friedrich, eds., Religionsgespräche im Mittelalter (Wiesbaden, 1992), 183. For an interpretation of Aquinas as often opposing the dualism of Averroes and Avicenna in the face of the Cathars, see Poupin, Roland, La papauté, les cathares & Thomas d'Aquin (Portet-sur-Garonne, 2000). Poupin adopts an ahistorical approach in that he does not read Aquinas from within the context of Dominican controversial works.Google Scholar

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18 On this point, see Wakefield, , Heresies, 494 and Thouzellier, Christine, Un traité cathare inédit du début du XIIIe siècle d'après le Liber contra manicheos de Durand de Huesca (Louvain, 1961), 87.Google Scholar

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20 Hinnebusch, , History of the Dominican Order , 1:64–65.Google Scholar

21 Two manuscripts say 1241, but the printed edition says 1244. For a discussion of this point, see Wakefield, and Evans, , Heresies of the High Middle Ages, 744 n. 1; and Dondaine, Antoine, “Le Manuel de l'inquisiteur (1230–1330),” Archivum fratrum praedicatorum 17 (1947): 179 n. 26. I cite the printed edition of Moneta's text: Moneta of Cremona, Summa adversus Catharos et Waldenses, ed. Ricchini, T. A. (Rome, 1743).Google Scholar

22 SACV 247–48. Moneta understands different groups of Cathars to deny Christ's bodily basis in different ways. For an account of various Cathar views that Moneta discusses, see Schmitz-Valckenberg, Georg, Grundlehren katharischer Sekten des 13. Jahrhunderts: Eine theologische Untersuchung mit besonderer Berücksichtigung von Adversus Catharos et Valdenses des Moneta von Cremona (Munich, 1971), 144–49.Google Scholar

23 On these views, see Schmitz-Valchenberg, , Grundlehren katharischer Sekten , 185–96.Google Scholar

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25 Many of these images were first sculpted on churches and cathedrals in the thirteenth century at the time of the crusades against the Cathars. On Chartres's sculptures on the north and south portals, see Katzenellenbogen, Adolf, The Sculptural Programs of Chartres Cathedral: Christ, Mary , Eccelesia (New York, 1964), 67, 76–77, 86–88.Google Scholar

26 This point is not lost on art historians (see ibid., 77).Google Scholar

27 In Sent. 2.28.1.1. Scriptum super Sententiis Magistri Petri Lombardi , ed. Mandonnet, R. P. and Moos, M. F., 4 vols. (Paris, 1929–47).Google Scholar

28 Bonaventure, , In Sent. 3.14.3.2. Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum , Bonaventure, , Opera Omnia , 10 vols. (Quaracchi, 1882–1902), vols. 1–4.Google Scholar

29 See In Sent. 3.14.3.5 ad 3; 3.18.3 ad 5.Google Scholar

30 He argues for this same position in his disputed questions De veritate (QDV 20.2–3). For edition, see n. 40 below.Google Scholar

31 ST 3.9.4; 3.12.2. The three questions that follow Aquinas's initial consideration of Christ's knowledge repeat the structure of this inquiry: beatific knowledge in question 10, infused knowledge in question 11, and acquired knowledge in question 12. Considering the epistemological attention often given to Aquinas's discussions of human knowledge, we might expect Aquinas to say that he will use Aristotle in order to offer a more philosophical approach to the human knowledge of Christ. Yet, as I explain, he has other concerns in the text. On this dating, see Torrell, Jean-Pierre, Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1: The Person and His Work , trans. Royal, Robert (Washington, 1996), 333. Edition of ST used: Aquinas, Thomas, Summa theologiae, ed. Members of the Institute of Medieval Studies of Ottawa, 5 vols. (Ottawa, 1941–45).Google Scholar

32 ST 3.9.1 sed contra. The quotation is taken from De incarnationis Dominicae sacramento, 7. For a clear statement of the relation between Ambrose and Aquinas, see Madigan, , “Did Jesus ‘Progress in Wisdom’?” (n. 2 above), 190–94.Google Scholar

33 ST 3.5.1. While Aquinas does not mention the Cathars at this point in his text, his frequent statements that the Manichees believed that Christ's body was only imaginary leave no doubt whom he has in mind. For examples that occur in the third part alone, see ST 3.5.2, 3.14.1, and 3.37.1. For a well-focused discussion of this point, see SCG 4.29. Edition used: Summa contra Gentiles (Rome, 1934). This view is often noted in Dominican works of the thirteenth century. For example, Hugh of St. Cher notes it in the third book of his commentary on the Sentences (3.2.22). For discussions by Hugh of this point and an edition of the text, see Principe, Walter, Hugh of Saint-Cher's Theology of the Hypostatic Union (Toronto, 1970), 54 and 167, respectively.Google Scholar

34 Where the Cathars are an issue, this is no idle concern. Moneta devotes a section to the claim that Christ truly suffered and died in order to bring out the corruptibility of his human nature while on earth (SACV 256–57). Key to human salvation, Christ not only assumed a body, but underwent suffering and death. Similar concerns motivate Aquinas's discussion of Christ's suffering and death in questions 46 through 50. For example, the reasons given for why Christ should not die sound like those of the Cathars (ST 3.50.1 obj. 1–3).Google Scholar

35 When considering whether Christ should have received the matter of his body from a woman, Aquinas includes a quotation from Augustine's letter to Volusianus (letter 137) that indicates how his view of human knowledge opposes that of the Cathars. He quotes Augustine claiming against the Manichees that the senses allow human beings to form concepts from material bodies (ST 3.31.4 ad 2).Google Scholar

36 For example, see the eighth argument and reply in the summa attributed to Alexander of Hales, Summa theologica 3.1.1.3.2.2 (Quaracchi, 4:165, 167) and Bonaventure's In Sent. 3.14.3.2 obj. 3 and ad 3. Albert does think, following Ambrose, that Christ must have progressed in knowledge in some sense. See In Sent. 3.3.10, and Madigan, “Did Jesus ‘Progress in Wisdom’?” (n. 2 above), 188. Edition used for Alexander of Hales: Summa theologica seu sic ab origine dicta “Summa fratris Alexandria,” 6 vols. (Quaracchi, 1924–79). Edition used for Albert the Great: Commentarii in IV Sententiarum , in B. Alberti Magni Opera Omnia , ed. Borgnet, E., 38 vols. (Paris, 1890–95), vols. 25–30.Google Scholar

37 Aquinas uses the name Cathari only once. He does this in one of his very few spirited works, Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem (2.5), which appeared in 1256. In this work, Aquinas contrasts the Dominican religious life with the extreme position on poverty taken by the Cathar Desiderius. Moneta of Cremona points out that Desiderius describes Christ at times as having a spiritual and not a material body (SACV 248). Interestingly enough, according to Anselm of Alessandria, a Dominican inquisitor writing in 1266, Desiderius broke with his Cathar bishop in holding that Christ had a body and ate physical food. For a selection from this notebook, see Wakefield, , Heresies (n. 17 above), 362.Google Scholar

38 On this important point, see Borst, , Die Katharer (n. 6 above), 252.Google Scholar

39 This point is made both in the summa attributed to Peter the Martyr and that of Moneta. See Käppeli, Thomas, “Une Somme contre les hérétiques de S. Pierre Martyr(?),” Archivum fratrum praedicatorum 17 (1947): 324, 330–31; Moneta, SACV 411; and Borst, , Die Katharer, 252.Google Scholar

40 DQV 20.1, in Quaestiones disputatae , ed. Spiazzi, Raimondo M., 2 vols. (Rome, 1953), vol. 1.Google Scholar

41 See Käppeli, , “Une Somme,” 324; and Sacconi, Rainerius, “Summa de Catharis et Pauperibus de Lugduno,” in Dondaine, Antoine, Un Traité néo-manichéen du XIIIe siècle: Le Liber de duobus principiis, suivi d'un fragment de rituel cathare (Rome, 1939), 76.Google Scholar

42 Super ad Hebraeos 2.3, in Super Epistolas S. Pauli lectura , ed. Cai, Raffaele, 8th ed., 2 vols. (Rome, 1953), 2:335–506.Google Scholar

43 Torrell dates this work to between 1265 and 1267, which places it close to the period when Aquinas treated Christ in the third part of the Summa. See Torrell, , Saint Thomas Aquinas (n. 31 above), 349. Edition used: S. Thomae Aquinatis, Opuscula omnia, ed. Mandonnet, P., 6 vols. (Paris, 1927), 2:1–219.Google Scholar

44 CT chap. 216. For Aquinas to deny that Christ only appeared to gain knowledge not only works against the Cathars, it also differs from Bonaventure's stand in his commentary on the Sentences where he states that any progress in knowledge is one only in appearance. See In Sent. 3.14.3.2 and Madigan, , “Did Jesus ‘Progress in Wisdom’?” (n. 2 above), 190. Bonaventure's claim could appeal to a Cathar.Google Scholar

45 See Madigan, , “Did Jesus ‘Progress in Wisdom’?” 181, 199–200.Google Scholar

46 See Scriptum 1.3.4.4, and Inglis, , Spheres of Philosophical Inquiry (n. 4 above), 243–44.Google Scholar

47 I make this argument in regard to the DQV and Summa discussions in Inglis, , Spheres of Philosophical Inquiry , 244–47 and 252, respectively.Google Scholar

48 On question 78 and on treating human knowledge as the imitation of God, see ibid., 247–48 and 252–60, respectively.Google Scholar

49 Erich Naab notes this point, “Sich schenkendes Wissen” (n. 2 above), 106.Google Scholar

50 On this point see Aquinas, DQV 20.4 ad 11–12, and Naab, , “Sich schenkendes Wissen,” 112–13.Google Scholar

51 On the formal role of Christ's human knowledge in relation to human beings, see Naab, Erich, “Sich schenkendes Wissen,” 105–24. On Aquinas's discussions of human knowledge and the imitation of God in his Summa as trinitarian, see Juvenal Merriell, D., To the Image of the Trinity: A Study in the Development of Aquinas's Teaching (Toronto, 1990). On the point that Aquinas's Summa was to prepare Dominican students for the study of Scripture, see Principe, Walter H., Introduction to Patristic and Medieval Theology (Toronto, 1980), chap. 5, p. 22.Google Scholar

52 Anthony Kenny represents the standard philosophical approach in noting that Aquinas was concerned with matter and form in these two texts. See Aquinas on Mind (n. 3 above), 89–145.Google Scholar

53 As I note above and below, Moneta views human beings as a composite of body and soul. But his anthropology at times tends to belie this characterization.Google Scholar

54 De anima 1.2 (ed. Hotot, , 2:66). On this point, see Baumgartner, Mattias, Die Erkenntnislehre des Wilhelm von Auvergne (Münster, 1893), 13, and Heinzmann, Richard, “Zur Anthropologie des Wilhelm von Auvergne (gest. 1249),” Münchener theologische Zeitschrift 16 (1965): 29–35. Edition used: William of Auvergne, Opera omnia , ed. Hotot, F., 2 vols. (repr. Frankfurt, 1963).Google Scholar

55 As is made clear in the opening chapters of the section of his work titled De universo (1.1.2–12 [ed. Hotot, 1:594–607]). Of course, William does not only have the Cathars in mind. He criticizes many points of Aristotle and a number of Islamic philosophers. But, often when he criticizes these people, his criticisms also respond to the Cathars. See Baumgartner, , Die Erkenntnislehre, 7–8; and Teske, Roland J., “William of Auvergne and the Manichees,” Traditio 48 (1993): 63–75.Google Scholar

56 De universo 1.2.13 (ed. Hotot, , 1:702). This point is discussed in Heinzmann, “Zur Anthropologie,” 30.Google Scholar

57 Richard Heinzmann is careful to point out that William's early interpreters were wrong to assume that such philosophical theses represent a systematic view upon which William's theology hangs. Depending on the apologetical issue at hand, William uses philosophical points to obtain a conclusion, but does not construct a philosophically coherent methodology. Therefore, we should be cautious about pressing what appear to be contradictions. Another important point is that philosophers often take single statements out of context without reading related texts. In this case other texts on the immortality of the soul and the resurrection establish that William does not view human beings as essentially souls (Heinzmann, “Zur Anthropologie,” 27–28, 32–33). On the importance of viewing specific points within the context of the Magisterium divinale as a whole, see Kramp, J., “Des Wilhelm von Auvergne Magisterium divinale,” Gregorianum 1 (1920): 538–84; 2 (1921): 42–78, 174–87.Google Scholar

58 Avicenna influenced Aquinas on the view that matter is an important aspect of the human species. On this account it is incorrect to talk about the human essence without taking into account the human body. Avicenna grants a more important role to both matter and the human body than does Averroes, who identifies the human essence as form without matter. My point is that in this case, Avicenna's view is more useful against the Cathars than that of Averroes. For a clear account of the difference between Avicenna and Averroes on this matter in relation to Aquinas, see Maurer, Armand, “Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas,” in idem, Being and Knowing (Toronto, 1990), 3–18.Google Scholar

59 For the interesting suggestion that in adapting Aristotle's view of form, Aquinas weakens his view of the intellectual substance as the form of the human body, see Abel, Donald C., “Intellectual Substance as Form of the Body in Aquinas,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 69 (1995): 227–36.Google Scholar

60 In each case reasons are given for why the incorporeal human soul and intellect cannot be united to a body. The second and third objections are that an intellect could not attain universality if it is united to a body. The fourth is that since intellectual power is incorporeal, it cannot extend to what is corporeal. The fifth is that since the intellect possesses its own being, it cannot be the form of something that must receive its own existence. The sixth is that since form cannot exist without matter, the intellectual principle would stand in need of matter, which it does not. Similar arguments appear in the fifth and sixth articles (ST 1.76.5–6).Google Scholar

61 ST 1.76.5–6. For a classic presentation of the view that the soul's being survives death, see Pegis, Anton, St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century (Toronto, 1934), 128–47.Google Scholar

62 For a clear philosophical account of question 76 that makes no mention of the Cathars, see Kenny, , Aquinas on Mind (n. 3 above), 145–55.Google Scholar

63 It is interesting that while Aquinas praises Avicenna for viewing matter as an aspect of the human species, he criticizes him for having a Platonic view of human understanding that neglects the role of the bodily organs (SCG 2.74). The criticism is that Avicenna placed too high a value on transcendent forms in his account of human understanding at the expense of the material elements. For my purposes, it is important to keep in mind that opposition to Avicenna on this point also responds to the Cathars. Since the Cathars were thought to use the arguments of Plato, responses to them often apply to the Cathars. For a clear account of Aquinas's criticism and further citations from Aquinas and Avicenna, see Lee, Patrick, “St. Thomas and Avicenna on the Agent Intellect,” Thomist 45 (1981): 41–61.Google Scholar

64 Cohen is right to point out that Etienne Gilson failed to devote attention to this point in his classic The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Cohen's interpretation has justly received favorable attention. For example, Martin Tweedale agrees with his analysis and attempts to clarify how material form comes to exist spiritually in the understanding, and James Robb confirms that scholars with an interest in defending intelligibility have neglected this side of Aquinas. Yet the traditional picture continues to be influential in works such as The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy and Marenbon's Later Medieval Philosophy. Slight attention is paid to the material elements in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, with no mention of Cohen's work. See Cohen, Sheldon M., “St. Thomas Aquinas on the Immaterial Reception of Sensible Forms,” The Philosophical Review 91 (1982): 193–94; Gilson, Etienne, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York, 1956), 203–4; Tweedale, Martin M., “Origins of the Medieval Theory that Sensation is an Immaterial Reception of a Form,” Philosophical Topics 20 (1992): 215–31; Robb, James, “The Unity of Adequate Knowing in St. Thomas Aquinas,” Monist 69 (1986): 447–57; Mahoney, Edward P., “Sense, Intellect, and Imagination in Albert, Thomas, and Siger,” in Kretzmann, Norman, Kenny, Anthony, and Pinborg, Jan, eds., The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 1982), 605–7; Marenbon, John, Later Medieval Philosophy (1150–1350): An Introduction (London, 1987), 116–31; and Kretzmann, Norman, “Philosophy of Mind,” and Scott MacDonald, “Theory of Knowledge,” in Kretzmann, Norman and Stump, Eleonore, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas (Cambridge, 1993), 128–59 and 160–95, respectively. For a summary of positions on both sides of this issue, see Pasnau, , Theories of Cognition (n. 3 above), 42.Google Scholar

65 ST 1.90.4 and ad 1–2. Aquinas also mentions the Cathars in the first article as the contemporary group that identifies the human soul with the substance of God.Google Scholar

66 SACV 426. On Aquinas's view that material things are known in the soul without matter, see ST 1.84.2; on Moneta on seeing color, see SACV 426. Moneta denies that the eyes receive material form, and Aquinas denies that the intellect receives material form (ST 1.75.5). On the material origin of ordinary human sight and understanding, see SACV 103.Google Scholar

67 Moneta also discusses the composite nature of human knowledge when arguing for the immortality of the human soul (SACV 422–29). A philosophically interesting argument is offered for why the human soul is not a composite of form and matter. Using Aristotle's distinction between form and matter and a discussion of the eye receiving but not becoming white, Moneta explains that no intellectual substance can consist essentially of material form (SACV 426). Aquinas uses the same argument when arguing that the soul does not consist of matter and form (ST 1.75.5). Moneta's discussion indicates the contemporary polemical nature of this discussion.Google Scholar

68 For example, when arguing for the material nature of Christ's miracles, Moneta distinguishes between healing material eyes and spiritual eyes. Spiritual eyes do not need to be opened in order to see (SACV 103). In fact, it is important for Moneta to point out that Jesus' lordship over all of material creation is shown by effected miracles at each level of nature: non-living, plant life, sensing, and the rational (SACV 100–104). This gives Moneta a reason to put Aristotle's categories to use in his polemical project. Google Scholar