No CrossRef data available.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 March 2009
In ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’ Wayne Sumner argues that (1) as a matter of necessity, virtue is intrinsically prudentially rewarding, and (2) if all else is equal, the virtuous will fare better than the non-virtuous. In this article, I reproduce and criticize those arguments. I offer several objections to the argument for the first thesis; each objection makes the same basic point: contrary to what Sumner assumes, certain contingent facts over and above a person's being virtuous have to obtain if virtue is to issue in any prudential reward. I object to Sumner's second thesis by arguing that moral neutrality can be at least as welfare-enhancing as moral virtuosity. Finally, I argue that even if virtue were intrinsically rewarding in the way Sumner envisions, it would still be impossible to determine a priori whether adopting a virtuous lifestyle would be prudentially rational.
1 See Plato, Apology 28b–c and Crito 48d for Socrates' view; Plato, Republic 441c–445b for Plato's own view; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, esp. book II for Aristotle's view. For other references, see Annas, Julia, The Morality of Happiness (New York, 1993)Google Scholar.
2 See David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, chs. 2–5; John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, chs. 1–3; and Sidgwick, Henry, The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn. (London, 1907), pp. 396–7Google Scholar. Also see Hooker, Brad, ‘Does Moral Virtue Constitute a Benefit to the Agent’, How Should One Live?, ed. Crisp, Roger (Oxford, 1996), pp. 141–55Google Scholar, for a more recent example.
3 Some example cases: (a) the person of good will who loses his family, friends and property to a natural disaster; (b) the person of good will who suffers tremendous chronic pain from an untreatable condition; (c) the greedy, cruel person who enjoys prosperity and good health.
4 Badhwar, Neera K., ‘Self-Interest and Virtue’, Social Philosophy and Policy 14.1 (1997), pp. 226–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hursthouse, Rosalind, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford, 1999)Google Scholar; Slote, Michael, Morals from Motives (New York, 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. chs. 6–7.
5 Here I have in mind practices like raising children, building and maintaining friendships, sharing resources, and working productively with others.
6 Sumner, L. W., ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’, Social Philosophy and Policy 15.1 (1998), pp. 18–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
7 Sumner, ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’, p. 32.
8 Sumner, ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’, p. 33.
9 Sumner, ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’, p. 36.
10 Sumner, ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’, p. 36.
11 Sumner, ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’, p. 32.
12 Sumner, ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’, p. 25.
13 Note: we will assume that no substantial motivational or emotional conditions have to be met in order for a person to count as being virtuous in any of these ways.
14 Sumner, ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’, p. 33.
15 Sumner, ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’, p. 33.
16 Sumner, ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’, p. 34.
17 Sumner, ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’, p. 34.
18 Sumner, ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’, p. 28. This notion of satisfaction is not to be confused with desire satisfaction. For a discussion of the difference between these attitudes, see Sumner, L. W., Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics (Oxford, 1996)Google Scholar, ch. 5.
19 Sumner, ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’, p. 28.
20 Sumner, ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’, p. 30.
21 Sumner, ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’, p. 29. For a more detailed discussion of these conditions, see Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics, ch. 6.
22 Sumner, ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’, p. 29.
23 Sumner, ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’, p. 33.
24 Sumner, ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’, pp. 33–5.
25 Sumner does not offer any additional justification for this premise. Since I won't be challenging the premise in this article, no further discussion of it is required.
26 Sumner, ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’, pp. 30–1.
27 Sumner, ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’, p. 36.
28 Sumner, ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’, p. 35.
29 A related objection: many religions urge their followers to develop attitudes like humility and meekness alongside behavioral traits like benevolence and justice. It seems likely that the combination of these attitudes and traits is bound to make some individuals either genuinely unaware of the fact that they are morally virtuous, or reluctant to admit the fact that they are morally virtuous. I suppose this could prevent many of these individuals from enjoying the satisfaction Sumner promises.
30 Though perhaps possessing perfect other-regarding virtue would. I say a few more words about this possibility in the conclusion of the article.
31 Sumner, ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’, p. 35.
32 Sumner, ‘Is Virtue Its Own Reward?’, p. 36.
33 Of course in depicting these lives, I do not mean to be implying that (e.g.) all criminals are vicious, or that all hospice workers and school teachers are virtuous, or that emergency aid workers are always more virtuous than business people, etc. I am merely using these job titles as devices for filling out the abstract structures of the lives in question.
34 Many thanks to Fred Feldman, Uri Leibowitz and Meghan Masto for helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.