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Collective Obligations and the Institutional Critique of Effective Altruism: A Reply to Alexander Dietz

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2019

Brian Berkey
Brian Berkey*
Affiliation:
University of Pennsylvania
*
Corresponding author. Email: bberkey@wharton.upenn.edu
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Abstract

In a recent article in this journal, Alexander Dietz argues that what I have called the ‘institutional critique of effective altruism’ is best understood as grounded in the claim that ‘EA relies on an overly individualistic approach to ethics, neglecting the importance of our collective obligations’. In this reply, I argue that Dietz's view does not represent a plausible interpretation of the institutional critiques offered by others, primarily because, unlike Dietz, they appear to believe that their critiques provide reasons to reject the EA view about the content of our individual obligations. I also argue that EA's identity as a social movement provides grounds for denying Dietz's claim that it is objectionably incomplete.

Type
Reply
Information
Utilitas , Volume 31 , Issue 3 , September 2019 , pp. 326 - 333
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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References

1 Berkey, Brian, ‘The Institutional Critique of Effective Altruism’, Utilitas 30 (2018), pp. 143–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Dietz, Alexander, ‘Effective Altruism and Collective Obligations’, Utilitas 31 (2019), pp. 106–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 107.

3 Dietz, ‘Effective Altruism and Collective Obligations’, pp. 107, 112–13. See also Dietz, , ‘What We Together Ought to Do’, Ethics 126 (2016), pp. 955–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Dietz, ‘Effective Altruism and Collective Obligations’, p. 109; Dietz, ‘What We Together Ought to Do’, pp. 960–3.

5 Berkey, ‘The Institutional Critique of Effective Altruism’, pp. 155–6.

6 Dietz, ‘Effective Altruism and Collective Obligations’, p. 111.

7 Dietz, ‘Effective Altruism and Collective Obligations’, pp. 112–13.

8 MacAskill, William, Doing Good Better: How Effective Altruism Can Help You Make a Difference (New York, 2015)Google Scholar, ch. 2.

9 Judith Lichtenberg, ‘Peter Singer's Extremely Altruistic Heirs’, New Republic (November 2015), <https://newrepublic.com/article/124690/peter-singers-extremely-altruistic-heirs> [accessed 25 September 2018].

10 Lichtenberg, Judith, Distant Strangers: Ethics, Psychology, and Global Poverty (New York: 2014)Google Scholar, p. 68, italics added.

11 Lichtenberg, ‘Peter Singer's Extremely Altruistic Heirs’.

12 Srinivasan, Amia, ‘Stop the Robot Apocalypse’, London Review of Books 37 (2015), pp. 3–6Google Scholar, <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n18/amia-srinivasan/stop-the-robot-apocalypse> [accessed 25 September 2018].

13 Srinivasan, ‘Stop the Robot Apocalypse’.

14 Srinivasan, ‘Stop the Robot Apocalypse’.

15 Lisa Herzog, ‘Can “Effective Altruism” Really Change the World?’, OpenDemocracy.net (February 2016), <https://www.opendemocracy.net/transformation/lisa-herzog/can-effective-altruism-really-change-world#> [accessed 25 September 2018].

16 Dietz, ‘Effective Altruism and Collective Obligations’, p. 107.

17 Singer, Peter, The Most Good You Can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas About Living Ethically (New Haven, 2015), pp. 4–5Google Scholar.

18 Dietz, ‘Effective Altruism and Collective Obligations’, p. 113.

19 Singer, The Most Good You Can Do, ch. 1.

20 Singer, Peter, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 1 (1972), pp. 229–43Google Scholar.

21 Dietz, ‘Effective Altruism and Collective Obligations’, p. 111.

22 Regan, Donald, Utilitarianism and Cooperation (Oxford, 1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, ch. 8.

23 Goodin, Robert, ‘Excused by the Unwillingness of Others’, Analysis 72 (2012), pp. 18–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

24 Dietz offers an objection to views of this kind that is, in my view, at least fairly compelling (‘What We Together Ought to Do’, p. 962). But because his aim in the article to which I am responding is to argue that EAs, qua EAs, ought to accept the view that collectives as such can be the bearers of obligations, what he would need to show in order for the argument to succeed is that alternative views such as Regan's and Goodin's cannot account for the requirement that EAs stand willing to cooperate, and in particular to pool resources, with others who are committed to contributing to bringing about the most good possible. Because their views can account for that requirement, there is no reason that EA as a movement needs to take a position on the success or failure of Dietz's objection to them.

25 I am grateful to the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University and the Berggruen Institute for their support of this work.