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I, Trolley: Self-Redirection and Hybrid Trolley Cases

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2021

Dustin Locke Open the ORCID record for Dustin Locke [Opens in a new window]
Dustin Locke*
Affiliation:
Claremont McKenna College, Claremont, USA
*
locke.dt@gmail.com
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Abstract

While it is permissible to switch the trolley in the classic Switch case, it is not permissible to push the stranger in the classic Footbridge (aka, ‘Push’) case. But what may we do in cases that offer both a ‘switch-like’ option and a ‘push-like’ option? Surprisingly, we may choose the push-like option, provided that it has better consequences than the switch-like option. We arrive at this conclusion by taking ourselves seriously – not just as agents who might redirect threats – but as threats who might be redirected by agents.

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Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , December 2021 , pp. 458 - 473
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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