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Moral Risk and Humane Farming
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2019
Abstract
Humane farming, that is, a husbandry system where animals do not suffer, either during their lives, or at the time of their killing, has been advertised as an ethical alternative to the horrors of factory farming. Although it could be argued that such a system does not currently exist, we ought to determine whether this is a morally desirable end to strive for. My objective is to assess one of the utilitarian arguments used in the debate about humane farming. In particular, I am interested in whether we have risk-related reasons to argue against the implementation of this practice. I will argue, against de Lazari-Radek and Singer, that considerations of moral risk should lead us to reject the practice of humane farming. In doing so, I will engage with arguments dealing with both the badness of animal death and the value of coming into existence.
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38 I am deeply indebted to Neil Levy and Stephen Bennett for helpful comments on previous drafts of this article. I am also grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their input.