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Agent-Relative Consequentialism and Collective Self-Defeat
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 April 2020
Abstract
Andrew Forcehimes and Luke Semrau argue that agent-relative consequentialism is implausible because in some circumstances it classes an act as impermissible yet holds that the outcome of all agents performing that impermissible act is preferable. I argue that their problem is closely related to Derek Parfit's problem of ‘direct collective self-defeat’ and show how Parfit's plausible solution to his problem can be adapted to solve their problem.
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References
1 Forcehimes, Andrew T. and Semrau, Luke, ‘Non-Compliance Shouldn't Be Better’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2019), pp. 46–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 See Parfit, Derek, ‘Prudence, Morality and the Prisoner's Dilemma’, Proceedings of the British Academy 65 (1979), pp. 539–64Google Scholar, and Parfit, Derek, Reasons and Persons (Oxford, 1984), pp. 95–110Google Scholar.
3 The wording closely follows Forcehimes and Semrau, ‘Non-Compliance Shouldn't Be Better’, p. 51.
4 Forcehimes and Semrau, ‘Non-Compliance Shouldn't Be Better’, p. 53.
5 See the table in Forcehimes and Semrau, ‘Non-Compliance Shouldn't Be Better’, p. 53.
6 See Parfit, ‘Prudence, Morality and the Prisoner's Dilemma’, and Reasons and Persons, pp. 95–110.
7 Parfit Reasons and Persons, pp. 53–54.
8 Parfit Reasons and Persons, pp. 95–98.
9 They appear to acknowledge this in Forcehimes, Andrew T. and Semrau, Luke, Thinking through Utilitarianism (Hackett, 2019), p. 71Google Scholar.
10 For example, see Hare, Casper, The Limits of Kindness (Oxford 2013), p. 91CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
11 Theories that entail the converse are also possible, although they seem less plausible; for example, a theory that requires you to kill the one, yet says that you have most reason to prefer that you do not kill them.
12 Parfit Reasons and Persons, pp. 100–110.
13 See Parfit Reasons and Persons, pp. 100–102. Parfit states these conditions in terms of the Parent's Dilemma. I have rewritten them to apply to all cases of direct collective self-defeat. I have also left out a third revision (R3) that further elaborates on R2.
14 Sen, Amartya, ‘Rights and Agency’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (1982), pp. 3–39Google Scholar, is widely regarded as the first presentation of agent-relative consequentialism; however, he sketches the view very broadly. Parfit's Reasons and Persons does not engage with Sen's work and appears to assume that consequentialism is necessarily agent-neutral.
15 Parfit's two provisos for R2, suitably adjusted, obviously apply here.
16 I am not aware of anyone who has raised this criticism in print. However, it seems to be a serious enough concern to deserve a response.
17 Parfit Reasons and Persons, p. 108.
18 This response will only appeal to those who are willing to accept Parfit's ‘second mistake in moral mathematics’. It is not an entirely uncontroversial thesis and has been disputed by Jackson, Frank, ‘Which Effects?’, Reading Parfit, ed. Dancy, Johnathan (Oxford, 1997), pp. 42–53Google Scholar.
19 See Gruzalski, Bart, ‘Parfit's Unified Theory of Morality’, Philosophical Studies 50 (1986), pp. 143–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kuflik, Arthur, ‘A Defense of Common-Sense Morality’, Ethics 96 (1986), pp. 784–803CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sowden, Lanning, ‘Parfit on Self-Interest, Common-sense Morality and Consequentialism’, The Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1986), pp. 515–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Setiya, Kieran, ‘Parfit on Direct Self-Defeat’, The Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1999), pp. 239–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Parfit, Derek, ‘Comments’, Ethics 96 (1986), pp. 832–72, at 851CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for a significant concession to these critics.
20 I am grateful to Ryan Cox, Sovan Patra, and two anonymous referees from this journal for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.