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Injecting Compassion into International Wildlife Law: From Conservation to Protection?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 May 2017

Werner Scholtz
Werner Scholtz*
Affiliation:
University of the Western Cape (UWC), Bellville (South Africa). Email: wscholtz@uwc.ac.za.
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Abstract

International wildlife law is concerned with the conservation of sentient species, but generally ignores the welfare of individual animals. It therefore does not reflect a recognition of the moral worth of animals and perpetuates the dichotomy between conservation and welfare. It is the primary goal of this article to ascertain how welfare concerns may be incorporated into international wildlife law in order to ensure that it takes cognizance of the moral worth of animals. The article advocates an injection of ethics, via a welfare-centric approach, into wildlife law in order to escape the dichotomy between conservation and welfare in relation to wild animals, and so to advance the progressive development of law that is conducive to wildlife protection rather than merely to its conservation.

Keywords

Animal welfareConservationProtectionWelfare-centric ethicCompassionInternational wildlife law
Type
Articles
Information
Transnational Environmental Law , Volume 6 , Issue 3 , November 2017 , pp. 463 - 483
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 2017 

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Footnotes

This article was made possible through the generous funding of the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung. I am grateful for the comments of Duncan French on a previous draft. Any errors or omissions remain the sole responsibility of the author.

References

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35 Art. 1 CBD, n. 22 above, includes the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components as objectives of the instrument. Art. 2 CBD defines biological diversity as ‘the variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems.’ Thus, biodiversity relates to the diversity of ecosystems (or habitat), species and genetic diversity.

36 Art. 2 CBD, n. 22 above, defines an ecosystem as ‘a dynamic complex of plant, animal and micro-organism communities and their non-living environment interacting as a functional unit’. Art. 8 CBD places an emphasis on in situ conservation, which it defines as ‘the conservation of ecosystems and natural habitats and the maintenance and recovery of viable populations of species in their natural surroundings’.

37 A precise universal definition of animal welfare does not exist. Some commentators restrict the notion to physical well-being, whereas others focus on the emotional response of animals. For a discussion, see Haynes, R.P., Animal Welfare: Competing Conceptions and their Ethical Implications (Springer, 2010), p. 107 Google Scholar. The Agreement on International Humane Trapping Standards between the European Union, Canada and the Russian Federation (1998, in force July 2008, available at: http://www.face.eu/international-agreements/aihts), Annex I, Pt I, para. 1.3.1 affirms that the ‘[w]elfare of animals is indicated by measures of the extent of ease or difficulty in their coping with the environment and the extent of failure to cope with their environment’. Although welfare can vary widely, the term ‘humane’ is used only for those trapping methods where the welfare of the animals concerned is contained at a sufficient level.

38 Gillespie, A., ‘Humane Killing: A Recognition of Universal Common Sense in International Law’ (2003) 6(1) Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy, pp. 1–29 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 4.

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42 Harrop, n. 16 above, p. 287. The incidental derivation of welfare measures from conservation objectives may be illustrated by reference to the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats (Bern Convention), Bern (Switzerland), 19 Sept. 1979, in force 1 June 1982, available at: http://www.coe.int/en/web/bern-convention. Art. 8 is concerned with the reduction of the killing of endangered or sensitive species through indiscriminate methods of capture of animals. The incidental welfare consequence of this provision is that it may alleviate suffering, as indiscriminate methods can result in suffering, in particular to non-target animals.

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45 Ibid., p. 862.

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56 Purdy, n. 43 above, p. 872. For a discussion of the different approaches in environmental ethics, see Yang, n. 29 above, pp. 28–33.

57 The determination of value is inseparable from human experience, and it is therefore impossible to depart from the anthropocentric approach: Scholtz, W., ‘Animal Culling: A Sustainable Approach or Anthropocentric Atrocity? Issues of Biodiversity and Custodial Sovereignty’ (2005) 2(2) Macquarie Journal of International and Comparative Environmental Law, pp. 9–30 Google Scholar.

58 According to Purdy (n. 43 above, p. 874) the focus on value theory fails to guide action in terms of the operation of legislation.

59 Ibid.

60 It would be more correct to refer to weak anthropocentrism: Redgwell, C., ‘Life, the Universe and Everything: A Critique of Anthropocentric Rights’, in A.E. Boyle & M.R. Anderson (eds), Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection (Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 71–87 Google Scholar, at 73.

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63 Cochrane, ibid., p. 158. Cochrane analyzes the proposal that non-conscious entities may also have interests and defends the welfarist understanding of interests by stating that ‘[i]t is true that not all interests are tied to conscious desires … But that does not undermine the point that the capacity for conscious experience is necessary for the possession of interests’: ibid., p. 159.

64 Ibid., p. 160.

65 Environmentalists favour holism rather than an exclusive concern with the plight of individual entities of the biotic community. This is evident from the much-quoted remark of Leopold: ‘A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends to do otherwise’: Leopold, A., A Sand County Almanac (Oxford University Press, 1949, reprinted 2001), p. 189 Google Scholar.

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68 Cochrane recognizes the limits of this approach. A necessary link between habitat destruction and animal suffering does not exist per se and this implies that it will be difficult to establish obligations to prevent environmental degradation if it does not harm the well-being of animals: Cochrane, n. 61 above, p. 162. In general, however, habitat destruction will impact negatively on sentient beings (including animals), which is a good reason for preventing its destruction.

69 Gillespie, n. 41 above, p. 45.

70 Bonn (Germany), 23 June 1979, in force 1 Nov. 1983, available at: http://www.cms.int/en/node/3916.

71 E.g., CMS Convention, ibid., Art. IV(1).

72 Ibid., Art. I(1)(b).

73 Ibid., Art. I(1)(c) read with (d). The conservation status of a species will be unfavourable when the following conditions are not met: (i) population dynamics data indicate that the migratory species is maintaining itself on a long-term basis as a viable component of its ecosystems; (ii) the range of the migratory species is neither currently being reduced, nor is likely to be reduced, on a long-term basis; (iii) there is, and will be in the foreseeable future, sufficient habitat to maintain the population of the migratory species on a long-term basis; and (iv) the distribution and abundance of the migratory species approach historic coverage and levels to the extent that potentially suitable ecosystems exist and to the extent consistent with wise wildlife management.

74 See also the Ramsar Convention, n. 34 above, and the Bern Convention, n. 42 above.

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76 Ibid.

77 Purdy, n. 43 above, p. 874.

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86 Ibid., p. 101.

87 Government Notice No. 251, Government Gazette, No. 30833, 29 Feb. 2008.

88 Act 10 of 2004 (Biodiversity Act).

89 Ibid., s. 2.

90 Ibid., Pt 2.

91 Ibid., Pt 3.

92 For a discussion of the process see Bilchitz, D., ‘Animal Interests and South African Law: The Elephant in the Room?’, in D. Cao & S. White (eds), Animal Law and Welfare: International Perspectives (Springer, 2016), pp. 131–155 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 148. Views may differ on the manner in which the policy reflects caring, as culling is still recognized as a last resort.

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94 Vienna (Austria), 23 May 1969, in force 27 Jan. 1980, available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf. Bowman, Davies & Redgwell, n. 23 above, p. 681.

95 Ibid., pp. 675–82. See also the analysis of Sykes, n. 11 above, pp. 46–7. It is not the intent of the author to repeat in detail the convincing arguments of Bowman, Davies & Redgwell and Sykes in support of the recognition of animal welfare as a general principle.

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97 General principles may be identified from national and/or international sources: Bassiouni, ibid., pp. 768, 772.

98 The ambiguous nature of general principles of international law has been the source of ‘vast amounts of doctrinal debate’, which are beyond the scope of this article: see Elias, O. & Lim, C., ‘“General Principles of Law”, “Soft Law” and the Identification of International Law’ (1997) 28 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, pp. 3–49 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 3, 5.

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100 Ibid., p. 157.

101 Ibid., p. 159.

102 Ibid.

103 Ibid., p. 158.

104 Wolfrum, R., ‘Sources of International Law’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law, para. 39, available at: http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1471?rskey=wWAIra&result=2&prd=EPIL Google Scholar.

105 For a comprehensive comparative overview of domestic jurisdictions that regulate animal welfare, see Wagman & Liebman, n. 14 above, pp. 28–47; see also Michel, n. 14 above.

106 N. 15 above.

107 Arts III(2)(c), III(4)(b), IV(2)(c), IV(5)(b), IV(6)(b), VI(2)(b), VII(7)(c) and VIII(3) CITES.

108 See also Sykes, n. 11 above, p. 22. The World Conservation Strategy states that ‘[e]very form of life warrants respect independently of its worth to people’ and ‘[p]eople should treat all creatures decently, and protect them from cruelty, avoidable suffering and unnecessary killing’: Barrow, C.J., Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable Living (International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 1991)Google Scholar. The Preamble to the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development (UN Doc. A/CONF.199/20, Johannesburg (South Africa), Sept. 2002, available at: http://www.joburg.org.za/pdfs/johannesburgdeclaration.pdf) strives for a ‘humane, equitable, caring global society’ and affirms humanity’s ‘responsibility to one another, to the greater community of life and to our children’.

109 The Universal Declaration on Animal Welfare (UDAW), initially proposed by the World Society for the Protection of Animals (WSPA) in 2000 (available at: https://www.globalanimallaw.org/database/universal.html), and the draft texts of the International Convention for the Protection of Animals (ICPA) and its protocols (available at: https://www.animallaw.info/treaty/international-convention-protection-animals) serve as examples.

110 Bowman, Davies & Redgwell, n. 23 above, p. 680.

111 Ibid., p. 681. This provision states that together with the context ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ shall be taken into account.

112 Ibid., pp. 682–97.

113 Scholtz, n. 33 above.

114 Washington DC (US), 2 Dec. 1946, in force 10 Nov. 1948, available at: https://iwc.int. A caveat applies. Unfortunately tribunals and courts rarely make use of the interpretative function of general principles and, as such, the utility of general principles remains limited. This is also evident from the decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ): Thirlway, H.W.A., The Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 98 Google Scholar.

115 Sagoff, M., ‘Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce’ (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall Law Journal, pp. 297–307 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 304 (emphasis in original).

116 Ibid., p. 305.

117 Bos, M., ‘The Recognized Manifestation of International Law’ (1977) 20 German Yearbook of International Law, pp. 9–76 Google Scholar, at 42.

118 As Koskenniemi aptly remarks, ‘greater coverage of State practice through general principles seems to be achieved only at the cost of the critical content of those principles’: Koskenniemi, M., Sources of International Law (Ashgate, 2000), p. 398 Google Scholar.

119 Gillespie, n. 38 above, p. 6. The deliberations of the International Whaling Commission (IWC) in relation to humane treatment are informative. The IWC does not work with an agreed definition of welfare. However, other expert bodies and intergovernmental organizations have established agreed definitions in order to aid intersessional deliberations on welfare issues. In this regard, welfare is considered ‘to be the health of an animal, encompassing both its physical and psychological state. An animal in a good state of welfare (as indicated by scientific evidence) would be free from pain, fear, and distress and be healthy, well nourished, and able to express innate behavior’: Report of the IWC 65 (2014), IWC/65/WKM&AWI05 Rev2, WKM&AWI Agenda item 6.3, Addressing Welfare within Q20 the IWC: Intersessional Working Group on Welfare, Summary Recommendations, available at: https://archive.iwc.int/pages/search.php?search=%21collection99&k=.

120 General principles of international law may be resorted to in order to identify opinio juris and as such may provide orientation to customary international law: see the Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade in the ICJ case, Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 Apr. 2010, ICJ Reports (2010), p. 204.

121 Palmer, G., ‘New Ways to Make International Environmental Law’ (1992) 86(2) American Journal of International Law, pp. 259–283 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 259.

122 Adopted by the UN Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm (Sweden), 5–16 June 1972, available at: http://www.unep.org/documents.multilingual/default.asp?documentid=97&articleid=1503.

123 Adopted by the UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 3–14 June 1992, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), 14 June 1992, available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm.

124 Scholtz, W., ‘Legal Protection of the Environment’, in H.A. Strydom (ed.), International Law (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 504–544 Google Scholar, at 511.

125 Birnie, Boyle & Redgwell, n. 30 above, p. 600.

126 N. 109 above.

127 This group included World Animal Protection, which was formerly the World Society for the Protection of Animals. The proposed agreement has been revised several times.

128 Draft UDAW (2011), n. 109 above, Art. V.

129 Ibid., Art. VI.

130 Ibid., Art. II states that ‘animal welfare includes animal health and encompasses both the physical and psychological state of the animal. The welfare of an animal can be described as good or high if the individual is fit, healthy, free from suffering and in a positive state of wellbeing’.

131 Favre, D., ‘An International Treaty for Animal Welfare’ (2011–12) 18 Animal Law, pp. 237–280 Google Scholar. Ozone depletion and climate change, as well as biodiversity regimes, are illustrative of this approach: Scholtz, n. 124 above, pp. 523–36.

132 ICPA, n. 109 above.

133 This statement may be criticized for its anthropocentricity. Animal rights advocates may be critical of the fact that it does not subscribe to abolition but is based rather on the socio-economic realities of the advantages that people gain from the utilization of animals.

134 ICPA, n. 109 above, Art. 1.

135 Ibid., Art. 2 contains the various definitions and Arts 3–9 deal with the separate categories.

136 Ibid., Art. 10(1).

137 Ibid., Arts 10(2) and 12.

138 Available at: https://www.animallaw.info/treaty/international-convention-protection-animals.

139 Paris (France), 18 Oct. 1950, in force 17 Jan. 1963, available at: http://www.ecolex.org/details/treaty/international-convention-for-the-protection-of-birds-tre-000066. See van Heijnsbergen, P., International Legal Protection of Wild Fauna and Flora (IOS Press, 1997), p. 43 Google Scholar.

140 Van Heijnsbergen, ibid.

141 The Preamble together with Arts II(2)(b), IV(2)(b), V(2)(a), XII, XIV, and XVI of CITES refer to protection.

142 Bowman, n. 15 above, p. 11.

143 Arts III and IV CITES deal with the conditions for granting export permits for Appendix I and II species, which stipulate conditions such as compliance with the laws of the relevant state for the protection of fauna and flora. The subsequent provisions in Articles III and IV deal with minimizing the risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment in relation to shipping and preparing.

144 Art. XI CITES.

145 Art. XV(2)(b) CITES.