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Parfit on Act Consequentialism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 May 2020

Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek  and
Peter Singer Open the ORCID record for Peter Singer [Opens in a new window]
Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek*
Affiliation:
Institute of Philosophy, University of Lodz
Peter Singer
Affiliation:
University Center for Human Values, Princeton University
*
*Corresponding author. Email:katarzyna.delazari@uni.lodz.pl
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Abstract

In the first two volumes of On What Matters, Derek Parfit argues that three major normative theories – Kantianism, Contractualism and Rule Consequentialism – are, in their most defensible forms, compatible, and can be reconciled in what he calls ‘Triple Theory’. This has led many to assume that Parfit does not believe that Act Consequentialism is a defensible form of Consequentialism. We draw on correspondence with Parfit to show that this assumption is incorrect. We then consider Parfit's efforts, in the third volume of On What Matters, to narrow the differences between Act Consequentialism and the triple theory, in part by treating impartial rationality as an external rival to morality, in much the same way that egoism is an external rival to morality. We argue that Parfit's attempts to bridge the gap between Act Consequentialism and Triple Theory meet with only limited success.

Type
Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 32 , Issue 4 , December 2020 , pp. 416 - 426
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

1 Parfit, Derek, On What Matters, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 419Google Scholar.

2 Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 1, p. 417.

3 This and the following passages are quoted from an attachment to an email sent by Parfit to Singer on 9 May 2011. Note also that, as explained below, in On What Matters, vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), Parfit returns to the passage just quoted, saying that in it he made ‘a bad mistake’ (Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 3, p. 419).

4 Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 3, p. 344.

5 Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 3, p. 177.

6 de Lazari-Radek, Katarzyna and Singer, Peter, The Point of View of the Universe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 162–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 We thank Ketan Ramakrishnan for this point.

8 Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 3, pp. 346–47.

9 Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 3, p. 348.

10 Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 3, p. 367.

11 Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 3, p. 368.

12 Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 3, p. 366.

13 Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 3, pp. 400–401.

14 Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 3, p. 401.

15 Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 3, p. 402.

16 Sidgwick, Henry, The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn (London: Macmillan, 1907), p. 397Google Scholar.

17 For more on debunking explanations in ethics, see Lazari-Radek, Katarzyna de and Singer, Peter, The Point of View of the Universe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 179–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 3, p. 414.

19 Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 3, pp. 414–15.

20 Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, p. 490.

21 We thank Roger Crisp and Tyler Paytas, each of whom independently suggested this point to us.

22 Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 3, p. 416.

23 Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 3, p. 418.

24 Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 3, p. 418.

25 We owe points in the preceding paragraph to Jake Nebel (personal communication).

26 Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 3, p. 419.

27 Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 3, p. 420.

28 We thank two anonymous reviewers for Utilitas for comments that have improved this article.