Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gxg78 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T04:05:11.602Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Causes of the War of Jenkins'1 Ear, 1739

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Harold W. V. Temperley
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Both Burke and Coxe have said that Jenkins never lost his ear from the stroke of a Spanish ‘cutlash’; a modern historian has shown it to be likely that he did. What, however, is more important than the establishment of this truth is the decision as to the exact amount of influence it had upon producing the war which followed. Jenkins' ear may be said to typify the feelings of the English public in their broad sense, their hatred for the Spaniards as cruel Papists, their insular detestation of the foreigner, and the like. The question is how far did these feelings influence the declaration of war; what were the main motives of the diplomats on either side? Did the English statesmen first truckle to Spain and then to England? The great interest of such an inquiry lies in the fact that the year 1739 was a turning point of history. It was, perhaps, the first of English wars in which the trade interest absolutely predominated, in which the war was waged solely for balance of trade rather than for balance of power. But it is not alone memorable on this account; from this war issued, in a clear and undeviating succession, the series of wars which were waged between England and France during the eighteenth century — wars in which Spain was sometimes a passive spectator, oftener an active enemy, never the friend of England. Spain's alliance with France produced grave complications for England in 1743, contributed to the fall of the greatest of English ministers in 1761, and to the loss of the greatest of English colonies in 1783.

Type
Research Article
Information
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society , Volume 3 , December 1909 , pp. 197 - 236
Copyright
Copyright © Royal Historical Society 1909

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

page 199 note 1 Public Record Office, Spain, State Papers Foreign, vol. 133, 01 13Google Scholar, K. to N., ‘private and particular,’ Ap. 13/24, 1739; K. to N., ‘most private’ (vide also for above touches—Spain, S.P.F. vol. 131, Segovia, 08 18/29, 1738).Google Scholar

page 200 note 1 Spain, S.P.F. vol. 133, 01 (apparently 13 or 14), 1739Google Scholar, K. to Conraud (Under Secretary to Newcastle).

page 200 note 2 He was the author of a secret memoir, Jan. 1738, vide below, p. 204. This Memoir is referred to by Coxe, and contains most valuable matter. I hope to publish it in full at a later stage.

page 201 note 1 I have found no trace of the Keene-Walpole correspondence, but the fact is substantiated by Coxe, , Walpole, ed. 1798, vol. 3, pp. 520–2.Google ScholarKeene, writes, p. 522Google Scholar, that he intends to burn all Walpole's letters and papers before leaving Madrid. This is the only letter of the series that appears to have escaped this English auto-da-fé on Spanish soil. There seems to be a reference to the fact of this Correspondence in P.R.O., Spain, S.P.F. vol. 133, Feb. 12/23, 1739. K. to Stone. There is some unpublished correspondence of Keene to the Duke of calendared, Leeds, Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xi.Google Scholar App. pt. vii. p. 47, but it appears to refer to the years 1751–6.

page 202 note 1 Drafts N. to K., P. R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 109.Google Scholar The letter of June 18 has annexed to it the deposition of Jenkins, June 17, 1731, made to a Government official (Delafaye) and signed and attested by his chief mate and boatswain. The Admiralty side of the matter (the first revelation of the truth) was given to the world by ProfessorLaughton, J. K., Eng. Hist. Rev. iv. [London 1889], 741–9.Google Scholar There is a good discussion of the matter in Hertz, , British Imperialism in the Eighteenth Century, London 1908, pp. 32–3.Google ScholarCp. also P.R.O., Spain, S.P.F. vol. 113, 01 10, 1731, N. to K.Google Scholar

page 202 note 2 See note I above.

page 202 note 3 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 113.Google ScholarCp. also Horatio Walpole's Secret Memoir, 01 1738Google Scholar, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 9131, ff. 236 sqq.

page 203 note 1 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 118Google Scholar, N. to K.; Patiño was rather bellicose also about this time, vide ibid. Oct. 9, 1733, ‘Private’ and in cypher, N. to K.; and vide ibid. vol. 121, Feb. 5, 173/4, N. to K., addition ‘most private.’

page 204 note 1 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 130, 04 12, 1738.Google Scholar K. to N. ‘private’ (vide also Spain, vol. 133, March 16, 1739, K. to N.); vide Horace Walpole to Trevor, July 21/Aug. 1, 1738, Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xiv.Google Scholar App. pt. ix. p. 20 (Buckinghamshire Papers, Trevor MSS.), on the advantages for illicit trade which the Assiento gave; vide also Horatio Walpole's Secret Memoir, 01 1738Google Scholar, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 9131, f.209, ff. 222 sqq. The judgment of Montijo is precisely that of the foreigner: c.p. Vaulgrenaul's instructions from Paris, April II, 1749, Recueil des Instructions, xii.Google Scholarbis. Espagne; Morel-Fatio et Léonarden, p. 316, Paris 1899.

page 204 note 2 Cp. P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 135Google Scholar, Duke of Bedford to K. May II, 1749, ‘The contraband trade with the Spanish West Indies, the great bone of contention between the two nations, and the cause of most of the wars that have happened betwixt them.’

page 204 note 3 According to the King of Spain's Memorial, April 17, 1732, received by Keene from Stert, September, 23, 1738, P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 131Google Scholar, this ‘unlawful trade’ was ‘carried on by the directors themselves … under the shadow of the ship of permission and of the Assiemo of negroes.’ There was also, there can be little doubt, a very large private trade among the Company's servants without the directorial cognizance. Consult the most instructive contemporary pamphlet on this subject, Considerations on the American Trade before and since the Establishment of the South Sea Company, 1739.Google Scholar

page 205 note 1 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 113, N. to K, 07 14, 1732Google Scholar; ibid. vol. 133, March 16, K. to N. ‘Mor de la Quadra has insinuated to me more than once, as well as to the Dutch Ambr., that the principal remedy (for grievances) … lyes in our own hands, by imposing penalties on Contrabandists, and he gave this as a reason why France never had any occasion to pass offices on this subject, notwithstanding the proximity of their Possessions in St. Domingo.’ This letter shows Keene to have been much afraid that the Dutch would agree to provisions suppressing their illicit commerce which would not be ‘agreeable to our constitution or the present temper of our [England's] people.’

page 205 note 2 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 131Google Scholar, Keene and Castres to N., Oct. 2/13, 1738, Segovia. For France, vide also Armstrong's well-known work Elizabeth Farnese, p. 286Google Scholar; references to English illicit trade may be found in P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 132, 01 7, 1738Google Scholar, N. to K.; ibid. vol. 130, K. to N., May 7, 1738, ‘secret and private,’ May 26, 1738 (enclosure in same of translation of La Quadra's letter); ibid. vol. 133, K. to Conraud, Jan. (13?) 1739; ibid. K. to N. March 16, 1739.

page 206 note 1 Carteret, May 2, 1738, Parl. Hist. x. 745–54.Google ScholarCp. also the same contention by Newcastle in P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 118, N. to K., Jan. 10, 1733; vide also Horatio Walpole's Secret Memoir, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 9131 f. 131, ff. 221–2. The aulhor of Popular Prejudices against the Convention (1739)Google Scholar pointed out, however, ‘there is indeed some cocoa growing in our Colonies, but very different from Spanish cocoa.’

page 206 note 2 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 130, 02 3, 1738.Google Scholar Madrid, cp. Armstrong, 's Elizabeth Farnese, p. 246.Google Scholar

page 207 note 1 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 130, 05 7, 1738Google Scholar, K. to N., Monte, Casadel, ‘most private.’Google Scholar

page 207 note 2 Most of the valuable contemporary pamphlets on this subject are referred to in Hertz, G. B., British Imperialism in the Eighteenth Century, London 1908, p. 15Google Scholarsqq. While not dealing with the diplomacy of the period, this work is of great value, owing to the patience and care with which the printed pamphlets and works of the period have been ransacked for information.

page 208 note 1 Popular Prejudices against the Convention, p. 21Google Scholar, quoted by MrHertz, , p. 52.Google Scholar This particular statement as to seeing Spaniards sold as slaves in British colonies is hotly traversed in A New Miscellany for the Year 1739, pp. 25–6.Google Scholar

page 208 note 2 Vide P.R.O. Admiralty Secretary Out Letters, vol. 55, 02 15, 1738Google Scholar, Instructions to Reddish, Captain, AngleseaGoogle Scholar, Plymouth, , pp. 194–8Google Scholar; and ibid. May 9, 1738, Instructions to Captain SirPeyton, Yelverton, HectorGoogle Scholar, Portsmouth, , pp. 231–5.Google Scholar ‘And whereas we have received information that the pirates do frequently infest the island of Providence’ ‥ ‘and the coast of Virginia.’ ‥ ‘the ship under your command shall be constantly kept in a good condition for service.’ The instructions state that the service during recent years had been very slack, and that British captains had allowed their vessels to lie in harbour. It is significant that the instructions say nothing of stopping illicit commerce, though they make it clear that the captains must not themselves be concerned with any kind of private trade, etc.

page 208 note 3 Cp. Sorel, , Europe et la Révolution Française, i. p. 338, Paris 1908.Google Scholar

page 208 note 4 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 130, 05 7, 1738Google Scholar, K. to N., Casa del Monte, ‘most private.’ There may be exaggeration here, for Montijo had reason to hate Patiño.

page 209 note 1 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 113Google Scholar [no date given].

page 209 note 2 On Oct. I, 1731, Delafaye wrote to Keene [S.P.F. Spain, 109, quoted p. 202], ‘In short, my dear friend, unless we do something to stop the Clamours of people, all we have done will be of little service here at home.’ This terror of the home public is the consistent note throughout.

page 210 note 1 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 132Google Scholar; vide also postscript of March 3.

page 210 note 2 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 132Google Scholar, Whitehall, , N. to K., 04 28, 1738Google Scholar, ‘secret and private.’ The reason was not due to diplomatic caution, ‘in Fact, not one Merchant has applied to the King for Letters of Reprisal.’ Vide also Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xiv. App. pt. ix; Earl of Buckinghamshire's Papers (Trevor MSS.), p. 13, 1738, March 7/18. Ib. p. 24.Google Scholar ‘The merchants would not, when it came to, take Letters of Reprisal, they required the Government to engage,’ etc. Horatio Walpole's Secret Memoir had recommended taking out Letters of Reprisal, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 9131, ff. 244 sqq.

page 210 note 3 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 131, 10 24, 11 4. 1738, K. to N.Google Scholar

page 210 note 4 P.R.O. Admirally Otit Letters 55Google Scholar, Instructions to Clinton, , p. 208.Google Scholar

page 211 note 1 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 132.Google Scholar

page 211 note 2 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 130, Casa del Monte, K. to N., 7 05 (n.s.), 1738.Google Scholar

page 211 note 3 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 130, K. to Stone, Ap. 4/15, 1738Google Scholar (under-secretary of Newcastle), Casa del Monte. ‘It is pretty plain they would not fall out with us at present, notwithstanding their late Blusterings about Georgia.’ This was à propos of an angry memorial of La Quadra's of this same date (April 4–15) on the subject of the Letters of Reprisal.

page 212 note 1 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 130, Ap. 26/05 7, K. to N., Aranjuez.Google Scholar

page 212 note 2 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 130, Ap. 26/05 7, 1738Google Scholar, K. to N., Casa del Monte, ‘most private.’ The information given was on the authority of Montijo, President of the Council of the Indies. Other information was sometimes secured by Keene from the Cardinal Nuncio, ‘my purple friend.’

page 212 note 3 P.R.O., S.P.F. vol. 224 (Reports of Spanish Consuls 1737–9).Google Scholar Report of J. B. Parker (Consul at Coruña) to N. June 4, 1738. ‘I cannot express to your Grace the concern and Consternation the Inhabitants of all this coast are under with the apprehension of a War with England, which they very much dread, and heartily wish to see it prevented.’ Vide also under June 13, 1738.

page 212 note 4 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 130Google Scholar, in K.'s ‘most private’ letter to N. of Ap. 26/May 7, 1738; Montijo continues in the warmth of his assurances, ‘that there never were, nor ever can be, better dispositions in his Court, than its present ones to do us justice, and to settle matters of this nature on a known and sure footing.’

page 213 note 1 P.R.O. Admiralty Out Letters, vol. 55, pp. 230, 242–5. 05 9, 15.Google Scholar

page 213 note 2 Ibid. pp. 231–5.

page 213 note 3 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 130, 05 15/26Google Scholar, K. to N., ‘Secret and private.’

page 213 note 4 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 130, K. to N., 05 7, 1738Google Scholar (n.s.); ibid. vol. 132, K. to K., March 2 and 17, 1738 (o.p.). The extent of the error was fully realised by the Ministry, vide Hist. MSS. Comm. Report, xiv. App. pt. ix., Papers of Earl of Buckinghamshire (Trevor MSS.), p. 13, Horace Walpole to Robert Trevor, Feb. 28 (o.p.), 1738: ‘The council is divided with respect to the sense of the treaty of 1667 as to the West Indies, and his Grace must support what he has wrote and signed, and Lord Chan[cello]r, between you and me, must support his friend’; also p. 13, March 7 (o.p.); and p. 14, March 14/25, 1738, H. W. to R. T: ‘We have been a good deal embarrassed in having laid, altho' we don't care to own it, the foundation of our arguments upon a wrong treaty. We scramble out of it as well as we can, and connect the treaties of 1667 and 1670 together, on account of the last having confirmed the first, and the full powers for making the last being founded upon the necessity of explaining the first.’

page 214 note 1 Admiralty Out Letters, vol. 55, p. 270, 06 27, 1738Google Scholar; vide also p. 296, 304, etc.Google Scholar

page 214 note 2 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 130, 05 18/29, 1738Google Scholar, K. to N., Casa del Monte.

page 214 note 3 All this is described in P. R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 132, N. to K. 06 21, 1738Google Scholar, and enclosures thereto. ‘The Lords’ mentioned below were Lord Chancellor, Lord Privy Seal, Duke of Devonshire, Earl of Pembroke, Earl of Scarborough, Earl of Islay, Lord Harrington, Sir C. Wager, Duke of Newcastle. I do not use the word ‘Cabinet’ to describe them, because, strictly, that phrase was applied to a larger and more formal body, corresponding more nearly to the modern Privy Council, to which reference is made on p. 209.

page 215 note 1 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 131, Segovia, 08 18/29, 1738, K. to N.Google Scholar

page 215 note 2 S.P.F. vol. 131, 07 22/08 2.Google Scholar ‘Montijo says he (Geraldino) ought to be hanged for his crossa ignorancia, in letting himself be imposed on by such an account.’ … ‘La Quadra, more moderate … wonders how he could have engaged himself so far … says that he has let himself be blinded by his good intentions.’ Keene here suggests that the whole negotiation may have been to delude England, while a secret treaty of alliance was being signed with France.

page 215 note 3 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 131, 08 29, 1738Google Scholar; vide ibid. ‘Most private,’ October 13, 1738, K. to N: ‘I am persuaded They (the Spanish Court) have now gone all the Lengths they will go, towards avoiding a War, and bringing on a Reconciliation between the two Crowns.’ How much Haddock's fleet had counted as an argument in bringing Spain this length is revealed in a letter from R. Trevor to Sir E. Fawkener, from the Hague (a copy), British Museum. Add. MSS. 23, 802, f. 86, verso, September 6 (n.s.) 1738. ‘You ought not to be surprised at these pacifick appearances, when I tell you, England has at present 107 Ships of War, of different Force, and Denominations, actually in Commission.’

page 216 note 1 British Consul-General at Madrid and Commissioner Plenipotentiary for the adjustment of British claims in conjunction with Keene. Segovia, P. R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 131.Google Scholar

page 216 note 2 Consuls' Reports, P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 224, 08 13 (n.s.)Google Scholar, Report of A. Stanyford. For a local English view at Chichester, September 9, 1738, of the affairs cp. Hare MSS. p. 241. Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xiv. App. pt. ix., London, 1895.Google Scholar

page 217 note 1 Consuls' Reports, P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 224, 08 13Google Scholar (n.s.), Report of Parker, J. B., vide also 11 19, 1738Google Scholar, ‘all the apprehensions which this People had of a Rupture with England are entirely vanished.’ Cadiz was specially important as an index of feeling, because the British interest was so strong there; ‘we have seldom less than a hundred sail of Vessels in that Bay, there being by this last post above one Hundred and Twenty.’ P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 130, 03 31, 1738Google Scholar, Keene to Newcastle.

page 217 note 2 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F., vol. 134, 01, 26Google Scholar, N. to K. Newcastle had previously hinted at this possibility in a letter of August 21/September 1, 1738, Spain, vol. 132, N. to K.

page 217 note 3 P.R.O. Admiralty Out Letters, vol. 55, p. 370.Google Scholar

page 217 note 4 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 133.Google Scholar‘Apart.’ MrLeadam, (Political History of England, vol. ix., London 1909, p. 363)Google Scholar traverses Mr. Armstrong's statement (Elizabeth Farnese, p. 355)Google Scholar, that ‘till within a month of the declaration of war, October 1739, no serious preparations were made.’ This is putting it too strongly, but the fact of the Spanish disarmament till the end of May is proved by the MSS. over and over again. Mr. Leadam quotes from Walpole, H., Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xiv.Google Scholar App. pt. ix. (Trevor MSS. p. 33), a letter to Trevor June 8/19 to show that the Spaniards were arming. But, as will be seen below, on May 29 (O.S). Spain refused to pay the 95,000l., and this was known ia England on June 7, after which war was inevitable and arming began.

page 218 note 1 P.R.O. Spain S.P.F. vol. 132Google Scholar, Stone, to Keene, , ‘private,’ 08 21, 1738Google Scholar, (italics my own). Horace Walpole took the same line of argument in Parliament; vide also The Convention Vindicated, pp. 11Google Scholarsqq.

page 219 note 1 This point is argued very forcibly in The Convention Vindicated, etc., from the misrepresentations of the enemies of our Peace, sold by J. Roberts, London, 1739. This pamphlet has been plausibly attributed to Horatio Walpole, but it is not in the catalogue of his works in Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 9131, ff. 1–5, which is in his own handwriting. Other pamphlets in favour of the Convention, Bordon, 's Appeal to the Unprejudiced concerning the present Discontents (1739)Google Scholar, Poptilar Prejudices against the Convention with Spain (1739)Google Scholar, the Grand Question whether War or no War with Spain (1739)Google Scholar, are all worth reading and perhaps quasiofficial Vide Hertz, , pp. 51sqq.Google Scholar

page 219 note 2 In its extreme form the cry ‘No Search’ appears to have been intended to mean no search of British vessels by Spaniards on the high seas. Even the most ardent British patriots (e.g. Carteret, , Parl. Hist., x. 745–54)Google Scholar appear to have admitted that Spaniards should be allowed to search and to seize British ships found in Spanish ports or really near their coasts. The question of the right to search on the high seas was full of difficulty, because contrary winds frequently blew perfectly honest vessels (which were trading between British colonies), to some point near the Spanish coasts. It is easy to see how mistakes could thus arise, and how extremely difficult it would be to frame equable conditions. Even Sir Robert Walpole seems to have been quite firm in the resolve to oppose the right of search, except when British ships were lurking near the Spanish coasts; vide Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 35406, f. 39, August 25, 1738, Newcastle to Hardwicke. A well-informed and sober contemporary view may be found in Hare MSS. pp. 243–4, Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xiv. App. pt. ix., London, 1895.Google Scholar

page 220 note 1 Vide supra, and also P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 132, N. to K., 04 12Google Scholar (o.p.), 1738. ‘The Freedom of Navigation and Commerce, which the Subjects of Great Britain have an undoubted Right to, by the Law of Nations, and by the Treaties subsisting between the two Crowns,’ etc.; vide also Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 35406, ff. 55–6.

page 220 note 2 Vattel, 's Law of Nations (ed. Chitty, 1834, p. 39)Google Scholar, quoted by MrHertz, , p. 16Google Scholar; vide also p. 35.Google Scholar

page 220 note 3 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. 132Google Scholar, N. to K. On the whole question vide Brit. Mus., Stowe MSS. 256, ff. 305–7, 308–18; Add. MSS. 33, 117, ff. 25–36 (Memoranda of Thos. Pelham), which give all the relevant documents or copies of them.

page 220 note 4 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 133, Madrid, 06 9, 1739, Keene to Conraud.Google Scholar

page 220 note 5 Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 35406, f. 50, Claremont, September 25, 1738, Newcastle to Hardwicke; Add. MSS. 35909, ff. 74–5; vide A New and Actual Account of the Provinces of South Carolina, and Georgia [London, 1732]Google Scholar for interesting details. Pulteney, , in A Review of all that passed between Great Britain and Spain, 1721–1739 [London, 1739]Google Scholar, writes: ‘The giving up of Georgia will be esteemed very dishonourable to the Legislature, which hath passed so many acts for maintaining it.’

page 221 note 1 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 133, 03 5/16, 1739, K. to N.Google Scholar

page 222 note 1 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 134, 05 8Google Scholar; vide also Hardwicke, Debate in the Lords on the Convention, March 1, 1739, x. pp. 1151–3; Horatio Walpole's Secret Memoir, 01 1738Google Scholar, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 9131, f. 249, points out the impossibility of getting Parliament to pass, or subjects to keep, legislation of this kind.

page 222 note 2 The main part of Newcastle's remonstrances seems to have been throughout against the garda costas for confiscating vessels carrying a few pieces of eight or a little logwood or cocoa (all of which might come from British colonies) not against obvious smugglers. That the above construction is his real meaning is proved from P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 109Google Scholar, N. to K., ‘Private,’ Dec. 9, 1731, where he declares that restitution must be made in all cases ‘provided there be no collusive trade’; vide also in the same strain Horatio Walpole's Secret Memoir, Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 9131, ff. 246 sqq.; and references supra, note 1, p. 206. A passage in P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 118, N. to K., 01 10, 1733Google Scholar, indeed, seems at first against this view—Keene is instructed to ‘prevail with the Court of Spain not to be so tenacious of their old laws, or jealous of facilitating an illicit trade,’ but the meaning appears to be that above mentioned.

page 222 note 3 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 109.Google Scholar

page 224 note 1 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 133, 01 1739Google Scholar, K. to Conraud (cp. Mr. Armstrong, p. 286). A letter of Horace Walpole's, July 21/Aug. 1, 1738 (vide supra, note 1, p. 204)Google Scholar, Trevor MSS. p. 20, makes it clear that in the case of an Assiento, illicit trade in connection with it was inevitable, even though it might be entirely suppressed elsewhere. The point is, then, that Newcastle was willing to suppress the illicit trade of interlopers, but knew that some such smuggling was inevitable in the case of the Company, cp. Carteret, Speech, March 1, 1739, Parl. History, x. 1104.Google Scholar The dangers of relying too much on this argument are forcibly pointed out by Hoadley, Bishop of Salisbury, ibid. p. 1127. For general details about the South Sea Company's affairs, etc. at this time vide Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 33,032, ff. 218–28, 277–82, etc.

page 225 note 1 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 133Google Scholar, K. to N. ‘Apart’; cp. also ibid., Jan. 13, ‘Private and particular,’ K. to N.

page 225 note 2 Ibid. 13, Ap. 133/24, K. to Stone.

page 225 note 3 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 134, N. to K. 05 8Google Scholar, ‘Private and particular to be opened by himself.’

page 225 note 4 Vide the admirable speech of the Earl of Cholmondley in the Lords, March, 1739. Parl. Hist. vol. x. pp. 1091–1102.Google Scholar It is difficult to know how far to give confidence to these Parliamentary utterances, but in these debates independent testimony occasionally confirms the opinions of the speakers, e.g. Hare MSS. pp. 242, sqq., Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xiv. pt. ix. London, 1895.Google Scholar

page 226 note 1 Vide the papers of this period passim, but especially Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 35,406, ff. 55–6, Oct. 22, 1738, Claremont, Newcastle to Hardwicke: ‘the nstructions should go at the same time that we send back the Treaty, that it may appear that tho' we consented to their alterations as immaterial, we still intended to insist upon the freedom of navigation in a proper manner;’ vide also-Add. MSS. 32,800, f. 280, Keene and Castres to Newcastle, Ap. 23, 1739.

page 227 note 1 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 133Google Scholar, Ap. 24, Keene to Stone; cp. also Francis Hare's description, pp. 240 sqq. Hare MSS., Hist MSS. Comai. Rep. xiv. App. ix., London 1895. ‘The Patriots were resolved to damn it, before they knew a word of it, and to inflame the people against it, which they have done with great success.’

page 227 note 2 Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 35,406, f. 158, September 30, 1739, Newcastle to Hardwicke.

page 228 note 1 P.R.O. Admiralty Out Letters, vol. 55, p. 370.Google Scholar

page 228 note 2 P.R.O. Admiralty Out Letters, vol. 55, p. 389Google Scholar (italics my own). The best contemporary discussion of the counter orders question is in Hare's MSS. p. 249, Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xivGoogle Scholar. App. pt. ix. Hare knew and sometimes talked with SirWalpole, R. (p. 246)Google Scholar, and his evidence and judgment are equally entitled o respect.

page 228 note 3 Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 35,406, f. 111: ‘as far as is consistent at least with our own point’ (i.e. alteration of the forms of the Resolution with reference to the Convention with Spain).

page 229 note 1 Vide supra. Keene had suspicions of French interference between England and Spain so early as May 29, 1738, vide letter of that date, ‘most secret,’ K. to N., P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. 130, and more important vide ibid. 131, K. to N., Segovia, August 2, ‘most private,’ where Keene hints at a projected alliance between Spain and France as having taken place in June 1738 (viae also note 2, p. 19).Google Scholar Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 19,036, f. 1, has a memoir drawn up for the English Government on the state of military force, revenue and gallies of France and Spain, 06 1738.Google Scholar

page 229 note 2 P.R.O., S.P.F. Spain, vol. 134, 01 26, 1739, N. to K.Google Scholar

page 229 note 3 Ibid. vol. 133, February 12/23, 1739.

page 229 note 4 B.M. Add. MSS. 23,803, f. 121, Harrington to Robinson, March 6/17, 1739 [interesting as written before the decision of March 10]. ‘What' [was] said to you concerning the communication of a French Treaty with Spain proceeds from a mistake, nothing of that kind having past, but I may acquaint you in confidence that His Majesty has certain information of a Treaty of Commerce now actually on foot between those two Crowns, which is intended to be concluded and will no doubt be followed by an offensive and defensive Alliance.’ Vide also P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. 134, 03 20Google Scholar, N. to K. ‘Private and Particular to be opened by Himself.’ This letter goes farther than Harrington's, and expresses a keen conviction that a Franco-Spanish alliance may already have been signed. Brit. Mus. Ad. MSS. vol. 32, 800, f. 215, Newcastle to Waldegrave, March 20, 1739, ‘Private and particular in cypher, to be opened by himself,’ shows clearly that Newcastle entertained the gravest suspicions as to a Franco-Spanish Treaty, but that, despite disturbing intelligence from Waldegrave, absolutely definite proof of such a Treaty was not to hand.

page 230 note 1 P.R.O. Spain, S.F.F. vol. 134, 03 20Google Scholar (o.p.), Whitehall, , ‘most private.’Google Scholar

page 230 note 2 Ibid. vol. 133, May 4 (n.s.), K. to N., private.

page 231 note 1 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 133, 04 13/24, 1739Google Scholar (n.s.), K. to N. Apart.

page 231 note 2 Ibid. vol. 133, May 4 (n.s.), K. to N. ‘private.’

page 232 note 1 P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 133, K. to N., Madrid (May 29/June 9), Apart. As a proleptic commentary on this vide P.R.O. Spain, S.P.F. vol. 134Google Scholar, Whitehall, N. to. K., May 8 (o.p.), ‘private and particular in Cypher to be opened by himself.’ Newcastle attributes the evident silence of the Spaniards as to paying the 95,000l. to the ‘Resolution of the South Sea Co. and the Counter-Orders supposed to be sent to the Fleet in the Mediterranean’!! The italics my own.

page 232 note 2 Admiralty Out Letters, vol. 55, p. 445sqq.Google Scholar

page 233 note 1 Newcastle to Hardwicke, , 09 30, 1739Google Scholar; Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 35,406, ff. 159.

page 234 note 1 Parl. Hist. xiv. p. 698.Google Scholar

page 235 note 1 Burke, , ‘First Letter on a Regicide Peace.’Google Scholar He says that he studied the original documents concerning certain important transactions of those times, but he did not study them enough to convince himself that Jenkins' ear was no ‘fable.’ He says that many of the principal actors in producing that clamour afterwards conversed with him, and that none of them, no not one, did in the least defend the measure, or attempt to justify their conduct! No doubt he conversed with Pitt, who repented in public in 1751 (Parl. Hist. xiv. pp. 798–803)Google Scholar, Compare his more private repentance in 1757, Brit. Mus. Stowe MSS. 256, ff. 282–304; of which transcripts are printed in Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. x. App. i. pp. 212–21.Google Scholar