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What if We Contain Multiple Morally Relevant Subjects?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 July 2022

Dustin Crummett Open the ORCID record for Dustin Crummett [Opens in a new window]
Dustin Crummett*
Affiliation:
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Munich, Germany
*
E-mail: dustin.crummett@gmail.com
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Abstract

First, I introduce the concept of a “non-agential subject,” where a non-agential subject (1) exists within an organism and (2) has phenomenally conscious experiences in a morally significant way, but (3) is not morally responsible for (some or all of) the organism's voluntary actions. Second, I argue that it's a live possibility that typical adult humans contain non-agential subjects. Finally, I argue that, if there are non-agential subjects, this has important and surprising implications for a variety of ethical issues. Accordingly, ethicists should pay more attention to whether there are non-agential subjects and what their implications for ethics would be.

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Article
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Utilitas , Volume 34 , Issue 3 , September 2022 , pp. 317 - 334
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Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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