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Consequentialism and the Wrong Kind of Reasons: A Reply to Lang

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 July 2010

JOHN BRUNERO
JOHN BRUNERO*
Affiliation:
University of Missouri, St Louisbruneroj@umsl.edu
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Abstract

In his article ‘The Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem’, Gerald Lang formulates the buck-passing account of value so as to resolve the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. I argue against his formulation of buck-passing. Specifically, I argue that his formulation of buck-passing is not compatible with consequentialism (whether direct or indirect), and so it should be rejected.

Type
Research Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 22 , Issue 3 , September 2010 , pp. 351 - 359
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

1 Scanlon, T. M., What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA, 1998), p. 96Google Scholar. Some authors helpfully distinguish the two theses presented here: the negative thesis that being good is not a property that provides reasons for certain responses, and the positive thesis that for something to be good is simply for it to have the property of having other properties that do provide such reasons. See, for instance, Väyrynen, Pekka, ‘Resisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value’, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, i, ed. Shafer-Landau, Russ (Oxford, 2006), pp. 295–300Google Scholar. This article focuses on a problem for the positive thesis.

2 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, p. 97.

3 See Rabinowicz, Wlodek and Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni, ‘The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-attitudes and Value’, Ethics 114 (2004), pp. 391–423, at p. 400CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Lang, Gerald, ‘The Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem’, Utilitas 20 (2008), pp. 472–89, at pp. 472–3CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 The problem was first posed with this label by Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen in ‘The Strike of the Demon’, though, as they acknowledge, it is the same problem as the ‘conflation problem’ for fitting-attitude theorists introduced in D'Arms, Justin and Jacobson, Daniel, ‘Sentiment and Value’, Ethics 110 (2000), pp. 722–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar. There have been a number of attempts to solve the problem, and a number of difficulties posed for those attempts. See also, for instance, Olson, Jonas, ‘Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons’, Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2004), pp. 295–300CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stratton-Lake, Philip, ‘How to Deal with Evil Demons: Comment on Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen’, Ethics 155 (2005), pp. 788–98CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rabinowicz, Wlodek and Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni, ‘Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons’ Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2006), pp. 114–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Danielson, Sven and Olson, Jonas, ‘Brentano and the Buck-Passers’, Mind 116 (2007), pp. 511–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Skorupski, John, ‘Buck-Passing about Goodness’, Hommage á Woldek: Philosophical Essays Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz, ed. Egonsson, D., Josefsson, J., Petersson, B. and Ronnow-Rasmussen, T. (Lund, 2007)Google Scholar.

6 This is a simplified version of Lang's (ED2) case (see Lang, ‘The Right Kind of Solution’, p. 474). There are some differences that don't matter for the argument here. For instance, in Lang's Evil Demon cases, unlike other appearances of Evil Demon cases in the literature, the attitude that is called for is not admiration but ‘valuing’. And according to (ED2), the Demon threatens us with punishment unless we ‘value him for his own sake’. Nothing hinges on these differences.

7 Lang, ‘The Right Kind of Solution’, p. 484.

8 Pettit, Philip, ‘Consequentialism’, A Companion to Ethics, ed. Singer, Peter (Oxford, 1991), pp. 205–18, at p. 231Google Scholar.

9 Pettit, ‘Consequentialism’, pp. 230–1.

10 See Pettit, ‘Consequentialism’, pp. 232–3, regarding the former task, and Wiland, Eric, ‘How Indirect Can Indirect Utilitarianism Be?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007), pp. 275–301CrossRefGoogle Scholar, regarding the latter. There is indeed now a quite extensive literature on indirect utilitarianism. Wiland's article presents a useful taxonomy of six different ways one could be an indirect utilitarian.

11 I'll leave open which ‘lower-order’ properties of personal loyalties provide us with a reason to have the attitudes that the consequentialist thinks we have reason to have towards personal loyalties. Presumably, the indirect consequentialist would claim that one reason-providing property of personal loyalties is the fact that they are such that directly aiming to promote them is not the most efficient way of promoting them.

12 It may be, as Scanlon notes in commenting on Pettit, that honoring is not a single attitude, but is constituted by a set of various attitudes. See Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, pp. 384, n. 20. This doesn't matter for the argument here. Suppose that honoring is constituted by a set of attitudes. According to the indirect consequentialist, one has reason to have that set of attitudes only because having that set of attitudes provides certain benefits: doing so best promotes personal loyalties. It would thus follow, in the way specified in the text, from (Modified BPV6) that personal loyalties are not good.

13 Connoisseurs of the WKRP may be interested in how my example of indirect consequentialism relates to a somewhat similar example often discussed in the literature: the paradox of hedonism. According to the paradox of hedonism, as it's usually presented, the best way to get pleasure is not to aim to get pleasure, but to aim to get other things, like knowledge or freedom. (This case is first discussed in Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen, ‘The Strike of the Demon’, p. 403.) Note that the idea here is that we have a reason to have a different object for some attitude; we have a reason to aim to obtain knowledge or freedom, instead of aiming to obtain pleasure itself. But my example involving indirect consequentialism is slightly different. It's not that one has reason to have a different object to one's attitude – the relevant object of one's attitudes (personal loyalties) remains the same throughout – but it's just that one has reason to have a different attitude toward that object (to honor personal loyalties, instead of aiming to promote them).

14 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, p. 98.

15 Others have argued that buck-passing in general is biased in favor of consequentialism and against deontology. See Dancy, Jonathan, ‘Should we Pass the Buck?’, Philosophy, the True, the Good and the Beautiful, ed. O'Hear, Anthony (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 159–73, at p. 168Google Scholar. I here say nothing about this worry about buck-passing in general. I'm simply arguing here that Lang's particular formulation of buck-passing is not compatible with consequentialism.

16 Thanks to Eric Wiland for valuable discussions about both consequentialism and value.