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Should Chimpanzees Have Standing? The Case for Pursuing Legal Personhood for Non-Human Animals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 August 2017

Alexia Staker
Alexia Staker*
Affiliation:
ClientEarth, London (United Kingdom). Email: alexia.staker@gmail.com.
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Abstract

Examples abound of national and international legal developments that indicate growing concern and respect for animals. However, a key barrier remains: animals are not recognized as legal persons and therefore do not have standing to pursue independent legal action. This significantly limits the scope for legal redress when animals’ interests are harmed. This article examines recent attempts in the United States and Europe to establish standing for animals via strategic litigation and the barriers that have so far undermined this project. The article argues that, despite their lack of success to date, cases that seek to establish standing for animals should continue to be pursued. Societal views about the value of animals’ lives are continually evolving such that these cases may soon be successful. Furthermore, even if unsuccessful, these cases help in creating the socio-cultural space required to redefine the human–animal divide and potentially transform animals into rights bearers.

Keywords

Animal rightsLegal personhoodStandingStrategic litigationHuman–animal divide
Type
Articles
Information
Transnational Environmental Law , Volume 6 , Issue 3 , November 2017 , pp. 485 - 507
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 2017 

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Footnotes

I would like to thank Veerle Heyvaert of the London School of Economics and Political Science for her support and encouragement in writing this article. I would also like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. The views expressed in this article are personal to the author and should not be attributed to ClientEarth.

References

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4 Stone, n. 1 above, pp. 463, 473–4. This is also true in international law: Sands notes that ‘[h]uman rights courts have taken important steps to protect the environment, but always so as to protect the rights of the human’: Sands, ibid., p. 3. However, at the time of writing this article, legal rights had just been granted to the Whanganui River in New Zealand and to the Ganges and Yamuna rivers in India: M. Safi, ‘Ganges and Yamuna Rivers Granted Same Legal Rights as Human Beings’, The Guardian, 21 Mar. 2017, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/21/ganges-and-yamuna-rivers-granted-same-legal-rights-as-human-beings.

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6 Stone, n. 1 above, p. 456, fn. 26. This article uses the terms ‘animal’ and ‘non-human animal’ interchangeably to mean ‘non-human animal’.

7 Stone, C.D., Should Trees Have Standing? Law, Morality, and the Environment (Oxford University Press, 2010)Google Scholar. In the Introduction to the text, Stone lists a number of post-‘Trees’ cases in which lawsuits were brought in the name of natural objects, including a brook, a marsh and a beach: p. xvi. However, Stone’s substantive discussion of case law developments post-‘Trees’ deals mostly with cases that pursued standing for non-human animals: pp. 160–4.

8 Ibid., p. 165.

9 Naffine, N., Law’s Meaning of Life: Philosophy, Religion, Darwin and the Legal Person (Hart, 2009), p. 122 Google Scholar; Korsgaard, C., ‘Kantian Ethics, Animals and the Law’ (2013) 33(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 629–648 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 629.

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20 Ibid., citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), p. 499.

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26 Hawaiian Crow v. Lujan, 906 F. Supp. 549 (D. Haw., 1991), p. 552. In the subsequent case of Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, Fla., 896 F. Supp. 1170 (M.D. Fla., 1995), where standing for the turtles was contested, the Court nevertheless held that the turtles’ claim was sufficient to establish standing, independently of the human plaintiffs’ claims. However, Stone argues such a case is but a curiosity: Stone, C.D., ‘Response to Commentators’ (2012) 3 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment, pp. 100–120 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 113–14.

27 386 F. 3d 1169 (9th Cir., 2004), p. 1173.

28 Ibid., p. 1176.

29 Albert Schweitzer Stiftung für Unsere Mitwelt, n. 11 above.

30 Ibid.

31 New Art. 515-14 of the Code Civil was adopted by the National Assembly on 28 Jan. 2015: ‘Les Animaux sont Désormais Officiellement « Doués de Sensibilité »’, Le Monde, 28 Jan. 2015, available at: http://www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2015/01/28/les-animaux-sont-desormais-officiellement-doues-de-sensibilite_4565410_3244.html (in French).

32 N. Roux, ‘Le Nouveau Statut Juridique de l’Animal: Une Idée Audacieuse pour une Réforme Ineffective’, Le Petit Juriste, 17 July 2015, available at: https://www.lepetitjuriste.fr/droit-civil/le-nouveau-statut-juridique-de-lanimal-une-idee-audacieuse-pour-une-reforme-ineffective (in French). For a discussion of the legal categorization of animals in France, see M. Falaise, ‘Pour une Approche Juridique de la Protection Animale’, Colloque National de la Recherche dans les IUT, Université de Lyon I (2008).

33 Roux, Ibid.

34 Gordon, n. 21 above, pp. 214, 240. Cf. the recent legal developments granting rights to rivers in New Zealand and India, described in Safi, n. 4 above.

35 Hogan provides a number of examples of this: Hogan, M., ‘Standing for Nonhuman Animals: Developing a Guardianship Model from the Dissents in Sierra Club v. Morton ’ (2007) 95(2) California Law Review, pp. 513–534 Google Scholar, at 525–7.

36 Ibid., p. 525.

37 Sierra Club, n. 13 above.

38 Stone, n. 7 above, p. xiii.

39 Sierra Club, n. 13 above, p. 734.

40 Ibid., p. 735.

41 Ibid., p. 741–2.

42 154 F. 3d 426 (D.C. App., 1998), p. 429 (Glickman).

43 Hogan, n. 35 above, p. 525.

44 Gordon, n. 21 above, p. 215; Francione, G.L., Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation (Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 91 Google Scholar.

45 Stone, n. 7 above, p. 172.

46 765 F. 2d 937 (9th Cir., 1985).

47 Ibid., p. 938.

48 Sankoff, P., ‘Opportunity Lost: The Supreme Court Misses a Historic Chance to Consider Question of Public Interest Standing for Animal Interests’ (2012) 30(2) Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice, pp. 129–136 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 134.

49 Bryant, T., ‘Sacrificing the Sacrifice of Animals: Legal Personhood for Animals, the Status of Animals as Property, and the Presumed Primacy of Humans’ (2008) 39 Rutgers Law Journal, pp. 247–330 Google Scholar, at 276.

50 Stone, n. 26 above, p. 109.

51 Francione, n. 15 above, p. 67; Tudor, S., ‘Some Implications for Legal Personhood of Extending Legal Rights to Non-Human Animals’ (2010) 35 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, pp. 134–139 Google Scholar, at 135.

52 Wise, n. 22 above, p. 1280.

53 Ibid., pp. 1280–1.

54 Ibid. Wise argues that one’s capacity to possess a right stems from one’s interests. For example, humans have a fundamental interest in bodily integrity and bodily liberty and these interests are protected by relevant rights. Wise argues that such interests and rights are possessed by all beings who have ‘practical autonomy’ – in other words, those animals who are ‘cognitively complex enough to want something’ and whose sense of self is sufficiently complex that ‘it matters whether one achieves one’s own goals’: ibid., pp. 1282–3. See also Wise, S.M., Rattling the Cage: Towards Legal Rights for Animals (M2 Communications Ltd, 2000)Google Scholar. Establishing (certain) animals’ legal personhood is the focus of Wise’s Nonhuman Rights Project, discussed in Section 3 below.

55 Wise, n. 22 above, p. 1281.

56 Ibid.

57 Cf. Kolber, who argues that standing for great apes ‘does not require us to accept arguments about ape personhood but merely requires recognition of certain obligations to protect animal interests’: Kolber, A., ‘Standing Upright: The Moral and Legal Standing of Humans and Other Apes’ (2001) 54(1) Stanford Law Review, pp. 163–204 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 167.

58 Tilikum v. Sea World, n. 18 above, p. 1264. This case is discussed in detail in Section 3 below.

59 Sunstein, C.R., ‘Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights)’ (2000) 47 UCLA Law Review, pp. 1333–1368 Google Scholar, at 1363. See also Sunstein, C.R., ‘The Rights of Animals’ (2003) 70(1) University of Chicago Law Review, pp. 387–401 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 389.

60 See, e.g., Francione, n. 15 above, p. 65. See also Peters, A., ‘Liberté, Egalité, Animalité: Human–Animal Comparisons in Law’ (2016) 5(1) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 25–53 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 47.

61 Peters, ibid., p. 47.

62 Ibid., p. 48.

63 See, e.g., Francione, n. 15 above.

64 E.g., Naffine argues that it may be important to maintain the link between legal persons and human beings because it allows judges to ‘employ a moral language of human sanctity’: Naffine, n. 9 above, p. 180. Conversely, Wise notes that rights are not a ‘zero sum game’: Wise, S.M., ‘Hardly a Revolution: The Eligibility of Nonhuman Animals for Dignity-Rights in a Liberal Democracy’ (1998) 22 Vermont Law Review, pp. 793–915 Google Scholar, at 796.

65 See R. Garner, ‘A Defense of a Broad Animal Protectionism’, in Francione, G.L. & Garner, R., The Animal Rights Debate: Abolition or Regulation? (Columbia University Press, 2010) pp. 103–74Google Scholar.

66 Binder, R., ‘Animal Welfare Regulation: Shortcomings, Requirements, Perspectives. The Case for Regulating the Human-Animal Relationship’, in A. Peters, S. Stucki & L. Boscardin (eds), Animal Law: Reform or Revolution? (Schulthess, 2015), pp. 67–85 Google Scholar, at 83.

67 Radford, M., Animal Welfare Law in Britain: Regulation and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 10 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Garner, R., Animals, Politics and Morality (Manchester University Press, 2004)Google Scholar and Robertson, I.A., Animal Welfare and the Law: Fundamental Principles for Critical Assessment (Routledge, 2015), pp. 107–108 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, who argues that discussion regarding the legal categorization of animals is ‘a distraction to the real issue of practical animal protection’.

68 Radford, ibid., p. 10.

69 See, e.g., Michel, M., ‘Law and Animals: An Introduction to Current European Animal Protection Legislation’, in Peters, Stucki & Boscardin (eds), n. 66 above, pp. 87–116 Google Scholar, at 110; Francione, n. 44 above, p. 72.

70 Bryant, n. 49 above, pp. 253–4. See also Totten, T., ‘Should Elephants Have Standing?’ (2015) 6(1) Western Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 1–16 Google Scholar.

71 Naffine, n. 9 above, p. 131. As Peters notes, animal welfare laws seek ‘to mitigate animal suffering while preserving their economic use by humans’: Peters, A., ‘Global Animal Law: What It Is and Why We Need It’ (2016) 5(1) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 9–23 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 11. Francione argues that such ‘improvements’ to the regulatory framework not only maintain the status of animals as property but can actively reinforce it: Francione, n. 44 above, p. 112.

72 Some commentators have called for the establishment of such ‘narrow’ standing via the insertion of animal-suit provisions into animal welfare legislation: see, e.g., Sunstein (2000), n. 59 above, p. 1336.

73 Bryant, n. 49 above, p. 253.

74 Bevilaqua, C.B., ‘Chimpanzees in Court: What Difference Does It Make?’, in Y. Otomo & E. Mussawir (eds), Law and the Question of the Animal: A Critical Jurisprudence (Routledge, 2013), pp. 71–88 Google Scholar, at 75.

75 Wise, S.M., ‘Legal Personhood and the Nonhuman Rights Project’ (2010) 17 Animal Law, pp. 1–11 Google Scholar.

76 Ibid., p. 2; NhRP, ‘Statement Re: NY Court of Appeals Decision to Deny Motion for Leave to Appeal in Tommy’s and Kiko’s Cases’, 1 Sept. 2015, available at: http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2015/09/01/statement-re-ny-court-of-appeals-decision-to-deny-motion-for-leave-to-appeal-in-tommys-and-kikos-cases.

77 Wise, n. 75 above, pp. 1–2.

78 NhRP, ‘Press Release re NhRP Lawsuit’, 2 Dec. 2013, available at: http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2013/11/30/press-release-re-nhrp-lawsuit-dec-2nd-2013. Habeas corpus claims on behalf of chimpanzees have also been pursued in Brazil, with unclear results: Bevilaqua, n. 74 above, pp. 72–3, 75–7; Maher, J., ‘Legal Technology Confronts Speciesism or We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us’, in P. MacCormack (ed.), The Animal Catalyst: Towards Ahuman Theory (Bloomsbury Institute, 2014), pp. 45–62 Google Scholar, at 57–8. In 2014, it was reported that a habeas corpus claim made on behalf of an orangutan in Argentina had succeeded: ‘Court in Argentina Grants Basic Rights to Orangutan’, BBC News, 21 Dec. 2014, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-30571577. However, the reported success of this case was subsequently questioned: NhRP, ‘Reviewing the Case of Sandra the Orangutan in Argentina’, 24 Dec. 2014, available at: http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2014/12/24/reviewing-the-case-of-sandra-the-orangutan-in-argentine.

79 NhRP, ‘Press Release re NhRP Lawsuit’, ibid.

80 New York Consolidated Laws, CVP − Civil Practice Law & Rules (2013) § 7002, cited in Peters, n. 60 above, p. 45, fn. 97.

81 NhRP (2013), n. 78 above.

82 The Nonhuman Rights Project Inc., on behalf of Tommy v. Patrick C. Lavery, N.Y Supp. Ct., Appellate Division, Third Judicial Dept, 4 Dec. 2014 (Tommy v. Lavery).

83 Ibid., p. 2.

84 Ibid., p. 4 (emphasis in original).

85 Ibid., p. 6.

86 NhRP, ‘Press Release: Nonhuman Rights Project Continues Legal Battle to Free Tommy the Chimpanzee’, 3 Dec. 2015, available at: http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/NhRPTommyRefileRelease12-3-15.pdf.

87 NhRP , ‘New York Trial Court Denies Tommy’s Second Bid for Freedom’, 7 Jan. 2016, available at: http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2016/01/07/new-york-court-denies-tommys-bid-for-freedom.

88 NhRP, ‘Appellate Decision in the Case of Kiko’, 2 Jan. 2015, available at: http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2015/01/02/appellate-decision-in-the-case-of-kiko.

89 In July 2016, the NhRP reported that Tommy’s whereabouts are presently unknown, with reports that he has been transferred to a Michigan zoo: NhRP , ‘Interview with Kevin Schneider re: Tommy, Kiko, Hercules & Leo’, 15 Jun. 2016, available at: http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2016/06/15/interview-with-kevin-schneider-re-tommy-kiko-hercules-leo. It is unclear whether Kiko’s case can be subject to any further appeal: NhRP, ‘Documents Filed in Kiko’s Appeal’, 6 Jun. 2016, available at: http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2016/06/06/documents-filed-in-kikos-appeal.

90 The Nonhuman Rights Project Inc. on behalf of Hercules and Leo v. Samuel Stanley and Stony Brook University, State of New York, Appellate Division, First Judicial Department, 30 Jul. 2015, at p. 31 (Hercules and Leo v. Stanley). In May 2016, with an appeal still pending, the research institute agreed to transfer Leo and Hercules to a sanctuary: NhRP, ‘Nonhuman Rights Project Chimpanzee Clients Hercules and Leo To Be Sent to Sanctuary’, 3 May 2016, available at: http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2016/05/03/nonhuman-rights-project-chimpanzee-clients-hercules-and-leo-to-be-sent-to-sanctuary.

91 See Maddux, E., ‘Time to Stand: Exploring the Past, Present and Future of Nonhuman Animal Standing’ (2013) 47(5) Wake Forest Law Review, pp. 1243–1267 Google Scholar, at 1261.

92 Tilikum v. Sea World, n. 18 above. The Thirteenth Amendment provides that ‘[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction’: United States Constitutional Amendment XIII.

93 Tilikum v. Sea World, n. 18 above, pp. 1259–60.

94 Ibid., p. 1260.

95 Ibid., p. 1264.

96 Gordon, n. 21 above, p. 238, fn. 197.

97 Wise, n. 22 above, pp. 1280–1. See also Maddux, n. 91 above, p. 1263.

98 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, n. 17 above, pp. 560–1

99 Tilikum v. Sea World, n. 18 above, p. 1264.

100 Ibid.

101 In German, the Association is called the Verein Gegen Tierfabriken: see https://www.vgt.at.

102 M. Balluch & E. Theurer, ‘Trial on Personhood for Chimp “Hiasl”’, Verein Gegen Tierfabriken, available at: https://www.vgt.at/publikationen/texte/artikel/20080118Hiasl.htm; Bevilaqua, n. 74 above, p. 74.

103 Balluch & Theurer, ibid.

104 Bevilaqua, n. 74 above, p. 74.

105 Bevilaqua, ibid.; Balluch & Theurer, n. 102 above.

106 Balluch & Theurer, ibid.

107 Ibid.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.; Allegemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (ABGB 1811), Fassung vom 12/201.

110 Balluch & Theurer, n. 102 above.

111 Ibid.; Bevilaqua, n. 74 above, p. 77.

112 Maher, n. 78 above, pp. 54–5.

113 Bevilaqua, n. 74 above, p. 78; ABGB, n. 109 above, § 273.

114 Maher, n. 78 above, p. 55.

115 Stibbe v. Austria, App. No. 26188/08, lodged 6 May 2008; Maher, n. 78 above, p. 55.

116 Peters, n. 60 above, p. 44.

117 Wise, n. 75 above, p. 5.

118 Bevilaqua, n. 74 above, p. 75.

119 Naffine, n. 9 above, pp. 7–8.

120 Ibid., p. 7. Similarly, Sunstein notes that there is no constitutional impediment to Congress granting standing to non-human animals: Sunstein (2000), n. 59 above, p. 1360. This was acknowledged in Cetacean Community v. Bush, n. 27 above, p. 1171.

121 Stone, n. 1 above, p. 452.

122 Bevilaqua, n. 74 above, p. 77.

123 Ibid., p. 78.

124 Ibid., p. 79.

125 Tilikum v. Sea World, n. 18 above, p. 1264.

126 Maddux, n. 91 above, p. 1264.

127 Peters, n. 60 above, pp. 45–6.

128 Tommy v. Lavery, n. 82 above, p. 5 fn. 3.

129 Ibid.

130 Naffine, n. 9 above, p. 8.

131 Ibid., pp. 9, 11.

132 Balluch & Theurer, n. 102 above.

133 Naffine, n. 5 above, p. 82.

134 Boyle, n. 19 above, p. 186.

135 Hercules and Leo v. Stanley, n. 90 above, pp. 21, 23 (emphasis added).

136 See Bryant, n. 49 above, p. 274.

137 Francione, n. 44 above, p. 62.

138 Bryant, n. 49 above, p. 264.

139 Spiegel, M., The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery (Mirror Books, 1988), pp. 14 Google Scholar, 16. See also Peters, n. 60 above, pp. 35–9.

140 Stone, n. 26 above, p. 116.

141 Ibid. Abate observes that only after four decades of being ‘mainstreamed’ has the concept of environmental ‘rights’ gained broader acceptance: Abate, R.S., ‘Introduction’, in R.S. Abate (ed.), What Can Animal Law Learn from Environmental Law? (Environmental Law Institute, 2015) pp. xxiii–xxxi Google Scholar, at xxxi.

142 Burke, K., ‘Can We Stand For It? Amending the Endangered Species Act with an Animal-Suit Provision’ (2004) 75 University of Colorado Law Review, pp. 633–666 Google Scholar, at 654.

143 Boyle, n. 19 above, p. 192.

144 J. Lovvorn, quoted in Cassuto, D., Lovvorn, J. & Meyer, K., ‘Legal Standing for Animals and Advocates’ (2006) 13 Animal Law, pp. 61–86 Google Scholar, at 79.

145 O’Sullivan terms this the ‘internal inconsistency’ – namely, the fact that animals of the same species are treated differently depending on their public visibility: O’Sullivan, S., Animals, Equality and Democracy (Palgrave MacMillan, 2011), p. 23 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

146 Bryant, n. 49 above, p. 300.

147 Ibid.

148 UNGA Resolution A/RES/37/7, 18 Oct. 1982, available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/a37r007.htm.

149 The Swiss Constitution provides that ‘[t]he Confederation shall legislate on the protection of animals’, including by regulating ‘the use of animals’ and ‘the killing of animals’: Art. 80, Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, 18 Apr. 1999, available at: https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19995395/201601010000/101.pdf (official translation). The German Constitution provides that ‘[m]indful also of its responsibility towards future generations, the state shall protect the natural foundations of life and animals by legislation and, in accordance with law and justice, by executive and judicial action’: Art 20a, Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 23 May 1949, available at: https://www.bundestag.de/blob/284870/ce0d03414872b427e57fccb703634dcd/basic_law-data.pdf (official translation). See also K. Connolly, ‘German Animals Given Legal Rights’, The Guardian, 22 June 2002, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jun/22/germany.animalwelfare; Francione, G.L. & Charlton, A.E., ‘Animal Law: A Proposal for a New Direction’, in Peters, Stucki & Boscardin (eds), n. 66 above, pp. 33–65 Google Scholar, at 41.

150 Wissenburg, M. & Schlosberg, D., ‘Introduction’, in M. Wissenburg & D. Schlosberg (eds), Political Animals and Animal Politics (Palgrave MacMillan, 2014), p. 9 Google Scholar. See also Borràs, who describes the recent increase in environmental laws which reject anthropocentrism and ‘recognize our interconnectedness with the natural world’: Borràs, S., ‘New Transitions from Human Rights to the Environment to the Rights of Nature’ (2016) 5(1) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 113–143 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 113.

151 See, e.g., Cornell, N., ‘In Defense of Animals’ (2015) 2(2) Penn Undergraduate Law Journal, pp. 1–11 Google Scholar, at 1.

152 Sunstein (2000), n. 59 above, p. 1336. See also Peters, n. 71 above, pp. 11–13.

153 Tilikum v. Sea World, n. 18 above, p. 1264.

154 People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 405 (1854), cited in Stone, n. 1 above, p. 454.

155 Boyle, n. 19 above, p. 183.

156 Tilikum v. Sea World, n. 18 above, p. 1264.

157 Bevilaqua, n. 74 above, p. 79.

158 Ibid., p. 80.

159 Ibid.

160 Ibid.

161 NhRP, ‘Appellate Court Enters Two Orders re Tommy Lawsuit’, 16 Jul. 2014, available at: http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2014/07/16/appellate-court-enters-two-orders-re-tommy-lawsuit.

162 Ibid.

163 Boyle, n. 19 above, p. 185.

164 McCann, M. & Silverstein, H., ‘Rethinking Law’s “Allurements”: A Relational Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United States’, in A. Sarat & S. Scheingold (eds), Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities (Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 261–292 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 270–1.

165 Ibid., p. 263.

166 Ibid., pp. 261, 270.

167 Ibid., p. 270.

168 Maher, n. 78 above, pp. 53, 59–60.

169 Bourke, D., ‘The Use and Misuse of “Rights Talk” by the Animal Rights Movement’, in P. Sankoff & S. White (eds), Animal Law in Australasia: A New Dialogue (The Federation Press, 2009), pp. 128–150 Google Scholar, at 149.

170 Bevilaqua, n. 74 above, pp. 83–4.

171 Ibid., p. 84.

172 Bryant, n. 49 above, p. 266 (emphasis in original).

173 Steiner, G., Anthropocentrism and its Discontents (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

174 Ibid., pp. 249–50.

175 Ibid., p. 250.

176 Bourke, n. 169 above, p. 147.

177 Maher, n. 78 above, p. 53.

178 Boyle, n. 19 above, p. 184.

179 Francione, n. 44 above, p. 109.

180 Bevilaqua, n. 74 above, p. 75.

181 Naffine, n. 9 above, p. 8.

182 Stone, n. 1 above, p. 456.