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Great Britain and the Coming of the Pacific War, 1939–1941

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Extract

In a mood of understandable frustration, the British minister in Bangkok sent a telegram to the head of the Far Eastern department of the Foreign Office in June 1941, referring to the tedious economic discussions he was conducting with the Thai government, saying:

I am disturbed by the contradictory tone of the telegrams sent to me from His Majesty's Foreign Office … Some of them breathe that broad and statesmanlike spirit which I have learnt to respect and admire over a period of nearly forty years. Others strike a shrill and petulant note which is new to me … I have an uneasy feeling that you people in Downing Street live in an ivory tower as regards Thailand …

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Royal Historical Society 1974

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References

1 Bangkok to Foreign Office (for J. C. Sterndale Bennett), 17 June 1941, F5342/1281/40, F.O. 371/28142. Transcripts/Translations of Crown-copyright records in the Public Record Office, London, appear by permission of the Controller of H.M. Stationery Office.

2 Craigie to Halifax, 23 September 1939, F10533/87/10, F.O. 371/23461.

3 Minute by R. A. Butler, 22 September 1939, F10710/176/23, F.6. 371/

4 War cabinet conclusions, 28 (39) 7, 26 September 1939; and 32 (39) 8, 30 September 1939, Cab. 65/1.

5 War cabinet conclusions, 42 (39) 8, 9 October 1939, Cab. 65/1.

6 Halifax to Craigie, 21 November 1939, F11946/6457/10, F.O. 371/23534.

7 Of a total value of £7,028,362 of munitions imported into Rangoon and passed by customs for outward transit to China between 26 March 1939 and 31 March 1940, about £239,000 or 3.4% originated in the British Empire; details communicated by Burma Office to Foreign Office, 29 June 1940, F3529/ 43/10, F.O. 371/24666.

8 Craigie to Halifax, 24 June 1940, F3479/43/10, F.O. 371/24666.

9 Craigie to Halifax, 25 June 1940, ibid.

10 Craigie to Halifax, 1 July 1940, ibid.

11 ‘Policy in the Far East,’ aide memoire by joint planning sub-committee, 29 June 1940, C.O.S. (40) 506 (J.P.). Cab. 80/14.

12 Chiefs of staff committee, conclusions 1 July 1940, C.O.S. (40) 202, Cab. 79/5.

13 War cabinet conclusions, 1 July 1940, 189 (40) 1, Cab. 65/7.

14 Chiefs of staff committee conclusions, 4 July 1940, C.O.S. (40) 208, Cab. 79/5.

15 War cabinet conclusions, 5 July 1940, 194 (40) 1, Cab. 65/8. The permanent under-secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Alexander Cadogan, noted in his diary that Churchill favoured ‘surrender’ over the Burma road contrary to his own view, see The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938–1945, ed. Dilks, D. (London, 1971), pp. 310–13Google Scholar, diary entries for 4 July–13 July 1940.

16 Halifax to Craigie, 11 July 1940, F3568/43/10, F.O. 371/24667.

17 ‘The Situation in the Far East in the Event of Japanese Intervention Against Us’, report of the chiefs of staff committee, 31 July 1940, C.O.S. (40) 592 and W.P. (40) 302, Cab. 66/10.

18 Chiefs of staff committee conclusions, 27 July 1940, C.O.S. (40) 236, Cab. 79/5.

19 Memorandum by Brenan, 10 July 1940, F3586/193/61, F.O. 371/24708.

20 Minute by Sterndale Bennett, 11 July 1940, ibid.

21 Minute by R. A. Butler, 23 July 1940, F3633/193/61, F.O. 371/24708.

22 Memorandum, ‘General Settlement with Japan’, enclosed in Foreign Office to Board of Trade, Ministry of Economic Warfare, Colonial Office, Dominions Office, India Office, Burma Office an d Petroleum Department, 10 August 1940, ibid.

23 Dominions Office to Foreign Office, 27 August 1940 and Ministry of Economic Warfare to Foreign Office, 3 September 1940, F4108/193/61 F.O. 371/24709.

24 Colonial Office to Foreign Office, 17 August 1940, F3859/193/61, F.O. 371/24709.

25 See letter from Lord Sempill to Hankey, 3 June 1941 enclosing notes prepared in September 1940, Hankey papers, Cab. 63/177.

26 Churchill, W. S., The Second World War, ii (5th edition, 1955), p. 571Google Scholar, Churchill to Halifax, 20 July 1940.

27 Memorandum by Halifax, ‘Reopening of the Burma Road’, 2 September 1940, W.P. (40) 348, Cab. 66/11.

28 Lothian to Halifax, 16 September 1940, F4290/193/61, F.O. 371/24709.

29 Foreign Office minutes, 20–21 September 1940, ibid.

30 War cabinet conclusions, 2 October 1940, 264 (40) 4, Cab. 65/9.

31 ‘Report of the Singapore Defence Conference, October 1940’, 31 October 1940, Cab. 80/24.

32 ‘Far East Tactical Appreciation and Report of Singapore Defence Conference, Commentary by the Joint Planning Staff’, 1 January 1941, Cab. 79/8.

34 There was some delay in Whitehall in completing arrangements for the conversations, to the annoyance of the American military attaché; see The London Observer: the Journal of General Raymond E. Lee 1940–1941, ed. Leutze, J. (London, 1972), pp. 198–93Google Scholar.

35 Annex: British–United States Technical Conversations, General Instructions for the United Kingdom Delegation to Washington, 15 December 1940, Cab. 80/24.

37 ‘British–United States Technical Conversations, Note by the Chiefs of Staff submitting Draft Instructions for the United Kingdom Delegation to Washington’, 15 December 1940, C.O.S. (40) 1043, Cab. 80/24. Lee, the American military attaché in London, remarked in his journal that the secretary of the navy, Colonel Frank Knox, was disturbed at the defeatism prevalent in the navy, which he attributed to the malign influence of Joseph Kennedy, the former ambassador in London and now a leading isolationist, see The London Observer, ed. Leutze, , p. 175Google Scholar.

38 ‘British–United States Technical Conversations’, Note by the Secretary, 19 December 1940, C.O.S. (40) 1052, Cab. 80/24.

39 ‘British–United States Staff Conversation. The Far East Appreciation by the United Kingdom Delegation’, 11 February 1941, B.U.S. (J) (41) 13, Cab. 99/5.

40 ‘British–United States Staff Conversations. Statement by the United States Staff Committee: The United States Military Position in the Far East’, 19 February 1941, B.U.S. (J) (41) 16, Cab. 99/5.

42 ‘Report of the Anglo–Dutch–Australian Conference’, held at Singapore, 22–25 February 1941, Cab. 80/29.

43 ‘Report of the American–Dutch–British Conversations’, held at Singapore, 27 April 1941 and ‘Report of the British–Dutch Conversations’, held at Singapore, 27 April 1941, C.O.S. (41) 387 and 388, Cab. 80/28.

44 War cabinet conclusions, confidential annex, 21 July 1941, 72 (41) 10, Cab. 65/23.

46 Churchill had then observed: 'that, to his mind, the central facet of the situation, if Japan obtained the mastery of the Netherlands East Indies, was that she would be able to prepare strong positions facing Singapore, including a base for her fleet. If we did not fight, she would be able to prepare these positions in peace, and to use them against us at the moment which suited her best.

If we made it dear that we should fight to preserve the integrity of the Netherlands East Indies, Japan might very well decide against attack …' See war cabinet conclusions, confidential annex, 29 July 1940, 214 (40) 7, Cab. 65/14.

47 Eden to Bland, 1 August 1941, F7214/230/G, F.O. 371/27779

48 Eden to Bland, 8 August 1941, F7526/230/G, F.O. 371/27780.

49 Minute by Clarke, 7 November 1941, F11734/4366/61, F.O. 371/27847.

50 Minute by Eden, 9 November 1941, ibid.

51 Minute by Cadogan, 6 May 1941, F4128/54/61, F.O. 371/27777.

52 From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency 1938–1941, ed. Blum, J. M. (Boston, 1965), p. 377Google Scholar.

53 War cabinet conclusions, 24 July 1941, 73 (41) 4 and 28 July 1941, 75 (41) 6, Cab. 65/19.

54 For a fuller discussion of the situation in 1941, see Lowe, P., ‘Great Britain and the Outbreak of War with Japan, 1941’, in War and Society: Historical Essays in Honour and Memory of J. R. Western 1928–71, ed. Foot, M. R. D. (London, 1973Google Scholar).

55 For a useful brief description of Matsuoka, see Hosoya, Chihiro, ‘Retrogression in Japan's Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process’, in Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan, ed. Morley, J. W. (Princeton, 1971), pp. 9293Google Scholar.

56 See Butow, R. J. C., ‘Backdoor Diplomacy in the Pacific: the Proposal for a Konoye-Roosevelt Meeting, 1941’, Journal of American History, lix (1972). PP. 4872CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

57 For the relevant documentation, based on notes taken by the Japanese military representatives, see Japan's Decision For War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences, ed. Ike, N. (Stanford, 1967), pp. 77163Google Scholar. See also Iriye, A., ‘The Failure of Military Expansionism’, in Dilemmas of Growth, ed. Morley, , pp. 130–35Google Scholar.

58 For the text, see Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter cited as F.R.U.S.], 1931–1941, ii, pp. 755–56, and F.R.U.S. 1941, iv, pp. 660–64 .

59 Minute by Clarke, 19 November 1941, on Washington to Foreign Office, 18 November 1941, F19475/86/23, F.O. 371/27912.

60 Minute by Sterndale Bennett, 20 November 1941, ibid..

61 Foreign Office to Washington, 24 November 1941, F12655/86/23, F.O. 371/27912.

62 Churchill, , The Second World War, iii, p. 530Google Scholar, Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt, 26 November 1941.

63 Washington to Foreign Office, 29 November 1941, F12992/86/23, F.O. 371/27913. For the text of Hull's communication to Japan, see F.R.U.S. 1931–1941, ii, pp. 768–70.

64 War cabinet conclusions, confidential annex, 12 November 1941, 112 (41) 1, Cab. 65/24.

65 War cabinet conclusions, confidential annex, 1 December 1941, 122 (41) 3, Cab. 65/24.

66 Foreign Office to Washington, 1 December 1941, F13114/86/23, F.O. 371/27913. See also, for a discussion of the last days before the outbreak of war, Woodward, L., British Foreign Policy In The Second World War, ii (London, 1971), pp. 165–77Google Scholar.

69 Foreign Office to Washington, 3 December 1941, ibid.

70 Washington to Foreign Office, 4 December 1941, F13219/86/23, F.O. 371/27914.

71 Washington to Foreign Office, 5 December 1941, F13780/86/23, F.O. 371/27914.

72 Minute by Sterndale Bennett, 5 February 1941, on Craigie to Foreign Office, 3 February 1941, F5401/9/61, F.O. 371/27760.

73 Sinclair to Beaverbrook, 16 March 1941, and Beaverbrook to Sinclair, 16 March and 11 April 1941, Sinclair papers, Air 19/510.

74 War cabinet conclusions, confidential annex, 5 November 1941, 109(41)2 Cab. 65/24.

75 Hankey to Piggott, 26 January 1942, Hankey Papers, Cab. 63/177.