Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-mlc7c Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-10T08:17:05.707Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

A New Argument Against Critical-Level Utilitarianism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 April 2021

Patrick Williamson Open the ORCID record for Patrick Williamson [Opens in a new window]
Patrick Williamson*
Affiliation:
Australian National University, Canberra, Australia
*
*Corresponding author. Email: patrick.williamson@anu.edu.au
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

One prominent welfarist axiology, critical-level utilitarianism, says that individual lives must surpass a specified ‘critical level’ in order to make a positive contribution to the comparative status of a given population. In this article I develop a new dilemma for critical-level utilitarians. When comparatively evaluating populations composed of different species, critical-level utilitarians must decide whether the critical level is a universal threshold or whether the critical level is a species-relative threshold. I argue that both thresholds lead to a range of axiological puzzles and objections as yet undiscussed within the literature, and therefore conclude that critical-level utilitarianism should not be taken as a morally plausible welfarist axiology. I show that certain competitive formulations of critical range utilitarianism are subject to the argument too, and that further attempts to relativise critical levels to a particular group or category of welfare bearer (in particular, individual-relative critical levels) are unsustainable.

Type
Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , December 2021 , pp. 399 - 416
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Arrhenius, Gustaf. 2000a. An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies, Economics and Philosophy, 16(2): 247–66.10.1017/S0266267100000249CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Arrhenius, Gustaf. 2000b. Future Generations: A Challenge for Moral Theory (Uppsala: Uppsala University Printers).Google Scholar
Blackorby, C., Bossert, W. and Donaldson, D.. 1996. Quasi-Orderings and Population Ethics, Social Choice and Welfare, 13: 129–51.10.1007/BF00183348CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blackorby, C., Bossert, W. and Donaldson, D.. 1997. Critical-Level Utilitarianism and the Population Ethics Dilemma, Economics and Philosophy, 13(2): 197–230.10.1017/S026626710000448XCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blackorby, C., Bossert, W. and Donaldson, D.. 2005. Population Issues in Social Choice Theory, Welfare Economics, and Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press).10.1017/CCOL0521825512CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blackorby, C. and Donaldson, D.. 1984. Social Criteria for Evaluating Population Change, Journal of Public Economics, 25: 13–33.10.1016/0047-2727(84)90042-2CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Broome, John. 2004. Weighing Lives (Oxford: Oxford University Press).10.1093/019924376X.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greaves, Hilary. 2017. Population Axiology, Philosophy Compass, 12(11): 1–15.10.1111/phc3.12442CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Griffin, James. 1986. Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
Gustafsson, Johan E. 2020. Population Axiology and the Possibility of a Fourth Category of Absolute Value, Economics and Philosophy, 26(1): 81–110.10.1017/S0266267119000087CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McMahan, Jeff. 1996. Cognitive Disabilities, Misfortune, and Justice, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 25(1): 3–35.10.1111/j.1088-4963.1996.tb00074.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Parfit, Derek. 1984. Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
Parfit, Derek. 2016. Can We Avoid the Repugnant Conclusion?, Theoria, 82(2): 110–27.10.1111/theo.12097CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sebo, Jeff. n.d. Animals and Climate Change, Philosophy and Climate Change, forthcoming.Google Scholar
Tännsjö, Torbjörn. 2002. Why We Ought to Accept the Repugnant Conclusion, Utilitas, 14(3): 339–59.10.1017/S0953820800003642CrossRefGoogle Scholar