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Unbundling the Regime Complex: The Effects of Private Authority

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 May 2016

Jessica F. Green  and
Graeme Auld
Jessica F. Green
Affiliation:
New York University, Department of Environmental Studies, New York, NY (United States). Email: jessica.green@nyu.edu (corresponding author: Green and Auld are equal authors).
Graeme Auld
Affiliation:
Carleton University, School of Public Policy and Administration, Ottawa, ON (Canada). Email: graeme.auld@carleton.ca.
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Abstract

The work on ‘regime complexes’ – loosely coupled regimes linked through non-hierarchical relationships – provides a lens for understanding the increasing density of international rules and institutions. However, the role of private authority in the regime complex – situations where non-state actors set rules or standards that other actors adopt – has only recently received academic attention. In this article, we ‘unbundle’ the concept of the regime complex in two novel ways. Firstly, we argue that an accurate depiction of any regime complex must also include private authority. Secondly, using examples from environmental governance, we carefully elaborate four specific mechanisms through which public and private authority interact, demonstrating the ways in which private authority can improve the problem-solving capacity of regime complexes. In short, a full understanding of the contributions of private authority to solving environmental problems requires examining its interactions with public rules and institutions.

Keywords

Environmental governanceRegime complexInternational cooperationPrivate authority
Type
Articles
Information
Transnational Environmental Law , Volume 6 , Issue 2 , July 2017 , pp. 259 - 284
Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 2016 

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Footnotes

We thank Jennifer Hadden, Virginia Haufler, Robert Keohane, and Stacy Vandeveer for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. We also appreciated the feedback received from participants at the Transnational Governance Interactions: Theoretical Approaches, Empirical Contexts and Practitioners’ Perspectives workshop held at the European University Institute in Florence (Italy), in May 2011, and at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association held in Seattle, WA (US), in Sept. 2011. The final article benefited considerably from the comments of four referees for TEL.

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102 N. 81 above.

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105 Kingdon (n. 68 above, Ch. 8) describes the key moment when an idea is finally considered viable as the opening of the ‘policy window’.

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113 Subsequent research has documented rent-seeking behaviour in both Indonesia and Brazil: see, respectively, Bohman, M., Jarvis, L. & Barichello, R., ‘Rent Seeking and International Commodity Agreements: The Case of Coffee’ (1996) 44(2) Economic Development and Cultural Change, pp. 379–404 Google Scholar; Jarvis, L.S., ‘The Rise and Decline of Rent-Seeking Activity in the Brazilian Coffee Sector: Lessons from the Imposition and Removal of Coffee Export Quotas’ (2005) 33(11) World Development, pp. 1881–1903 Google Scholar. In both cases, considerable waste was incurred as a result of efforts taken to capture ICA quotas: see Ullman, R.H., ‘Human Rights and Economic Power: The United States versus Idi Amin’ (1978) 56(3) Foreign Affairs, pp. 529–543 Google Scholar.

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119 Ibid.

120 MSC, MSC Fishery Standard: Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Fishing (MSC, 2010), available at: http://www.msc.org/documents/scheme-documents/msc-standards/MSC_environmental_standard_for_sustainable_fishing.pdf.

121 N. 92 above; Auld, n. 60 above, p. 192.

122 Wright, A. & Doulman, D.J., ‘Drift-Net Fishing in the South Pacific: From Controversy to Management’ (1991) 15(5) Marine Policy, pp. 303–329 Google Scholar.

123 UNGA Resolution A/RES/44/225, ‘Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and Its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World’s Oceans and Seas’, 22 Dec. 1989, available at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r225.htm; Jenkins, J.K., ‘International Regulation of Driftnet Fishing: The Role of Environmental Activism and Leverage Diplomacy’ (1993) 4(1) Indiana International & Comparative Law Review, pp. 197–218 Google Scholar.

124 Baird, I. & Quastel, N., ‘Dolphin-safe Tuna from California to Thailand: Localisms in Environmental Certification of Global Commodity Networks’ (2011) 101(2) Annals of the Association of American Geographers, pp. 337–355 Google Scholar.

125 Miller and Bush report that 450 companies are certified as dolphin safe, which EII reports cover 90% of the market: Miller, A.M.M. & Bush, S.R., ‘Authority Without Credibility? Competition and Conflict Between Ecolabels in Tuna Fisheries’ (2015) 107 Journal of Cleaner Production, pp. 137–145 Google Scholar. According to the EII website, the figure of 90% represents the companies that have committed to dolphin-safe fishing practices: see http://savedolphins.eii.org/campaigns/dsf.

126 Australian Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, National Carbon Offset Standard: Version 1, Nov. 2009, available at: http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/~/media/publications/carbon-accounting/revised-NCOS-standard-2010-pdf.ashx. See also J.F. Green, ‘Blurred Lines: Public–Private Interactions in Carbon Regulations’, unpublished manuscript, on file with the author.

127 N. 107 above.

128 EU, ‘Guidance Document for the EU Timber Regulations’, Sept. 2013, p. 14, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/forests/pdf/Final%20Guidance%20document.pdf.

129 Besky, S., ‘Colonial Pasts and Fair Trade Futures: Changing Modes of Production and Regulation on Darjeeling Tea Plantations’, in S. Lyon & M. Moberg (eds), Fair Trade and Social Justice: Global Ethnographies (New York Univesity Press, 2011), pp. 97–122 Google Scholar.

130 Auld, n. 60 above, pp. 204–5; Gulbrandsen & Auld, n. 65 above.

131 For discussion of group systems being promoted for Global GAP, see UNCTAD, Workshop on Environmental Requirements and Market Access for Developing Countries: How to Turn Challenges into Opportunities (United Nations, 2007).

132 Green, J.F., ‘Private Standards in the Climate Regime: The Case of the Greenhouse Gas Protocol’ (2010) 12(3) Business and Politics, available at: http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bap.2010.12.3/bap.2010.12.3.1318/bap.2010.12.3.1318.xml Google Scholar.